2 * AppArmor security module
4 * This file contains AppArmor LSM hooks.
6 * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
7 * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
10 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
11 * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
15 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
16 #include <linux/moduleparam.h>
18 #include <linux/mman.h>
19 #include <linux/mount.h>
20 #include <linux/namei.h>
21 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
22 #include <linux/ctype.h>
23 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
24 #include <linux/audit.h>
25 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
26 #include <linux/kmemleak.h>
29 #include "include/apparmor.h"
30 #include "include/apparmorfs.h"
31 #include "include/audit.h"
32 #include "include/capability.h"
33 #include "include/context.h"
34 #include "include/file.h"
35 #include "include/ipc.h"
36 #include "include/net.h"
37 #include "include/path.h"
38 #include "include/label.h"
39 #include "include/policy.h"
40 #include "include/policy_ns.h"
41 #include "include/procattr.h"
42 #include "include/mount.h"
44 /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
45 int apparmor_initialized;
47 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct aa_buffers, aa_buffers);
55 * free the associated aa_task_ctx and put its labels
57 static void apparmor_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
59 aa_free_task_context(cred_ctx(cred));
60 cred_ctx(cred) = NULL;
64 * allocate the apparmor part of blank credentials
66 static int apparmor_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
68 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
69 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
79 * prepare new aa_task_ctx for modification by prepare_cred block
81 static int apparmor_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
84 /* freed by apparmor_cred_free */
85 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(gfp);
90 aa_dup_task_context(ctx, cred_ctx(old));
96 * transfer the apparmor data to a blank set of creds
98 static void apparmor_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
100 const struct aa_task_ctx *old_ctx = cred_ctx(old);
101 struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(new);
103 aa_dup_task_context(new_ctx, old_ctx);
106 static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
109 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
112 tracer = begin_current_label_crit_section();
113 tracee = aa_get_task_label(child);
114 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee,
115 mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ ? AA_PTRACE_READ : AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
116 aa_put_label(tracee);
117 end_current_label_crit_section(tracer);
122 static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
124 struct aa_label *tracer, *tracee;
127 tracee = begin_current_label_crit_section();
128 tracer = aa_get_task_label(parent);
129 error = aa_may_ptrace(tracer, tracee, AA_PTRACE_TRACE);
130 aa_put_label(tracer);
131 end_current_label_crit_section(tracee);
136 /* Derived from security/commoncap.c:cap_capget */
137 static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
138 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
140 struct aa_label *label;
141 const struct cred *cred;
144 cred = __task_cred(target);
145 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
148 * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
149 * initialize effective and permitted.
151 if (!unconfined(label)) {
152 struct aa_profile *profile;
155 label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
156 if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))
158 *effective = cap_intersect(*effective,
159 profile->caps.allow);
160 *permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted,
161 profile->caps.allow);
170 static int apparmor_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
173 struct aa_label *label;
176 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
177 if (!unconfined(label))
178 error = aa_capable(label, cap, audit);
185 * common_perm - basic common permission check wrapper fn for paths
186 * @op: operation being checked
187 * @path: path to check permission of (NOT NULL)
188 * @mask: requested permissions mask
189 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
191 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
193 static int common_perm(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask,
194 struct path_cond *cond)
196 struct aa_label *label;
199 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
200 if (!unconfined(label))
201 error = aa_path_perm(op, label, path, 0, mask, cond);
202 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
208 * common_perm_cond - common permission wrapper around inode cond
209 * @op: operation being checked
210 * @path: location to check (NOT NULL)
211 * @mask: requested permissions mask
213 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
215 static int common_perm_cond(const char *op, const struct path *path, u32 mask)
217 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_uid,
218 d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_mode
221 if (!path_mediated_fs(path->dentry))
224 return common_perm(op, path, mask, &cond);
228 * common_perm_dir_dentry - common permission wrapper when path is dir, dentry
229 * @op: operation being checked
230 * @dir: directory of the dentry (NOT NULL)
231 * @dentry: dentry to check (NOT NULL)
232 * @mask: requested permissions mask
233 * @cond: conditional info for the permission request (NOT NULL)
235 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
237 static int common_perm_dir_dentry(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
238 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask,
239 struct path_cond *cond)
241 struct path path = { .mnt = dir->mnt, .dentry = dentry };
243 return common_perm(op, &path, mask, cond);
247 * common_perm_rm - common permission wrapper for operations doing rm
248 * @op: operation being checked
249 * @dir: directory that the dentry is in (NOT NULL)
250 * @dentry: dentry being rm'd (NOT NULL)
251 * @mask: requested permission mask
253 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
255 static int common_perm_rm(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
256 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask)
258 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
259 struct path_cond cond = { };
261 if (!inode || !path_mediated_fs(dentry))
264 cond.uid = inode->i_uid;
265 cond.mode = inode->i_mode;
267 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
271 * common_perm_create - common permission wrapper for operations doing create
272 * @op: operation being checked
273 * @dir: directory that dentry will be created in (NOT NULL)
274 * @dentry: dentry to create (NOT NULL)
275 * @mask: request permission mask
276 * @mode: created file mode
278 * Returns: %0 else error code if error or permission denied
280 static int common_perm_create(const char *op, const struct path *dir,
281 struct dentry *dentry, u32 mask, umode_t mode)
283 struct path_cond cond = { current_fsuid(), mode };
285 if (!path_mediated_fs(dir->dentry))
288 return common_perm_dir_dentry(op, dir, dentry, mask, &cond);
291 static int apparmor_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
293 return common_perm_rm(OP_UNLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
296 static int apparmor_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
299 return common_perm_create(OP_MKDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
303 static int apparmor_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
305 return common_perm_rm(OP_RMDIR, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_DELETE);
308 static int apparmor_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
309 umode_t mode, unsigned int dev)
311 return common_perm_create(OP_MKNOD, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE, mode);
314 static int apparmor_path_truncate(const struct path *path)
316 return common_perm_cond(OP_TRUNC, path, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR);
319 static int apparmor_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
320 const char *old_name)
322 return common_perm_create(OP_SYMLINK, dir, dentry, AA_MAY_CREATE,
326 static int apparmor_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir,
327 struct dentry *new_dentry)
329 struct aa_label *label;
332 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
335 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
336 if (!unconfined(label))
337 error = aa_path_link(label, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
338 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
343 static int apparmor_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
344 const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
346 struct aa_label *label;
349 if (!path_mediated_fs(old_dentry))
352 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
353 if (!unconfined(label)) {
354 struct path old_path = { .mnt = old_dir->mnt,
355 .dentry = old_dentry };
356 struct path new_path = { .mnt = new_dir->mnt,
357 .dentry = new_dentry };
358 struct path_cond cond = { d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_uid,
359 d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode
362 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_SRC, label, &old_path, 0,
363 MAY_READ | AA_MAY_GETATTR | MAY_WRITE |
364 AA_MAY_SETATTR | AA_MAY_DELETE,
367 error = aa_path_perm(OP_RENAME_DEST, label, &new_path,
368 0, MAY_WRITE | AA_MAY_SETATTR |
369 AA_MAY_CREATE, &cond);
372 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
377 static int apparmor_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
379 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHMOD, path, AA_MAY_CHMOD);
382 static int apparmor_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
384 return common_perm_cond(OP_CHOWN, path, AA_MAY_CHOWN);
387 static int apparmor_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
389 return common_perm_cond(OP_GETATTR, path, AA_MAY_GETATTR);
392 static int apparmor_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
394 struct aa_file_ctx *fctx = file_ctx(file);
395 struct aa_label *label;
398 if (!path_mediated_fs(file->f_path.dentry))
401 /* If in exec, permission is handled by bprm hooks.
402 * Cache permissions granted by the previous exec check, with
403 * implicit read and executable mmap which are required to
404 * actually execute the image.
406 if (current->in_execve) {
407 fctx->allow = MAY_EXEC | MAY_READ | AA_EXEC_MMAP;
411 label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred);
412 if (!unconfined(label)) {
413 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
414 struct path_cond cond = { inode->i_uid, inode->i_mode };
416 error = aa_path_perm(OP_OPEN, label, &file->f_path, 0,
417 aa_map_file_to_perms(file), &cond);
418 /* todo cache full allowed permissions set and state */
419 fctx->allow = aa_map_file_to_perms(file);
426 static int apparmor_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
430 /* freed by apparmor_file_free_security */
431 struct aa_label *label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
432 file->f_security = aa_alloc_file_ctx(label, GFP_KERNEL);
435 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
440 static void apparmor_file_free_security(struct file *file)
442 aa_free_file_ctx(file_ctx(file));
445 static int common_file_perm(const char *op, struct file *file, u32 mask)
447 struct aa_label *label;
450 /* don't reaudit files closed during inheritance */
451 if (file->f_path.dentry == aa_null.dentry)
454 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
455 error = aa_file_perm(op, label, file, mask);
456 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
461 static int apparmor_file_receive(struct file *file)
463 return common_file_perm(OP_FRECEIVE, file, aa_map_file_to_perms(file));
466 static int apparmor_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
468 return common_file_perm(OP_FPERM, file, mask);
471 static int apparmor_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
473 u32 mask = AA_MAY_LOCK;
478 return common_file_perm(OP_FLOCK, file, mask);
481 static int common_mmap(const char *op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
486 if (!file || !file_ctx(file))
489 if (prot & PROT_READ)
492 * Private mappings don't require write perms since they don't
493 * write back to the files
495 if ((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(flags & MAP_PRIVATE))
497 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
498 mask |= AA_EXEC_MMAP;
500 return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
503 static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
504 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
506 return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
509 static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
510 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot)
512 return common_mmap(OP_FMPROT, vma->vm_file, prot,
513 !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
516 static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path,
517 const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
519 struct aa_label *label;
523 if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
524 flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
526 flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
528 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
529 if (!unconfined(label)) {
530 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
531 error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data);
532 else if (flags & MS_BIND)
533 error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags);
534 else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
536 error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags);
537 else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
538 error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name);
540 error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type,
543 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
548 static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
550 struct aa_label *label;
553 label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
554 if (!unconfined(label))
555 error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags);
556 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
561 static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path,
562 const struct path *new_path)
564 struct aa_label *label;
567 label = aa_get_current_label();
568 if (!unconfined(label))
569 error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path);
575 static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
580 const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
581 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx = cred_ctx(cred);
582 struct aa_label *label = NULL;
584 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0)
585 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label);
586 else if (strcmp(name, "prev") == 0 && ctx->previous)
587 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->previous);
588 else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec)
589 label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec);
594 error = aa_getprocattr(label, value);
602 static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,
605 char *command, *largs = NULL, *args = value;
608 DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SETPROCATTR);
613 /* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */
614 if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
616 largs = args = kmalloc(size + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
619 memcpy(args, value, size);
625 command = strsep(&args, " ");
628 args = skip_spaces(args);
632 arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
633 if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
634 if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
635 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
637 } else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
638 error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
640 } else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
641 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_NOFLAGS);
642 } else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
643 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_TEST);
644 } else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0) {
645 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_STACK);
648 } else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
649 if (strcmp(command, "exec") == 0)
650 error = aa_change_profile(args, AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC);
651 else if (strcmp(command, "stack") == 0)
652 error = aa_change_profile(args, (AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC |
657 /* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
667 aad(&sa)->label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
668 aad(&sa)->info = name;
669 aad(&sa)->error = error = -EINVAL;
670 aa_audit_msg(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, &sa, NULL);
671 end_current_label_crit_section(aad(&sa)->label);
676 * apparmor_bprm_committing_creds - do task cleanup on committing new creds
677 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
679 static void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
681 struct aa_label *label = aa_current_raw_label();
682 struct aa_task_ctx *new_ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred);
684 /* bail out if unconfined or not changing profile */
685 if ((new_ctx->label->proxy == label->proxy) ||
686 (unconfined(new_ctx->label)))
689 aa_inherit_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
691 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
693 /* reset soft limits and set hard limits for the new label */
694 __aa_transition_rlimits(label, new_ctx->label);
698 * apparmor_bprm_committed_cred - do cleanup after new creds committed
699 * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL)
701 static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
703 /* TODO: cleanup signals - ipc mediation */
707 static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
708 unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
710 struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
713 if (!unconfined(label))
714 error = aa_task_setrlimit(label, task, resource, new_rlim);
715 __end_current_label_crit_section(label);
720 static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info,
723 struct aa_label *cl, *tl;
727 /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done.
728 * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior
731 cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
732 tl = aa_get_task_label(target);
733 error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig);
735 __end_current_label_crit_section(cl);
741 * apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field
743 static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t flags)
745 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx;
747 ctx = kzalloc(sizeof(*ctx), flags);
757 * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field
759 static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
761 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
764 aa_put_label(ctx->label);
765 aa_put_label(ctx->peer);
766 path_put(&ctx->path);
771 * apparmor_clone_security - clone the sk_security field
773 static void apparmor_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk,
776 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
777 struct aa_sk_ctx *new = SK_CTX(newsk);
779 new->label = aa_get_label(ctx->label);
780 new->peer = aa_get_label(ctx->peer);
781 new->path = ctx->path;
782 path_get(&new->path);
785 static int aa_sock_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
789 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
791 return aa_af_perm(label, OP_CREATE, AA_MAY_CREATE, family, type,
797 * apparmor_socket_create - check perms before creating a new socket
799 static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
801 struct aa_label *label;
804 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
805 if (!(kern || unconfined(label)))
806 error = aa_sock_create_perm(label, family, type, protocol);
807 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
813 * apparmor_socket_post_create - setup the per-socket security struct
816 * - kernel sockets currently labeled unconfined but we may want to
817 * move to a special kernel label
818 * - socket may not have sk here if created with sock_create_lite or
819 * sock_alloc. These should be accept cases which will be handled in
822 static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
823 int type, int protocol, int kern)
825 struct aa_label *label;
828 struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_current_ns();
830 label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(ns));
833 label = aa_get_current_label();
836 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sock->sk);
838 aa_put_label(ctx->label);
839 ctx->label = aa_get_label(label);
847 * apparmor_socket_bind - check perms before bind addr to socket
849 static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
850 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
855 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
857 return aa_sk_perm(OP_BIND, AA_MAY_BIND, sock->sk);
861 * apparmor_socket_connect - check perms before connecting @sock to @address
863 static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
864 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
869 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
871 return aa_sk_perm(OP_CONNECT, AA_MAY_CONNECT, sock->sk);
875 * apparmor_socket_list - check perms before allowing listen
877 static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
881 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
883 return aa_sk_perm(OP_LISTEN, AA_MAY_LISTEN, sock->sk);
887 * apparmor_socket_accept - check perms before accepting a new connection.
889 * Note: while @newsock is created and has some information, the accept
892 static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
897 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
899 return aa_sk_perm(OP_ACCEPT, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, sock->sk);
902 static int aa_sock_msg_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
903 struct msghdr *msg, int size)
908 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
910 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
914 * apparmor_socket_sendmsg - check perms before sending msg to another socket
916 static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
917 struct msghdr *msg, int size)
919 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_SENDMSG, AA_MAY_SEND, sock, msg, size);
923 * apparmor_socket_recvmsg - check perms before receiving a message
925 static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
926 struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
928 return aa_sock_msg_perm(OP_RECVMSG, AA_MAY_RECEIVE, sock, msg, size);
931 /* revaliation, get/set attr, shutdown */
932 static int aa_sock_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
936 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
938 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
942 * apparmor_socket_getsockname - check perms before getting the local address
944 static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
946 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETSOCKNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
950 * apparmor_socket_getpeername - check perms before getting remote address
952 static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
954 return aa_sock_perm(OP_GETPEERNAME, AA_MAY_GETATTR, sock);
957 /* revaliation, get/set attr, opt */
958 static int aa_sock_opt_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
959 int level, int optname)
963 AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
965 return aa_sk_perm(op, request, sock->sk);
969 * apparmor_getsockopt - check perms before getting socket options
971 static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
974 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_GETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_GETOPT, sock,
979 * apparmor_setsockopt - check perms before setting socket options
981 static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
984 return aa_sock_opt_perm(OP_SETSOCKOPT, AA_MAY_SETOPT, sock,
989 * apparmor_socket_shutdown - check perms before shutting down @sock conn
991 static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
993 return aa_sock_perm(OP_SHUTDOWN, AA_MAY_SHUTDOWN, sock);
997 * apparmor_socket_sock_recv_skb - check perms before associating skb to sk
999 * Note: can not sleep may be called with locks held
1001 * dont want protocol specific in __skb_recv_datagram()
1002 * to deny an incoming connection socket_sock_rcv_skb()
1004 static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
1010 static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label(struct sock *sk)
1012 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1017 return ERR_PTR(-ENOPROTOOPT);
1021 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream - get security context of peer
1023 * Note: for tcp only valid if using ipsec or cipso on lan
1025 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
1026 char __user *optval,
1031 int slen, error = 0;
1032 struct aa_label *label;
1033 struct aa_label *peer;
1035 label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
1036 peer = sk_peer_label(sock->sk);
1038 error = PTR_ERR(peer);
1041 slen = aa_label_asxprint(&name, labels_ns(label), peer,
1042 FLAG_SHOW_MODE | FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |
1043 FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED, GFP_KERNEL);
1044 /* don't include terminating \0 in slen, it breaks some apps */
1050 } else if (copy_to_user(optval, name, slen)) {
1054 if (put_user(slen, optlen))
1062 end_current_label_crit_section(label);
1068 * apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet
1069 * @sock: the peer socket
1071 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
1073 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
1075 static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
1076 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
1079 /* TODO: requires secid support */
1080 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
1084 * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket
1086 * @parent: parent socket
1088 * Note: could set off of SOCK_CTX(parent) but need to track inode and we can
1089 * just set sk security information off of current creating process label
1090 * Labeling of sk for accept case - probably should be sock based
1091 * instead of task, because of the case where an implicitly labeled
1092 * socket is shared by different tasks.
1094 static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
1096 struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx = SK_CTX(sk);
1099 ctx->label = aa_get_current_label();
1102 static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
1103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
1104 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
1105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
1106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
1108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount),
1109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount),
1110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot),
1112 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
1113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
1114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
1115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
1116 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
1117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
1118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
1119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
1120 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
1121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
1122 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
1124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
1125 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, apparmor_file_receive),
1126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
1127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
1128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
1129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
1130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
1131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
1133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
1134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
1136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),
1137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security),
1138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
1140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, apparmor_socket_create),
1141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, apparmor_socket_post_create),
1142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, apparmor_socket_bind),
1143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, apparmor_socket_connect),
1144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, apparmor_socket_listen),
1145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, apparmor_socket_accept),
1146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, apparmor_socket_sendmsg),
1147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, apparmor_socket_recvmsg),
1148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, apparmor_socket_getsockname),
1149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, apparmor_socket_getpeername),
1150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, apparmor_socket_getsockopt),
1151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, apparmor_socket_setsockopt),
1152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, apparmor_socket_shutdown),
1153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
1154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
1155 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream),
1156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram,
1157 apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
1158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft),
1160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
1161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
1162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
1163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
1165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
1166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
1167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
1169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
1170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
1174 * AppArmor sysfs module parameters
1177 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1178 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1179 #define param_check_aabool param_check_bool
1180 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aabool = {
1181 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1182 .set = param_set_aabool,
1183 .get = param_get_aabool
1186 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1187 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1188 #define param_check_aauint param_check_uint
1189 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aauint = {
1190 .set = param_set_aauint,
1191 .get = param_get_aauint
1194 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1195 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
1196 #define param_check_aalockpolicy param_check_bool
1197 static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
1198 .flags = KERNEL_PARAM_OPS_FL_NOARG,
1199 .set = param_set_aalockpolicy,
1200 .get = param_get_aalockpolicy
1203 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
1204 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
1206 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
1207 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
1209 /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
1210 * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
1213 /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
1214 enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
1215 module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
1216 &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1218 /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
1219 bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
1220 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
1221 module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1225 bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
1226 module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1229 enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
1230 module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
1231 &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1233 /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
1234 * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
1236 bool aa_g_audit_header = 1;
1237 module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
1240 /* lock out loading/removal of policy
1241 * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
1242 * load policy, if lock_policy is set
1244 bool aa_g_lock_policy;
1245 module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
1248 /* Syscall logging mode */
1249 bool aa_g_logsyscall;
1250 module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
1252 /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
1253 unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
1254 module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
1256 /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
1257 * on the loaded policy is done.
1258 * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now
1259 * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
1261 bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1;
1262 module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
1264 /* Boot time disable flag */
1265 static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
1266 module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
1268 static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
1270 unsigned long enabled;
1271 int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
1273 apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
1277 __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
1279 /* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
1280 static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1282 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1284 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1286 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1289 static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1291 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1293 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1295 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1298 static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1300 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1302 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1304 return param_set_bool(val, kp);
1307 static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1309 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1311 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1313 return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
1316 static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1320 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1322 /* file is ro but enforce 2nd line check */
1323 if (apparmor_initialized)
1326 error = param_set_uint(val, kp);
1327 pr_info("AppArmor: buffer size set to %d bytes\n", aa_g_path_max);
1332 static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
1334 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1336 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1338 return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
1341 static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
1343 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1345 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1347 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]);
1350 static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
1354 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1358 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1361 for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
1362 if (strcmp(val, audit_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
1371 static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
1373 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1375 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_view_capable(NULL))
1378 return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]);
1381 static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
1385 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1389 if (apparmor_initialized && !policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1392 for (i = 0; i < APPARMOR_MODE_NAMES_MAX_INDEX; i++) {
1393 if (strcmp(val, aa_profile_mode_names[i]) == 0) {
1394 aa_g_profile_mode = i;
1403 * AppArmor init functions
1407 * set_init_ctx - set a task context and profile on the first task.
1409 * TODO: allow setting an alternate profile than unconfined
1411 static int __init set_init_ctx(void)
1413 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
1414 struct aa_task_ctx *ctx;
1416 ctx = aa_alloc_task_context(GFP_KERNEL);
1420 ctx->label = aa_get_label(ns_unconfined(root_ns));
1421 cred_ctx(cred) = ctx;
1426 static void destroy_buffers(void)
1430 for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1431 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1432 kfree(per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j]);
1433 per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = NULL;
1438 static int __init alloc_buffers(void)
1442 for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
1443 for_each_cpu_buffer(j) {
1446 if (cpu_to_node(i) > num_online_nodes())
1447 /* fallback to kmalloc for offline nodes */
1448 buffer = kmalloc(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL);
1450 buffer = kmalloc_node(aa_g_path_max, GFP_KERNEL,
1456 per_cpu(aa_buffers, i).buf[j] = buffer;
1463 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
1464 static int apparmor_dointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
1465 void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
1467 if (!policy_admin_capable(NULL))
1469 if (!apparmor_enabled)
1472 return proc_dointvec(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
1475 static struct ctl_path apparmor_sysctl_path[] = {
1476 { .procname = "kernel", },
1480 static struct ctl_table apparmor_sysctl_table[] = {
1482 .procname = "unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy",
1483 .data = &unprivileged_userns_apparmor_policy,
1484 .maxlen = sizeof(int),
1486 .proc_handler = apparmor_dointvec,
1491 static int __init apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1493 return register_sysctl_paths(apparmor_sysctl_path,
1494 apparmor_sysctl_table) ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
1497 static inline int apparmor_init_sysctl(void)
1501 #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
1503 static int __init apparmor_init(void)
1507 if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
1508 aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
1509 apparmor_enabled = 0;
1513 error = aa_setup_dfa_engine();
1515 AA_ERROR("Unable to setup dfa engine\n");
1519 error = aa_alloc_root_ns();
1521 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate default profile namespace\n");
1525 error = apparmor_init_sysctl();
1527 AA_ERROR("Unable to register sysctls\n");
1532 error = alloc_buffers();
1534 AA_ERROR("Unable to allocate work buffers\n");
1538 error = set_init_ctx();
1540 AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
1544 security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks),
1547 /* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
1548 apparmor_initialized = 1;
1549 if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_COMPLAIN)
1550 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: complain mode enabled");
1551 else if (aa_g_profile_mode == APPARMOR_KILL)
1552 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized: kill mode enabled");
1554 aa_info_message("AppArmor initialized");
1563 aa_teardown_dfa_engine();
1565 apparmor_enabled = 0;
1569 security_initcall(apparmor_init);