-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
#ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */
#undef TARGET_OS_MAC
#include "zlib.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
-#include "monitor_mm.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "roaming.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
static Authctxt *authctxt;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */
-#endif
-
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static u_int key_bloblen = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
#ifdef GSSAPI
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok},
- {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+ {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
{0, 0, NULL}
};
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge},
- {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response},
-#ifdef BSD_AUTH
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef SKEY
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery},
- {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond},
-#endif
-#ifdef USE_PAM
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
-#endif
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
-struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = {
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty},
- {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
- {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
- {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command},
-#endif
-#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */
- {0, 0, NULL}
-};
-
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
void
monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
-
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15;
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1);
- }
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
- if (!compat20)
- fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported"
- "with SSH protocol 1");
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
+ ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
mm_get_keystate(pmonitor);
signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
- if (compat20) {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+ mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+ /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- } else {
- mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15;
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
- }
if (!no_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
-void
-monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor)
-{
- if (options.compression) {
- /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */
- mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback);
- }
-}
-
-/* Allocation functions for zlib */
-static void *
-mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size)
-{
- size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount;
- void *address;
-
- if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size)
- fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size);
-
- address = mm_malloc(mm, len);
-
- return (address);
-}
-
-static void
-mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address)
-{
- mm_free(mm, address);
-}
-
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
- struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
- u_char *p;
- u_char *signature;
- size_t datlen, siglen;
- int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL;
+ size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ int r, is_proof = 0;
+ u_int keyid;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (keyid > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
- session_id2_len) != 0) ||
+ session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
datafellows)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
- p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
+ p, datlen, alg, datafellows)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
int allowed = 0;
buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell);
out:
+ ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+ authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
- if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+ if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
- /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */
- if (!compat20)
- monitor_permit_authentications(1);
- else {
- /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
- }
+ /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
int authenticated;
u_int plen;
+ if (!options.password_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen);
#if !defined(ANDROID)
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authenticated);
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+ buffer_put_int(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached());
+#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
char **prompts;
u_int success;
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
char *response;
int authok;
- if (authctxt->as == 0)
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ if (authctxt->as == NULL)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
- if (compat20) {
- auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
- auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
- } else
- auth_method = "bsdauth";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m);
- auth_method = "skey";
+ auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+ auth_submethod = "skey";
return (authok != 0);
}
start_pam(authctxt);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+ if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
return (0);
}
u_int ret;
if (!options.use_pam)
- fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+ fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
ret = do_pam_account();
mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
+ fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
buffer_put_int(m, 1);
} else {
buffer_put_int(m, 0);
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
- ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
+ ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
+ &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
- ret = -1;
+ fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, ret);
buffer_put_cstring(m, name);
free(name);
buffer_put_cstring(m, info);
free(info);
+ buffer_put_int(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached());
buffer_put_int(m, num);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]);
int ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
num = buffer_get_int(m);
if (num > 0) {
int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
+ if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
buffer_clear(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+ /* Allow another attempt */
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return r;
key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
- if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) ||
- (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY))
- fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__);
-
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
cuser, chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
- case MM_RSAHOSTKEY:
- key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */
- allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication &&
- auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw,
- cuser, chost, key);
- if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1)
- auth_clear_options();
- auth_method = "rsa";
- break;
-#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
}
+
+ debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
+ __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
if (key != NULL)
key_free(key);
free(chost);
}
- debug3("%s: key %p is %s",
- __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
-
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
- if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
-
return (0);
}
monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
Buffer b;
- char *p, *userstyle;
+ u_char *p;
+ char *userstyle, *cp;
u_int len;
int fail = 0;
}
if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
- if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) {
- logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s",
- userstyle, p);
+ if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+ logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+ "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
buffer_skip_string(&b);
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) {
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
} else {
- p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
- if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0)
+ cp = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL);
+ if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
if (!buffer_get_char(&b))
fail++;
buffer_skip_string(&b);
__func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified");
/* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */
- if (verified == 1)
+ if (verified == 1 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key);
else
key_free(key);
static void
mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
+ struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
- if (options.use_login)
- return;
-
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
- get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+ session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
return (0);
}
-#ifdef WITH_SSH1
-int
-mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *p;
- int rsafail;
-
- /* Turn off permissions */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0);
-
- if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, p);
-
- rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, rsafail);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, p);
-
- BN_clear_free(p);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- int i;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (buffer_len(m) != 16)
- fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__);
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m);
-
- /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
-
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- BIGNUM *client_n;
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob = NULL;
- u_int blen = 0;
- int allowed = 0;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- auth_method = "rsa";
- if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) {
- if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
- buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n);
- allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key);
- BN_clear_free(client_n);
- }
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, allowed);
- buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL);
-
- /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- if (allowed && key != NULL) {
- key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */
- if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0)
- fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__);
- buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen);
-
- /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
- key_blob = blob;
- key_bloblen = blen;
- key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY;
- }
- if (key != NULL)
- key_free(key);
-
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed);
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob;
- u_int blen;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- if (key->type != KEY_RSA)
- fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type);
- key->type = KEY_RSA1;
- if (ssh1_challenge)
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key);
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge);
-
- debug3("%s sending reply", __func__);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m);
-
- monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- return (0);
-}
-
-int
-mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m)
-{
- Key *key = NULL;
- u_char *blob, *response;
- u_int blen, len;
- int success;
-
- debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
- if (!authctxt->valid)
- fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__);
- if (ssh1_challenge == NULL)
- fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__);
-
- blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen);
- if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen))
- fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
- if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)
- fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype);
- if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__);
- response = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
- if (len != 16)
- fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__);
- success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response);
-
- free(blob);
- key_free(key);
- free(response);
-
- auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa";
-
- /* reset state */
- BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge);
- ssh1_challenge = NULL;
- monitor_reset_key_state();
-
- buffer_clear(m);
- buffer_put_int(m, success);
- mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m);
-
- return (success);
-}
-#endif
-
int
mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req)
{
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
- if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) {
+ if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
+ kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
-
- /* Update with new address */
- if (options.compression) {
- ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib,
- (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
- (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
- }
}
/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
- struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
-
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
- /* Used to share zlib space across processes */
- if (options.compression) {
- mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
- mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
-
- /* Compression needs to share state across borders */
- ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
- (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
- (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
- }
-
return mon;
}
OM_uint32 major;
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
goid.length = len;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
in.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
OM_uint32 ret;
u_int len;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
gssbuf.length = len;
mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len);
{
int authenticated;
+ if (!options.gss_authentication)
+ fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
+
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
buffer_clear(m);
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
-