Bluetooth: Fix tracking local SSP authentication requirement

When we need to make the decision whether to perform just-works or real
user confirmation we need to know the exact local authentication
requirement that was passed to the controller. So far conn->auth_type
(the local requirement) wasn't in one case updated appropriately in fear
of the user confirmation being rejected later.

The real problem however was not really that conn->auth_type couldn't
represent the true value but that we were checking the local MITM
requirement in an incorrect way. It's perfectly fine to let auth_type
follow what we tell the controller since we're still tracking the target
security level with conn->pending_sec_level.

This patch updates the check for local MITM requirement in the
hci_user_confirm_request_evt function to use the locally requested
security level and ensures that auth_type always represents what we tell
the controller. All other code in hci_user_confirm_request_evt still
uses the auth_type instead of pending_sec_level for determining whether
to do just-works or not, since that's the only value that's in sync with
what the remote device knows.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Tested-by: Szymon Janc <szymon.janc@tieto.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.16

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
index f0f2200..8980bd2 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
@@ -3664,18 +3664,14 @@ static void hci_io_capa_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
                /* If we are initiators, there is no remote information yet */
                if (conn->remote_auth == 0xff) {
-                       cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
-
                        /* Request MITM protection if our IO caps allow it
                         * except for the no-bonding case.
-                        * conn->auth_type is not updated here since
-                        * that might cause the user confirmation to be
-                        * rejected in case the remote doesn't have the
-                        * IO capabilities for MITM.
                         */
                        if (conn->io_capability != HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT &&
                            cp.authentication != HCI_AT_NO_BONDING)
-                               cp.authentication |= 0x01;
+                               conn->auth_type |= 0x01;
+
+                       cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
                } else {
                        conn->auth_type = hci_get_auth_req(conn);
                        cp.authentication = conn->auth_type;
@@ -3747,9 +3743,12 @@ static void hci_user_confirm_request_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev,
        rem_mitm = (conn->remote_auth & 0x01);
 
        /* If we require MITM but the remote device can't provide that
-        * (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation request
+        * (it has NoInputNoOutput) then reject the confirmation
+        * request. We check the security level here since it doesn't
+        * necessarily match conn->auth_type.
         */
-       if (loc_mitm && conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
+       if (conn->pending_sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM &&
+           conn->remote_cap == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT) {
                BT_DBG("Rejecting request: remote device can't provide MITM");
                hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY,
                             sizeof(ev->bdaddr), &ev->bdaddr);