*
******************************************************************************/
+#include <log/log.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "device/include/interop.h"
#include "include/bt_target.h"
#include "stack/btm/btm_int.h"
#include "stack/include/l2c_api.h"
+#include "stack/smp/p_256_ecc_pp.h"
#include "stack/smp/smp_int.h"
#include "utils/include/bt_utils.h"
+extern fixed_queue_t *btu_general_alarm_queue;
+
#if SMP_INCLUDED == TRUE
const UINT8 smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] =
{
return acl->lmp_version < version;
}
+static bool pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(tSMP_CB *p_cb)
+{
+ uint8_t reason = 0;
+
+ if (p_cb->cert_failure < 2 || p_cb->cert_failure > 6)
+ return false;
+
+ SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
+
+ switch (p_cb->cert_failure)
+ {
+ case 2:
+ reason = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ break;
+ case 3:
+ reason = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_UNKNOWN;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ break;
+ case 4:
+ reason = SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ break;
+ case 5:
+ reason = SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAIL;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ break;
+ case 6:
+ reason = SMP_REPEATED_ATTEMPTS;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return true;;
+}
+
/*******************************************************************************
** Function smp_update_key_mask
** Description This function updates the key mask for sending or receiving.
{
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
+
+ /* Cancel pending auth complete timer if set */
+ alarm_cancel(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent);
}
/*******************************************************************************
return;
}
+ // PTS Testing failure modes
+ if (pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(p_cb))
+ return;
+
if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
{
if (!(p_cb->flags & SMP_PAIR_FLAGS_WE_STARTED_DD))
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
STREAM_TO_ARRAY(p_cb->peer_publ_key.y, p, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
+
+ Point pt;
+ memcpy(pt.x, p_cb->peer_publ_key.x, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
+ memcpy(pt.y, p_cb->peer_publ_key.y, BT_OCTET32_LEN);
+
+ if (!ECC_ValidatePoint(&pt)) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "72377774");
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ return;
+ }
+
p_cb->flags |= SMP_PAIR_FLAG_HAVE_PEER_PUBL_KEY;
smp_wait_for_both_public_keys(p_cb, NULL);
UINT8 reason = SMP_INVALID_PARAMETERS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__);
- p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
if (smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(p_cb))
{
+ if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len < 2) { // 1 (opcode) + 1 (Notif Type) bytes
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "111936834");
+ }
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
return;
}
+ p_cb->status = *(UINT8 *)p_data;
+
if (p != NULL)
{
STREAM_TO_UINT8(p_cb->peer_keypress_notification, p);
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_key_distribution(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
- UINT8 reason = SMP_SUCCESS;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s role=%d (0-master) r_keys=0x%x i_keys=0x%x",
__func__, p_cb->role, p_cb->local_r_key, p_cb->local_i_key);
}
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
- smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
- else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Instead of declaring authorization complete immediately,
+ * delay the event from being sent by SMP_DELAYED_AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS.
+ * This allows the slave to send over Pairing Failed if the
+ * last key is rejected. During this waiting window, the
+ * state should remain in SMP_STATE_BOND_PENDING.
+ */
+ if (!alarm_is_scheduled(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent)) {
+ SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s delaying auth complete.", __func__);
+ alarm_set_on_queue(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent, SMP_DELAYED_AUTH_TIMEOUT_MS,
+ smp_delayed_auth_complete_timeout, NULL, btu_general_alarm_queue);
+ }
+ } else {
p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete = TRUE;
+ }
}
}
}
{
if (smp_request_oob_data(p_cb)) return;
}
+
+ // PTS Testing failure modes
+ if (pts_test_send_authentication_complete_failure(p_cb))
+ return;
+
smp_send_pair_rsp(p_cb, NULL);
}
}
{
if (p_cb->total_tx_unacked == 0)
{
- /* update connection parameter to remote preferred */
- L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, TRUE);
/* process the pairing complete */
smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(p_cb);
}
*******************************************************************************/
void smp_fast_conn_param(tSMP_CB *p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA *p_data)
{
- /* disable connection parameter update */
- L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, FALSE);
+ /* Disable L2CAP connection parameter updates while bonding since
+ some peripherals are not able to revert to fast connection parameters
+ during the start of service discovery. Connection paramter updates
+ get enabled again once service discovery completes. */
+ L2CA_EnableUpdateBleConnParams(p_cb->pairing_bda, false);
}
/*******************************************************************************
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s start ", __func__);
+ // PTS Testing failure modes
+ if (p_cb->cert_failure == 1) {
+ SMP_TRACE_ERROR("%s failure case = %d", __func__, p_cb->cert_failure);
+ reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
+ smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
+ return;
+ }
+
switch(p_cb->selected_association_model)
{
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS:
break;
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT:
case SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP:
- if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb))
+ if (!smp_check_commitment(p_cb) && p_cb->cert_failure != 9)
{
reason = p_cb->failure = SMP_CONFIRM_VALUE_ERR;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &reason);
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