BLACKFIN Blackfin architecture is enabled.
CLK Common clock infrastructure is enabled.
CMA Contiguous Memory Area support is enabled.
+ DM Device mapper support is enabled.
DRM Direct Rendering Management support is enabled.
DYNAMIC_DEBUG Build in debug messages and enable them at runtime
EDD BIOS Enhanced Disk Drive Services (EDD) is enabled
dis_ucode_ldr [X86] Disable the microcode loader.
+ dm= [DM] Allows early creation of a device-mapper device.
+ See Documentation/device-mapper/boot.txt.
+
+ dmasound= [HW,OSS] Sound subsystem buff
+
dma_debug=off If the kernel is compiled with DMA_API_DEBUG support,
this option disables the debugging code at boot.
In such case C2/C3 won't be used again.
idle=nomwait: Disable mwait for CPU C-states
+ ieee754= [MIPS] Select IEEE Std 754 conformance mode
+ Format: { strict | legacy | 2008 | relaxed }
+ Default: strict
+
+ Choose which programs will be accepted for execution
+ based on the IEEE 754 NaN encoding(s) supported by
+ the FPU and the NaN encoding requested with the value
+ of an ELF file header flag individually set by each
+ binary. Hardware implementations are permitted to
+ support either or both of the legacy and the 2008 NaN
+ encoding mode.
+
+ Available settings are as follows:
+ strict accept binaries that request a NaN encoding
+ supported by the FPU
+ legacy only accept legacy-NaN binaries, if supported
+ by the FPU
+ 2008 only accept 2008-NaN binaries, if supported
+ by the FPU
+ relaxed accept any binaries regardless of whether
+ supported by the FPU
+
+ The FPU emulator is always able to support both NaN
+ encodings, so if no FPU hardware is present or it has
+ been disabled with 'nofpu', then the settings of
+ 'legacy' and '2008' strap the emulator accordingly,
+ 'relaxed' straps the emulator for both legacy-NaN and
+ 2008-NaN, whereas 'strict' enables legacy-NaN only on
+ legacy processors and both NaN encodings on MIPS32 or
+ MIPS64 CPUs.
+
+ The setting for ABS.fmt/NEG.fmt instruction execution
+ mode generally follows that for the NaN encoding,
+ except where unsupported by hardware.
+
ignore_loglevel [KNL]
Ignore loglevel setting - this will print /all/
kernel messages to the console. Useful for debugging.
full - Enable MDS mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
off - Unconditionally disable MDS mitigation
+ On TAA-affected machines, mds=off can be prevented by
+ an active TAA mitigation as both vulnerabilities are
+ mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+ this mitigation, you need to specify tsx_async_abort=off
+ too.
+
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
mds=full.
spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86]
mds=off [X86]
+ tsx_async_abort=off [X86]
auto (default)
Mitigate all CPU vulnerabilities, but leave SMT
noexec=on: enable non-executable mappings (default)
noexec=off: disable non-executable mappings
+ noexec [MIPS]
+ Force indicating stack and heap as non-executable or
+ executable regardless of PT_GNU_STACK entry or CPU XI
+ (execute inhibit) support. Valid valuess are: on, off.
+ noexec=on: force indicating non-executable
+ stack and heap
+ noexec=off: force indicating executable
+ stack and heap
+ If this parameter is omitted, stack and heap will be
+ indicated non-executable or executable as they are
+ actually set up, which depends on PT_GNU_STACK entry
+ and possibly other factors (for instance, CPU XI
+ support).
+ NOTE: Using noexec=on on a system without CPU XI
+ support is not recommended since there is no actual
+ HW support that provide non-executable stack/heap.
+ Use only for debugging purposes and not in a
+ production environment.
+
nosmap [X86]
Disable SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention)
even if it is supported by processor.
ro [KNL] Mount root device read-only on boot
+ rodata= [KNL]
+ on Mark read-only kernel memory as read-only (default).
+ off Leave read-only kernel memory writable for debugging.
+
root= [KNL] Root filesystem
See name_to_dev_t comment in init/do_mounts.c.
platforms where RDTSC is slow and this accounting
can add overhead.
+ tsx= [X86] Control Transactional Synchronization
+ Extensions (TSX) feature in Intel processors that
+ support TSX control.
+
+ This parameter controls the TSX feature. The options are:
+
+ on - Enable TSX on the system. Although there are
+ mitigations for all known security vulnerabilities,
+ TSX has been known to be an accelerator for
+ several previous speculation-related CVEs, and
+ so there may be unknown security risks associated
+ with leaving it enabled.
+
+ off - Disable TSX on the system. (Note that this
+ option takes effect only on newer CPUs which are
+ not vulnerable to MDS, i.e., have
+ MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.MDS_NO=1 and which get
+ the new IA32_TSX_CTRL MSR through a microcode
+ update. This new MSR allows for the reliable
+ deactivation of the TSX functionality.)
+
+ auto - Disable TSX if X86_BUG_TAA is present,
+ otherwise enable TSX on the system.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to tsx=off.
+
+ See Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+ for more details.
+
+ tsx_async_abort= [X86,INTEL] Control mitigation for the TSX Async
+ Abort (TAA) vulnerability.
+
+ Similar to Micro-architectural Data Sampling (MDS)
+ certain CPUs that support Transactional
+ Synchronization Extensions (TSX) are vulnerable to an
+ exploit against CPU internal buffers which can forward
+ information to a disclosure gadget under certain
+ conditions.
+
+ In vulnerable processors, the speculatively forwarded
+ data can be used in a cache side channel attack, to
+ access data to which the attacker does not have direct
+ access.
+
+ This parameter controls the TAA mitigation. The
+ options are:
+
+ full - Enable TAA mitigation on vulnerable CPUs
+ if TSX is enabled.
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable TAA mitigation
+
+ On MDS-affected machines, tsx_async_abort=off can be
+ prevented by an active MDS mitigation as both vulnerabilities
+ are mitigated with the same mechanism so in order to disable
+ this mitigation, you need to specify mds=off too.
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ tsx_async_abort=full. On CPUs which are MDS affected
+ and deploy MDS mitigation, TAA mitigation is not
+ required and doesn't provide any additional
+ mitigation.
+
+ For details see:
+ Documentation/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
+
turbografx.map[2|3]= [HW,JOY]
TurboGraFX parallel port interface
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