OSDN Git Service

x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer
authorAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Tue, 8 Jun 2021 14:36:19 +0000 (16:36 +0200)
committerBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Wed, 9 Jun 2021 07:49:38 +0000 (09:49 +0200)
commitd8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a
tree3a52ddcc283c9bbe45a98a638060475906b8c7dd
parent484cea4f362e1eeb5c869abbfb5f90eae6421b38
x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a user buffer

Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to
fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state.  The actual
conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems
plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page
and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing
XRSTOR on the page in question.

__fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers
are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the
fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but
modify the registers.

If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig()
could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without
reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU
state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the
victim task's user-visible state.

Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this
situation from corrupting any state.

[1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex
    microarchitectural conditions".

Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()")
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.de
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c