ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull

Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning
IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
  CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
  Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
    dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
    kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125
    kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219
    kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
    put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
    ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719
    ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733
    rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521
    [..]

This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from
the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4.

With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a
packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in
the head and the remainder in a frag.

Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies
in skb head.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@mail.gmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
index 64c76dc..c0fe5ad 100644 (file)
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -150,15 +150,18 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
        struct sockaddr_in sin;
        const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-       __be16 *ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+       __be16 *ports;
+       int end;
 
-       if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 > (int)skb->len)
+       end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
+       if (end > 0 && !pskb_may_pull(skb, end))
                return;
 
        /* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
         * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
         * written with this assumption in mind.
         */
+       ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
 
        sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
        sin.sin_addr.s_addr = iph->daddr;

diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 2ee08b6..1a1f876 100644 (file)
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -700,13 +700,16 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
        }
        if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
                struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
-               __be16 *ports = (__be16 *) skb_transport_header(skb);
+               __be16 *ports;
+               int end;
 
-               if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 <= (int)skb->len) {
+               end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
+               if (end <= 0 || pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) {
                        /* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
                         * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
                         * written with this assumption in mind.
                         */
+                       ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
 
                        sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
                        sin6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;