1 /*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 * functions related to setting up a secure connection to the frontend.
5 * Secure connections are expected to provide confidentiality,
6 * message integrity and endpoint authentication.
9 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2010, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
10 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
14 * $PostgreSQL: pgsql/src/backend/libpq/be-secure.c,v 1.96 2010/01/15 09:19:02 heikki Exp $
16 * Since the server static private key ($DataDir/server.key)
17 * will normally be stored unencrypted so that the database
18 * backend can restart automatically, it is important that
19 * we select an algorithm that continues to provide confidentiality
20 * even if the attacker has the server's private key. Empheral
21 * DH (EDH) keys provide this, and in fact provide Perfect Forward
22 * Secrecy (PFS) except for situations where the session can
23 * be hijacked during a periodic handshake/renegotiation.
24 * Even that backdoor can be closed if client certificates
25 * are used (since the imposter will be unable to successfully
26 * complete renegotiation).
28 * N.B., the static private key should still be protected to
29 * the largest extent possible, to minimize the risk of
32 * Another benefit of EDH is that it allows the backend and
33 * clients to use DSA keys. DSA keys can only provide digital
34 * signatures, not encryption, and are often acceptable in
35 * jurisdictions where RSA keys are unacceptable.
37 * The downside to EDH is that it makes it impossible to
38 * use ssldump(1) if there's a problem establishing an SSL
39 * session. In this case you'll need to temporarily disable
40 * EDH by commenting out the callback.
44 * Because the risk of cryptanalysis increases as large
45 * amounts of data are sent with the same session key, the
46 * session keys are periodically renegotiated.
48 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
57 #include <sys/socket.h>
60 #include <netinet/in.h>
61 #ifdef HAVE_NETINET_TCP_H
62 #include <netinet/tcp.h>
63 #include <arpa/inet.h>
67 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
68 #include <openssl/dh.h>
69 #if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0907000L
70 #include <openssl/conf.h>
74 #include "libpq/libpq.h"
75 #include "tcop/tcopprot.h"
80 #define ROOT_CERT_FILE "root.crt"
81 #define ROOT_CRL_FILE "root.crl"
82 #define SERVER_CERT_FILE "server.crt"
83 #define SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE "server.key"
85 static DH *load_dh_file(int keylength);
86 static DH *load_dh_buffer(const char *, size_t);
87 static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength);
88 static int verify_cb(int, X509_STORE_CTX *);
89 static void info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args);
90 static void initialize_SSL(void);
91 static int open_server_SSL(Port *);
92 static void close_SSL(Port *);
93 static const char *SSLerrmessage(void);
98 * How much data can be sent across a secure connection
99 * (total in both directions) before we require renegotiation.
101 #define RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT (512 * 1024 * 1024)
103 static SSL_CTX *SSL_context = NULL;
104 static bool ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
106 /* GUC variable controlling SSL cipher list */
107 char *SSLCipherSuites = NULL;
110 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
111 /* Hardcoded values */
112 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
115 * Hardcoded DH parameters, used in empheral DH keying.
116 * As discussed above, EDH protects the confidentiality of
117 * sessions even if the static private key is compromised,
118 * so we are *highly* motivated to ensure that we can use
119 * EDH even if the DBA... or an attacker... deletes the
120 * $DataDir/dh*.pem files.
122 * We could refuse SSL connections unless a good DH parameter
123 * file exists, but some clients may quietly renegotiate an
124 * unsecured connection without fully informing the user.
127 * Alternatively, the backend could attempt to load these files
128 * on startup if SSL is enabled - and refuse to start if any
129 * do not exist - but this would tend to piss off DBAs.
131 * If you want to create your own hardcoded DH parameters
132 * for fun and profit, review "Assigned Number for SKIP
133 * Protocols" (http://www.skip-vpn.org/spec/numbers.html)
138 static const char file_dh512[] =
139 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
140 MEYCQQD1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWak\n\
141 XUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpKgVfAgEC\n\
142 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
144 static const char file_dh1024[] =
145 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
146 MIGHAoGBAPSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY7288kjwEPwpVsY\n\
147 jY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy1obEAxnIByl6\n\
148 ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XpL3jHAgEC\n\
149 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
151 static const char file_dh2048[] =
152 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
153 MIIBCAKCAQEA9kJXtwh/CBdyorrWqULzBej5UxE5T7bxbrlLOCDaAadWoxTpj0BV\n\
154 89AHxstDqZSt90xkhkn4DIO9ZekX1KHTUPj1WV/cdlJPPT2N286Z4VeSWc39uK50\n\
155 T8X8dryDxUcwYc58yWb/Ffm7/ZFexwGq01uejaClcjrUGvC/RgBYK+X0iP1YTknb\n\
156 zSC0neSRBzZrM2w4DUUdD3yIsxx8Wy2O9vPJI8BD8KVbGI2Ou1WMuF040zT9fBdX\n\
157 Q6MdGGzeMyEstSr/POGxKUAYEY18hKcKctaGxAMZyAcpesqVDNmWn6vQClCbAkbT\n\
158 CD1mpF1Bn5x8vYlLIhkmuquiXsNV6TILOwIBAg==\n\
159 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
161 static const char file_dh4096[] =
162 "-----BEGIN DH PARAMETERS-----\n\
163 MIICCAKCAgEA+hRyUsFN4VpJ1O8JLcCo/VWr19k3BCgJ4uk+d+KhehjdRqNDNyOQ\n\
164 l/MOyQNQfWXPeGKmOmIig6Ev/nm6Nf9Z2B1h3R4hExf+zTiHnvVPeRBhjdQi81rt\n\
165 Xeoh6TNrSBIKIHfUJWBh3va0TxxjQIs6IZOLeVNRLMqzeylWqMf49HsIXqbcokUS\n\
166 Vt1BkvLdW48j8PPv5DsKRN3tloTxqDJGo9tKvj1Fuk74A+Xda1kNhB7KFlqMyN98\n\
167 VETEJ6c7KpfOo30mnK30wqw3S8OtaIR/maYX72tGOno2ehFDkq3pnPtEbD2CScxc\n\
168 alJC+EL7RPk5c/tgeTvCngvc1KZn92Y//EI7G9tPZtylj2b56sHtMftIoYJ9+ODM\n\
169 sccD5Piz/rejE3Ome8EOOceUSCYAhXn8b3qvxVI1ddd1pED6FHRhFvLrZxFvBEM9\n\
170 ERRMp5QqOaHJkM+Dxv8Cj6MqrCbfC4u+ZErxodzuusgDgvZiLF22uxMZbobFWyte\n\
171 OvOzKGtwcTqO/1wV5gKkzu1ZVswVUQd5Gg8lJicwqRWyyNRczDDoG9jVDxmogKTH\n\
172 AaqLulO7R8Ifa1SwF2DteSGVtgWEN8gDpN3RBmmPTDngyF2DHb5qmpnznwtFKdTL\n\
173 KWbuHn491xNO25CQWMtem80uKw+pTnisBRF/454n1Jnhub144YRBoN8CAQI=\n\
174 -----END DH PARAMETERS-----\n";
177 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
178 /* Procedures common to all secure sessions */
179 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
182 * Initialize global context
185 secure_initialize(void)
195 * Indicate if we have loaded the root CA store to verify certificates
198 secure_loaded_verify_locations(void)
201 return ssl_loaded_verify_locations;
208 * Attempt to negotiate secure session.
211 secure_open_server(Port *port)
216 r = open_server_SSL(port);
223 * Close secure session.
226 secure_close(Port *port)
235 * Read data from a secure connection.
238 secure_read(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
249 n = SSL_read(port->ssl, ptr, len);
250 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
256 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
257 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
261 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
262 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
263 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE,
267 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
268 /* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
277 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
278 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage())));
280 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
286 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
287 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
296 prepare_for_client_read();
298 n = recv(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
307 * Write data to a secure connection.
310 secure_write(Port *port, void *ptr, size_t len)
319 if (port->count > RENEGOTIATION_LIMIT)
321 SSL_set_session_id_context(port->ssl, (void *) &SSL_context,
322 sizeof(SSL_context));
323 if (SSL_renegotiate(port->ssl) <= 0)
325 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
326 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
327 if (SSL_do_handshake(port->ssl) <= 0)
329 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
330 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
331 if (port->ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK)
333 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
334 errmsg("SSL failed to send renegotiation request")));
335 port->ssl->state |= SSL_ST_ACCEPT;
336 SSL_do_handshake(port->ssl);
337 if (port->ssl->state != SSL_ST_OK)
339 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
340 errmsg("SSL renegotiation failure")));
346 n = SSL_write(port->ssl, ptr, len);
347 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, n);
353 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
354 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
356 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
357 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
358 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE,
362 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
363 /* leave it to caller to ereport the value of errno */
372 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
373 errmsg("SSL error: %s", SSLerrmessage())));
375 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
381 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
382 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
390 n = send(port->sock, ptr, len, 0);
395 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
396 /* SSL specific code */
397 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
401 * Private substitute BIO: this does the sending and receiving using send() and
402 * recv() instead. This is so that we can enable and disable interrupts
403 * just while calling recv(). We cannot have interrupts occurring while
404 * the bulk of openssl runs, because it uses malloc() and possibly other
405 * non-reentrant libc facilities. We also need to call send() and recv()
406 * directly so it gets passed through the socket/signals layer on Win32.
408 * They are closely modelled on the original socket implementations in OpenSSL.
412 static bool my_bio_initialized = false;
413 static BIO_METHOD my_bio_methods;
416 my_sock_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size)
420 prepare_for_client_read();
424 res = recv(h->num, buf, size, 0);
425 BIO_clear_retry_flags(h);
428 /* If we were interrupted, tell caller to retry */
431 BIO_set_retry_read(h);
442 my_sock_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int size)
446 res = send(h->num, buf, size, 0);
451 BIO_set_retry_write(h);
459 my_BIO_s_socket(void)
461 if (!my_bio_initialized)
463 memcpy(&my_bio_methods, BIO_s_socket(), sizeof(BIO_METHOD));
464 my_bio_methods.bread = my_sock_read;
465 my_bio_methods.bwrite = my_sock_write;
466 my_bio_initialized = true;
468 return &my_bio_methods;
471 /* This should exactly match openssl's SSL_set_fd except for using my BIO */
473 my_SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd)
478 bio = BIO_new(my_BIO_s_socket());
482 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
485 BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE);
486 SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio);
493 * Load precomputed DH parameters.
495 * To prevent "downgrade" attacks, we perform a number of checks
496 * to verify that the DBA-generated DH parameters file contains
497 * what we expect it to contain.
500 load_dh_file(int keylength)
503 char fnbuf[MAXPGPATH];
507 /* attempt to open file. It's not an error if it doesn't exist. */
508 snprintf(fnbuf, sizeof(fnbuf), "dh%d.pem", keylength);
509 if ((fp = fopen(fnbuf, "r")) == NULL)
512 /* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_SH); */
513 dh = PEM_read_DHparams(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
514 /* flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_UN); */
517 /* is the prime the correct size? */
518 if (dh != NULL && 8 * DH_size(dh) < keylength)
520 elog(LOG, "DH errors (%s): %d bits expected, %d bits found",
521 fnbuf, keylength, 8 * DH_size(dh));
525 /* make sure the DH parameters are usable */
528 if (DH_check(dh, &codes) == 0)
530 elog(LOG, "DH_check error (%s): %s", fnbuf, SSLerrmessage());
533 if (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_PRIME)
535 elog(LOG, "DH error (%s): p is not prime", fnbuf);
538 if ((codes & DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR) &&
539 (codes & DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME))
542 "DH error (%s): neither suitable generator or safe prime",
552 * Load hardcoded DH parameters.
554 * To prevent problems if the DH parameters files don't even
555 * exist, we can load DH parameters hardcoded into this file.
558 load_dh_buffer(const char *buffer, size_t len)
563 bio = BIO_new_mem_buf((char *) buffer, len);
566 dh = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
569 (errmsg_internal("DH load buffer: %s",
577 * Generate an empheral DH key. Because this can take a long
578 * time to compute, we can use precomputed parameters of the
581 * Since few sites will bother to precompute these parameter
582 * files, we also provide a fallback to the parameters provided
583 * by the OpenSSL project.
585 * These values can be static (once loaded or computed) since
586 * the OpenSSL library can efficiently generate random keys from
587 * the information provided.
590 tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength)
593 static DH *dh = NULL;
594 static DH *dh512 = NULL;
595 static DH *dh1024 = NULL;
596 static DH *dh2048 = NULL;
597 static DH *dh4096 = NULL;
603 dh512 = load_dh_file(keylength);
605 dh512 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh512, sizeof file_dh512);
611 dh1024 = load_dh_file(keylength);
613 dh1024 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh1024, sizeof file_dh1024);
619 dh2048 = load_dh_file(keylength);
621 dh2048 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh2048, sizeof file_dh2048);
627 dh4096 = load_dh_file(keylength);
629 dh4096 = load_dh_buffer(file_dh4096, sizeof file_dh4096);
635 dh = load_dh_file(keylength);
639 /* this may take a long time, but it may be necessary... */
640 if (r == NULL || 8 * DH_size(r) < keylength)
643 (errmsg_internal("DH: generating parameters (%d bits)....",
645 r = DH_generate_parameters(keylength, DH_GENERATOR_2, NULL, NULL);
652 * Certificate verification callback
654 * This callback allows us to log intermediate problems during
655 * verification, but for now we'll see if the final error message
656 * contains enough information.
658 * This callback also allows us to override the default acceptance
659 * criteria (e.g., accepting self-signed or expired certs), but
660 * for now we accept the default checks.
663 verify_cb(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
669 * This callback is used to copy SSL information messages
670 * into the PostgreSQL log.
673 info_cb(const SSL *ssl, int type, int args)
677 case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START:
679 (errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake start")));
681 case SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE:
683 (errmsg_internal("SSL: handshake done")));
685 case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP:
687 (errmsg_internal("SSL: accept loop")));
689 case SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT:
691 (errmsg_internal("SSL: accept exit (%d)", args)));
693 case SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP:
695 (errmsg_internal("SSL: connect loop")));
697 case SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT:
699 (errmsg_internal("SSL: connect exit (%d)", args)));
701 case SSL_CB_READ_ALERT:
703 (errmsg_internal("SSL: read alert (0x%04x)", args)));
705 case SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT:
707 (errmsg_internal("SSL: write alert (0x%04x)", args)));
713 * Initialize global SSL context.
722 #if SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0907000L
723 OPENSSL_config(NULL);
726 SSL_load_error_strings();
727 SSL_context = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method());
730 (errmsg("could not create SSL context: %s",
734 * Load and verify certificate and private key
736 if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_context,
737 SERVER_CERT_FILE) != 1)
739 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
740 errmsg("could not load server certificate file \"%s\": %s",
741 SERVER_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
743 if (stat(SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, &buf) != 0)
745 (errcode_for_file_access(),
746 errmsg("could not access private key file \"%s\": %m",
747 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE)));
750 * Require no public access to key file.
752 * XXX temporarily suppress check when on Windows, because there may
753 * not be proper support for Unix-y file permissions. Need to think
754 * of a reasonable check to apply on Windows. (See also the data
755 * directory permission check in postmaster.c)
757 #if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__CYGWIN__)
758 if (!S_ISREG(buf.st_mode) || buf.st_mode & (S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO))
760 (errcode(ERRCODE_CONFIG_FILE_ERROR),
761 errmsg("private key file \"%s\" has group or world access",
762 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE),
763 errdetail("Permissions should be u=rw (0600) or less.")));
766 if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_context,
767 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE,
768 SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != 1)
770 (errmsg("could not load private key file \"%s\": %s",
771 SERVER_PRIVATE_KEY_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
773 if (SSL_CTX_check_private_key(SSL_context) != 1)
775 (errmsg("check of private key failed: %s",
779 /* set up empheral DH keys */
780 SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_context, tmp_dh_cb);
781 SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_context, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
783 /* setup the allowed cipher list */
784 if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_context, SSLCipherSuites) != 1)
785 elog(FATAL, "could not set the cipher list (no valid ciphers available)");
788 * Attempt to load CA store, so we can verify client certificates if
791 if (access(ROOT_CERT_FILE, R_OK))
793 ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
796 * If root certificate file simply not found. Don't log an error here,
797 * because it's quite likely the user isn't planning on using client
798 * certificates. If we can't access it for other reasons, it is an
804 (errmsg("could not access root certificate file \"%s\": %m",
808 else if (SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_context, ROOT_CERT_FILE, NULL) != 1)
811 * File was there, but we could not load it. This means the file is
812 * somehow broken, and we cannot do verification at all - so abort
815 ssl_loaded_verify_locations = false;
817 (errmsg("could not load root certificate file \"%s\": %s",
818 ROOT_CERT_FILE, SSLerrmessage())));
823 * Check the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) if file exists.
824 * http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid14_gci803160,
827 X509_STORE *cvstore = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_context);
831 /* Set the flags to check against the complete CRL chain */
832 if (X509_STORE_load_locations(cvstore, ROOT_CRL_FILE, NULL) == 1)
833 /* OpenSSL 0.96 does not support X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK */
834 #ifdef X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK
835 X509_STORE_set_flags(cvstore,
836 X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK | X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
839 (errmsg("SSL certificate revocation list file \"%s\" ignored",
841 errdetail("SSL library does not support certificate revocation lists.")));
845 /* Not fatal - we do not require CRL */
847 (errmsg("SSL certificate revocation list file \"%s\" not found, skipping: %s",
848 ROOT_CRL_FILE, SSLerrmessage()),
849 errdetail("Certificates will not be checked against revocation list.")));
853 * Always ask for SSL client cert, but don't fail if it's not
854 * presented. We'll fail later in this case, based on what we find
857 SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_context,
859 SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE),
862 ssl_loaded_verify_locations = true;
868 * Attempt to negotiate SSL connection.
871 open_server_SSL(Port *port)
879 if (!(port->ssl = SSL_new(SSL_context)))
882 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
883 errmsg("could not initialize SSL connection: %s",
888 if (!my_SSL_set_fd(port->ssl, port->sock))
891 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
892 errmsg("could not set SSL socket: %s",
899 r = SSL_accept(port->ssl);
902 err = SSL_get_error(port->ssl, r);
905 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
906 case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
908 pgwin32_waitforsinglesocket(SSL_get_fd(port->ssl),
909 (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) ?
910 FD_READ | FD_CLOSE | FD_ACCEPT : FD_WRITE | FD_CLOSE,
914 case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
917 (errcode_for_socket_access(),
918 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %m")));
921 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
922 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
926 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
927 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: %s",
930 case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
932 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
933 errmsg("could not accept SSL connection: EOF detected")));
937 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
938 errmsg("unrecognized SSL error code: %d",
948 /* get client certificate, if available. */
949 port->peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(port->ssl);
950 if (port->peer == NULL)
952 strlcpy(port->peer_dn, "(anonymous)", sizeof(port->peer_dn));
953 strlcpy(port->peer_cn, "(anonymous)", sizeof(port->peer_cn));
957 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
958 port->peer_dn, sizeof(port->peer_dn));
959 port->peer_dn[sizeof(port->peer_dn) - 1] = '\0';
960 r = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(port->peer),
961 NID_commonName, port->peer_cn, sizeof(port->peer_cn));
962 port->peer_cn[sizeof(port->peer_cn) - 1] = '\0';
965 /* Unable to get the CN, set it to blank so it can't be used */
966 port->peer_cn[0] = '\0';
971 * Reject embedded NULLs in certificate common name to prevent attacks like
974 if (r != strlen(port->peer_cn))
977 (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
978 errmsg("SSL certificate's common name contains embedded null")));
985 (errmsg("SSL connection from \"%s\"", port->peer_cn)));
987 /* set up debugging/info callback */
988 SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_context, info_cb);
994 * Close SSL connection.
997 close_SSL(Port *port)
1001 SSL_shutdown(port->ssl);
1002 SSL_free(port->ssl);
1008 X509_free(port->peer);
1014 * Obtain reason string for last SSL error
1016 * Some caution is needed here since ERR_reason_error_string will
1017 * return NULL if it doesn't recognize the error code. We don't
1018 * want to return NULL ever.
1023 unsigned long errcode;
1024 const char *errreason;
1025 static char errbuf[32];
1027 errcode = ERR_get_error();
1029 return _("no SSL error reported");
1030 errreason = ERR_reason_error_string(errcode);
1031 if (errreason != NULL)
1033 snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), _("SSL error code %lu"), errcode);
1037 #endif /* USE_SSL */