My previous patch checked if encryption should be enabled by directly
checking info->control.hw_key (like the downstream driver).
However that missed that the control and driver_info members of
struct ieee80211_tx_info are union fields.
Due to this when rsi_core_xmit() updates fields in "tx_params"
(driver_info) it can overwrite the control.hw_key, causing the result
of the later test to be incorrect.
With the current structure layout the first byte of control.hw_key is
overlayed with the vap_id so, since we only test if control.hw_key is
NULL / non NULL, a non zero vap_id will incorrectly enable encryption.
In basic STA and AP modes the vap_id is always zero so it works but in
P2P client mode a second VIF is created causing vap_id to be non zero
and hence encryption to be enabled before keys have been set.
Fix this by extracting the key presence flag to a new field in the driver
private tx_params structure and populating it first.
Fixes:
314538041b56 ("rsi: fix AP mode with WPA failure due to encrypted EAPOL")
Signed-off-by: Martin Fuzzey <martin.fuzzey@flowbird.group>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1630337206-12410-3-git-send-email-martin.fuzzey@flowbird.group
info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
tx_params = (struct skb_info *)info->driver_data;
+ /* info->driver_data and info->control part of union so make copy */
+ tx_params->have_key = !!info->control.hw_key;
wh = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)&skb->data[0];
tx_params->sta_id = 0;
wh->frame_control |= cpu_to_le16(RSI_SET_PS_ENABLE);
if ((!(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_DONT_ENCRYPT)) &&
- info->control.hw_key) {
+ tx_params->have_key) {
if (rsi_is_cipher_wep(common))
ieee80211_size += 4;
else
u8 internal_hdr_size;
struct ieee80211_vif *vif;
u8 vap_id;
+ bool have_key;
};
enum edca_queue {