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x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigation
[android-x86/kernel.git] / arch / x86 / include / asm / nospec-branch.h
1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
2
3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
5
6 #include <asm/alternative.h>
7 #include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
8 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
9 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
10
11 /*
12  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
13  *
14  * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
15  * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
16  *
17  * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
18  * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
19  * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
20  * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
21  * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
22  *
23  * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
24  * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
25  * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
26  */
27
28 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS         32      /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
29 #define RSB_FILL_LOOPS          16      /* To avoid underflow */
30
31 /*
32  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
33  * the optimal version — two calls, each with their own speculation
34  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
35  */
36 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)       \
37         mov     $(nr/2), reg;                   \
38 771:                                            \
39         call    772f;                           \
40 773:    /* speculation trap */                  \
41         pause;                                  \
42         lfence;                                 \
43         jmp     773b;                           \
44 772:                                            \
45         call    774f;                           \
46 775:    /* speculation trap */                  \
47         pause;                                  \
48         lfence;                                 \
49         jmp     775b;                           \
50 774:                                            \
51         dec     reg;                            \
52         jnz     771b;                           \
53         add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * nr, sp;
54
55 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
56
57 /*
58  * This should be used immediately before a retpoline alternative.  It tells
59  * objtool where the retpolines are so that it can make sense of the control
60  * flow by just reading the original instruction(s) and ignoring the
61  * alternatives.
62  */
63 .macro ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
64         .Lannotate_\@:
65         .pushsection .discard.nospec
66         .long .Lannotate_\@ - .
67         .popsection
68 .endm
69
70 /*
71  * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
72  * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
73  * builds.
74  */
75 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
76         .Lannotate_\@:
77         .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
78         _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
79         .popsection
80 .endm
81
82 /*
83  * These are the bare retpoline primitives for indirect jmp and call.
84  * Do not use these directly; they only exist to make the ALTERNATIVE
85  * invocation below less ugly.
86  */
87 .macro RETPOLINE_JMP reg:req
88         call    .Ldo_rop_\@
89 .Lspec_trap_\@:
90         pause
91         lfence
92         jmp     .Lspec_trap_\@
93 .Ldo_rop_\@:
94         mov     \reg, (%_ASM_SP)
95         ret
96 .endm
97
98 /*
99  * This is a wrapper around RETPOLINE_JMP so the called function in reg
100  * returns to the instruction after the macro.
101  */
102 .macro RETPOLINE_CALL reg:req
103         jmp     .Ldo_call_\@
104 .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@:
105         RETPOLINE_JMP \reg
106 .Ldo_call_\@:
107         call    .Ldo_retpoline_jmp_\@
108 .endm
109
110 /*
111  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
112  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
113  * attack.
114  */
115 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
116 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
117         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
118         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg),  \
119                 __stringify(RETPOLINE_JMP \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
120                 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
121 #else
122         jmp     *\reg
123 #endif
124 .endm
125
126 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
127 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
128         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
129         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), \
130                 __stringify(RETPOLINE_CALL \reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,\
131                 __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
132 #else
133         call    *\reg
134 #endif
135 .endm
136
137  /*
138   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
139   * monstrosity above, manually.
140   */
141 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
142 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
143         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
144         ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@",                                \
145                 __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP))    \
146                 \ftr
147 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
148 #endif
149 .endm
150
151 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
152
153 #define ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE                             \
154         "999:\n\t"                                              \
155         ".pushsection .discard.nospec\n\t"                      \
156         ".long 999b - .\n\t"                                    \
157         ".popsection\n\t"
158
159 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
160         "999:\n\t"                                              \
161         ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"              \
162         _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"                                    \
163         ".popsection\n\t"
164
165 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && defined(RETPOLINE)
166
167 /*
168  * Since the inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC,
169  * the 64-bit one is dependent on RETPOLINE not CONFIG_RETPOLINE.
170  */
171 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
172         ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE                             \
173         ALTERNATIVE(                                            \
174         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
175         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
176         "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",         \
177         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
178 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
179
180 #elif defined(CONFIG_X86_32) && defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
181 /*
182  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
183  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
184  * here, anyway.
185  */
186 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
187         ALTERNATIVE(                                            \
188         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
189         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
190         "       jmp    904f;\n"                                 \
191         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
192         "901:   call   903f;\n"                                 \
193         "902:   pause;\n"                                       \
194         "       lfence;\n"                                      \
195         "       jmp    902b;\n"                                 \
196         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
197         "903:   addl   $4, %%esp;\n"                            \
198         "       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"                      \
199         "       ret;\n"                                         \
200         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
201         "904:   call   901b;\n",                                \
202         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
203
204 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
205 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
206 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
207 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
208 #endif
209
210 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
211 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
212         SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
213         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL,
214         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD,
215         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
216         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
217         SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
218 };
219
220 /*
221  * The Intel specification for the SPEC_CTRL MSR requires that we
222  * preserve any already set reserved bits at boot time (e.g. for
223  * future additions that this kernel is not currently aware of).
224  * We then set any additional mitigation bits that we want
225  * ourselves and always use this as the base for SPEC_CTRL.
226  * We also use this when handling guest entry/exit as below.
227  */
228 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set(u64);
229 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_get_default(void);
230
231 /*
232  * On VMENTER we must preserve whatever view of the SPEC_CTRL MSR
233  * the guest has, while on VMEXIT we restore the host view. This
234  * would be easier if SPEC_CTRL were architecturally maskable or
235  * shadowable for guests but this is not (currently) the case.
236  * Takes the guest view of SPEC_CTRL MSR as a parameter.
237  */
238 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(u64);
239 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(u64);
240
241 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
242 enum ssb_mitigation {
243         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
244         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
245 };
246
247 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
248 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
249
250 /*
251  * On VMEXIT we must ensure that no RSB predictions learned in the guest
252  * can be followed in the host, by overwriting the RSB completely. Both
253  * retpoline and IBRS mitigations for Spectre v2 need this; only on future
254  * CPUs with IBRS_ALL *might* it be avoided.
255  */
256 static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
257 {
258 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
259         unsigned long loops;
260
261         asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
262                       ALTERNATIVE("jmp 910f",
263                                   __stringify(__FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(%0, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, %1)),
264                                   X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE)
265                       "910:"
266                       : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
267                       : : "memory" );
268 #endif
269 }
270
271 static __always_inline
272 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
273 {
274         asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
275                 : : "c" (msr),
276                     "a" (val),
277                     "d" (val >> 32),
278                     [feature] "i" (feature)
279                 : "memory");
280 }
281
282 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
283 {
284         u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
285
286         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
287 }
288
289 /*
290  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
291  * before calling into firmware.
292  *
293  * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
294  */
295 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()                    \
296 do {                                                                    \
297         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default() | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;         \
298                                                                         \
299         preempt_disable();                                              \
300         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
301                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
302 } while (0)
303
304 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()                      \
305 do {                                                                    \
306         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_get_default();                          \
307                                                                         \
308         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
309                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
310         preempt_enable();                                               \
311 } while (0)
312
313 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
314
315 /*
316  * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
317  * for the following assembly:
318  *
319  * With retpolines configured:
320  *
321  *    callq do_rop
322  *  spec_trap:
323  *    pause
324  *    lfence
325  *    jmp spec_trap
326  *  do_rop:
327  *    mov %rax,(%rsp)
328  *    retq
329  *
330  * Without retpolines configured:
331  *
332  *    jmp *%rax
333  */
334 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
335 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE     17
336 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT()                                \
337         EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7);    /* callq do_rop */             \
338         /* spec_trap: */                                        \
339         EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90);       /* pause */                    \
340         EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */                   \
341         EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9);       /* jmp spec_trap */            \
342         /* do_rop: */                                           \
343         EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x04, 0x24); /* mov %rax,(%rsp) */    \
344         EMIT1(0xC3);             /* retq */
345 #else
346 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT_SIZE     2
347 # define RETPOLINE_RAX_BPF_JIT()                                \
348         EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0);       /* jmp *%rax */
349 #endif
350
351 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */