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KVM: vmx: Inject #UD for SGX ENCLS instruction in guest
authorSean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Tue, 14 Aug 2018 16:33:34 +0000 (09:33 -0700)
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Wed, 22 Aug 2018 14:48:35 +0000 (16:48 +0200)
Virtualization of Intel SGX depends on Enclave Page Cache (EPC)
management that is not yet available in the kernel, i.e. KVM support
for exposing SGX to a guest cannot be added until basic support
for SGX is upstreamed, which is a WIP[1].

Until SGX is properly supported in KVM, ensure a guest sees expected
behavior for ENCLS, i.e. all ENCLS #UD.  Because SGX does not have a
true software enable bit, e.g. there is no CR4.SGXE bit, the ENCLS
instruction can be executed[1] by the guest if SGX is supported by the
system.  Intercept all ENCLS leafs (via the ENCLS- exiting control and
field) and unconditionally inject #UD.

[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/kvm/msg171333.html or
    https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/7/3/879

[2] A guest can execute ENCLS in the sense that ENCLS will not take
    an immediate #UD, but no ENCLS will ever succeed in a guest
    without explicit support from KVM (map EPC memory into the guest),
    unless KVM has a *very* egregious bug, e.g. accidentally mapped
    EPC memory into the guest SPTEs.  In other words this patch is
    needed only to prevent the guest from seeing inconsistent behavior,
    e.g. #GP (SGX not enabled in Feature Control MSR) or #PF (leaf
    operand(s) does not point at EPC memory) instead of #UD on ENCLS.
    Intercepting ENCLS is not required to prevent the guest from truly
    utilizing SGX.

Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Message-Id: <20180814163334.25724-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c

index 31e90e8..c76ca8c 100644 (file)
@@ -1684,6 +1684,12 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery(void)
                SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY;
 }
 
+static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit(void)
+{
+       return vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl &
+               SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+}
+
 /*
  * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
  * Refer from
@@ -4551,7 +4557,8 @@ static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf)
                        SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
                        SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
                        SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
-                       SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC;
+                       SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
+                       SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
                if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
                                        MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
                                        &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
@@ -6648,6 +6655,9 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_setup(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
                vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
                vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
        }
+
+       if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+               vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
 }
 
 static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
@@ -9314,6 +9324,17 @@ fail:
        return 1;
 }
 
+static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+       /*
+        * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
+        * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
+        * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+        */
+       kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+       return 1;
+}
+
 /*
  * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
  * may resume.  Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
@@ -9371,6 +9392,7 @@ static int (*const kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
        [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID]                 = handle_invpcid,
        [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC]                  = handle_vmfunc,
        [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER]        = handle_preemption_timer,
+       [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS]                   = handle_encls,
 };
 
 static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
@@ -9741,6 +9763,9 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_reflected(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 exit_reason)
        case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC:
                /* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
                return false;
+       case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
+               /* SGX is never exposed to L1 */
+               return false;
        default:
                return true;
        }
@@ -12101,6 +12126,9 @@ static int prepare_vmcs02(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
                if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
                        vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, -1ull);
 
+               if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+                       vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+
                vmcs_write32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL, exec_control);
        }