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perf tool: Make perf tool aware of SELinux access control
authorAlexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Thu, 30 Apr 2020 07:15:57 +0000 (10:15 +0300)
committerArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Thu, 28 May 2020 13:03:26 +0000 (10:03 -0300)
Implement selinux sysfs check to see the system is in enforcing mode and
print warning message with pointer to check audit logs.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/819338ce-d160-4a2f-f1aa-d756a2e7c6fc@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
tools/perf/util/cloexec.c
tools/perf/util/evsel.c

index 6b3988a..fa8248a 100644 (file)
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
                return 1;
        }
 
-       WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY,
+       WARN_ONCE(err != EINVAL && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
                  "perf_event_open(..., PERF_FLAG_FD_CLOEXEC) failed with unexpected error %d (%s)\n",
                  err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)));
 
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static int perf_flag_probe(void)
        if (fd >= 0)
                close(fd);
 
-       if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY,
+       if (WARN_ONCE(fd < 0 && err != EBUSY && err != EACCES,
                      "perf_event_open(..., 0) failed unexpectedly with error %d (%s)\n",
                      err, str_error_r(err, sbuf, sizeof(sbuf))))
                return -1;
index 55f2c6c..95b5251 100644 (file)
@@ -2478,31 +2478,40 @@ int evsel__open_strerror(struct evsel *evsel, struct target *target,
                         int err, char *msg, size_t size)
 {
        char sbuf[STRERR_BUFSIZE];
-       int printed = 0;
+       int printed = 0, enforced = 0;
 
        switch (err) {
        case EPERM:
        case EACCES:
+               printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+                       "Access to performance monitoring and observability operations is limited.\n");
+
+               if (!sysfs__read_int("fs/selinux/enforce", &enforced)) {
+                       if (enforced) {
+                               printed += scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
+                                       "Enforced MAC policy settings (SELinux) can limit access to performance\n"
+                                       "monitoring and observability operations. Inspect system audit records for\n"
+                                       "more perf_event access control information and adjusting the policy.\n");
+                       }
+               }
+
                if (err == EPERM)
-                       printed = scnprintf(msg, size,
+                       printed += scnprintf(msg, size,
                                "No permission to enable %s event.\n\n", evsel__name(evsel));
 
                return scnprintf(msg + printed, size - printed,
-                "You may not have permission to collect %sstats.\n\n"
-                "Consider tweaking /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid,\n"
-                "which controls use of the performance events system by\n"
-                "unprivileged users (without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN).\n\n"
-                "The current value is %d:\n\n"
+                "Consider adjusting /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_paranoid setting to open\n"
+                "access to performance monitoring and observability operations for users\n"
+                "without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN Linux capability.\n"
+                "perf_event_paranoid setting is %d:\n"
                 "  -1: Allow use of (almost) all events by all users\n"
                 "      Ignore mlock limit after perf_event_mlock_kb without CAP_IPC_LOCK\n"
-                ">= 0: Disallow ftrace function tracepoint by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-                "      Disallow raw tracepoint access by users without CAP_SYS_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-                ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n"
-                ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling by users without CAP_PERFMON or CAP_SYS_ADMIN\n\n"
-                "To make this setting permanent, edit /etc/sysctl.conf too, e.g.:\n\n"
-                "      kernel.perf_event_paranoid = -1\n" ,
-                                target->system_wide ? "system-wide " : "",
-                                perf_event_paranoid());
+                ">= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access\n"
+                ">= 1: Disallow CPU event access\n"
+                ">= 2: Disallow kernel profiling\n"
+                "To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it\n"
+                "in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)",
+                perf_event_paranoid());
        case ENOENT:
                return scnprintf(msg, size, "The %s event is not supported.", evsel__name(evsel));
        case EMFILE: