UPSTREAM: net/packet: fix overflow in check for priv area size

[android-x86/kernel.git] / net / packet / af_packet.c

diff --git a/net/packet/af_packet.c b/net/packet/af_packet.c
index d805cd5..d768001 100644 (file)
--- a/net/packet/af_packet.c
+++ b/net/packet/af_packet.c
@@ -3021,7 +3021,7 @@ static int packet_bind_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
                            int addr_len)
 {
        struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
-       char name[15];
+       char name[sizeof(uaddr->sa_data) + 1];
 
        /*
         *      Check legality
@@ -3029,7 +3029,11 @@ static int packet_bind_spkt(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
 
        if (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr))
                return -EINVAL;
-       strlcpy(name, uaddr->sa_data, sizeof(name));
+       /* uaddr->sa_data comes from the userspace, it's not guaranteed to be
+        * zero-terminated.
+        */
+       memcpy(name, uaddr->sa_data, sizeof(uaddr->sa_data));
+       name[sizeof(uaddr->sa_data)] = 0;
 
        return packet_do_bind(sk, name, 0, pkt_sk(sk)->num);
 }
@@ -4134,8 +4138,8 @@ static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
                if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
                        goto out;
                if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
-                   (int)(req->tp_block_size -
-                         BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
+                   req->tp_block_size <=
+                         BLK_PLUS_PRIV((u64)req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv))
                        goto out;
                if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
                                        po->tp_reserve))