2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
15 #include <linux/security.h>
16 #include <linux/magic.h>
17 #include <linux/parser.h>
18 #include <linux/slab.h>
19 #include <linux/genhd.h>
23 /* flags definitions */
24 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
25 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
26 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
27 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
28 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
29 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
30 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
31 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
34 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
35 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
36 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
37 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
42 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
43 enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
44 LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
47 struct ima_rule_entry {
48 struct list_head list;
53 unsigned long fsmagic;
58 void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
59 void *args_p; /* audit value */
60 int type; /* audit type */
65 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
66 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
70 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
71 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
72 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
73 * and running executables.
75 static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
76 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
77 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
78 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
79 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
80 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
81 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
82 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
83 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
84 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
85 .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
86 {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
87 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
88 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
89 {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
90 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
91 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
92 .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
93 {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
94 {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
97 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules[] = {
98 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
99 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
100 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
101 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
102 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = RAMFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
103 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
104 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
105 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
106 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
107 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
108 {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
109 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
110 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
112 /* force signature */
113 {.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
114 .flags = IMA_FOWNER | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED},
118 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules);
119 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules);
120 static struct list_head *ima_rules;
122 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
124 static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
125 static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
130 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
132 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
133 static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
135 ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1;
138 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
141 * Although the IMA policy does not change, the LSM policy can be
142 * reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring to the old,
145 * Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect the reloaded LSM policy.
146 * We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if they don't.
148 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
150 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
154 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
155 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
156 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
157 if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
159 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[i].type,
161 entry->lsm[i].args_p,
162 &entry->lsm[i].rule);
163 BUG_ON(!entry->lsm[i].rule);
166 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
170 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
171 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
172 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
173 * @func: LIM hook identifier
174 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
176 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
178 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
179 struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
181 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
182 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
185 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) &&
186 (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR))
188 if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
189 (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
191 if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
192 (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
194 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
195 && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
197 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSUUID) &&
198 memcmp(rule->fsuuid, inode->i_sb->s_uuid, sizeof(rule->fsuuid)))
200 if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
202 if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
203 if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
204 if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
205 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
206 && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
208 } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
212 if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
214 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
219 if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
226 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
227 rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
236 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
237 rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
245 if ((rc < 0) && (!retried)) {
247 ima_lsm_update_rules();
257 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
258 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
260 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int func)
262 if (!(rule->flags & IMA_FUNC))
263 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
267 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE;
269 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE;
271 return IMA_MODULE_APPRAISE;
273 return IMA_FIRMWARE_APPRAISE;
276 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE;
281 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
282 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
283 * @func: IMA hook identifier
284 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
286 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
289 * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
290 * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
293 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
296 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
297 int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
299 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
301 if (!(entry->action & actmask))
304 if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask))
307 action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS;
309 action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK;
310 if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE)
311 action |= get_subaction(entry, func);
313 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
314 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1);
316 actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
326 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
327 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
328 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
329 * can be made earlier.
331 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
333 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
336 list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_rules, list) {
337 if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK)
338 ima_policy_flag |= entry->action;
342 ima_policy_flag &= ~IMA_APPRAISE;
346 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
348 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
349 * the new ima_policy_rules.
351 void __init ima_init_policy(void)
353 int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
355 /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
356 measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
357 appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
358 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
360 for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
361 list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
363 for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
364 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
368 ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
372 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
374 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
375 * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
376 * added to the policy.
378 void ima_update_policy(void)
380 ima_rules = &ima_policy_rules;
381 ima_update_policy_flag();
386 Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
387 Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise,
389 Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
390 Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
391 Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
392 Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
393 Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
396 static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
397 {Opt_measure, "measure"},
398 {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
399 {Opt_appraise, "appraise"},
400 {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"},
401 {Opt_audit, "audit"},
402 {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
403 {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
404 {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
405 {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
406 {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
407 {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
408 {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
409 {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
410 {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
411 {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
413 {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
414 {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
415 {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
416 {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
420 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
421 substring_t *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
425 if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
428 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
429 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p)
432 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
433 result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
435 entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
436 &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
437 if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
438 kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
445 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value)
447 audit_log_format(ab, "%s=", key);
448 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, value);
449 audit_log_format(ab, " ");
452 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
454 struct audit_buffer *ab;
459 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
461 entry->uid = INVALID_UID;
462 entry->fowner = INVALID_UID;
463 entry->action = UNKNOWN;
464 while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \t")) != NULL) {
465 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
471 if ((*p == '\0') || (*p == ' ') || (*p == '\t'))
473 token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
476 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "measure");
478 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
481 entry->action = MEASURE;
483 case Opt_dont_measure:
484 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_measure");
486 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
489 entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
492 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "appraise");
494 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
497 entry->action = APPRAISE;
499 case Opt_dont_appraise:
500 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_appraise");
502 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
505 entry->action = DONT_APPRAISE;
508 ima_log_string(ab, "action", "audit");
510 if (entry->action != UNKNOWN)
513 entry->action = AUDIT;
516 ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from);
521 if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
522 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
523 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
524 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
525 entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
526 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
527 entry->func = MODULE_CHECK;
528 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
529 entry->func = FIRMWARE_CHECK;
530 else if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
531 || (strcmp(args[0].from, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
532 entry->func = MMAP_CHECK;
533 else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
534 entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
538 entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
541 ima_log_string(ab, "mask", args[0].from);
550 if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
551 entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
552 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
553 entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
554 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
555 entry->mask = MAY_READ;
556 else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
557 entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
561 entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
562 ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
565 ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
567 if (entry->fsmagic) {
572 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &entry->fsmagic);
574 entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
577 ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from);
579 if (memchr_inv(entry->fsuuid, 0x00,
580 sizeof(entry->fsuuid))) {
585 result = blk_part_pack_uuid(args[0].from,
588 entry->flags |= IMA_FSUUID;
591 ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
593 if (token == Opt_euid)
594 ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
596 if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
601 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
603 entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
605 if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
609 entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
610 ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
614 ima_log_string(ab, "fowner", args[0].from);
616 if (uid_valid(entry->fowner)) {
621 result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
623 entry->fowner = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
624 if (!uid_valid(entry->fowner) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
627 entry->flags |= IMA_FOWNER;
631 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_user", args[0].from);
632 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
637 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_role", args[0].from);
638 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
643 ima_log_string(ab, "obj_type", args[0].from);
644 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
649 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_user", args[0].from);
650 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
655 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_role", args[0].from);
656 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
661 ima_log_string(ab, "subj_type", args[0].from);
662 result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args,
666 case Opt_appraise_type:
667 if (entry->action != APPRAISE) {
672 ima_log_string(ab, "appraise_type", args[0].from);
673 if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "imasig")) == 0)
674 entry->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED;
678 case Opt_permit_directio:
679 entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
682 ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
687 if (!result && (entry->action == UNKNOWN))
689 else if (entry->func == MODULE_CHECK)
690 ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES;
691 else if (entry->func == FIRMWARE_CHECK)
692 ima_appraise |= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE;
693 audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result);
699 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
700 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
702 * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
703 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
705 ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
707 static const char op[] = "update_policy";
709 struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
713 p = strsep(&rule, "\n");
715 p += strspn(p, " \t");
717 if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0')
720 entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
722 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
723 NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
727 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
729 result = ima_parse_rule(p, entry);
732 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
733 NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
738 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
739 list_add_tail(&entry->list, &ima_policy_rules);
740 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);
745 /* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
746 void ima_delete_rules(void)
748 struct ima_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
751 mutex_lock(&ima_rules_mutex);
752 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
753 for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++)
754 kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
756 list_del(&entry->list);
759 mutex_unlock(&ima_rules_mutex);