legacy: Add HACK to set legacy SM4 from gd_acl

Bug: 185967523
Test: gd/cert/run
Tag: #refactor
BYPASS_LONG_LINES_REASON: Bluetooth likes 120 lines

Change-Id: I32c92511fadebf458175a7f8f210c4ec0e0d3c74

diff --git a/stack/acl/btm_acl.cc b/stack/acl/btm_acl.cc
index 39892b7..65b3c94 100644 (file)
--- a/stack/acl/btm_acl.cc
+++ b/stack/acl/btm_acl.cc
@@ -2910,3 +2910,35 @@ bool acl_check_and_clear_ignore_auto_connect_after_disconnect(
 void acl_clear_all_ignore_auto_connect_after_disconnect() {
   btm_cb.acl_cb_.ClearAllIgnoreAutoConnectAfterDisconnect();
 }
+
+/**
+ * Confusingly, immutable device features are stored in the
+ * ephemeral connection data structure while connection security
+ * is stored in the device record.
+ *
+ * This HACK allows legacy security protocols to work as intended under
+ * those conditions.
+ */
+void HACK_acl_check_sm4(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC& record) {
+  // Return if we already know this info
+  if ((record.sm4 & BTM_SM4_TRUE) != BTM_SM4_UNKNOWN) return;
+
+  tACL_CONN* p_acl =
+      internal_.btm_bda_to_acl(record.RemoteAddress(), BT_TRANSPORT_BR_EDR);
+  if (p_acl == nullptr) {
+    LOG_WARN("Unable to find active acl for authentication device:%s",
+             PRIVATE_ADDRESS(record.RemoteAddress()));
+  }
+
+  // If we have not received the SSP feature record
+  // we have to wait
+  if (!p_acl->peer_lmp_feature_valid[1]) {
+    LOG_WARN(
+        "Authentication started without extended feature page 1 request "
+        "response");
+    return;
+  }
+  record.sm4 = (HCI_SSP_HOST_SUPPORTED(p_acl->peer_lmp_feature_pages[1]))
+                   ? BTM_SM4_TRUE
+                   : BTM_SM4_KNOWN;
+}

diff --git a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
index 85744df..5b309ba 100644 (file)
--- a/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
+++ b/stack/btm/btm_sec.cc
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include "osi/include/log.h"
 #include "osi/include/osi.h"
 #include "stack/btm/btm_dev.h"
+#include "stack/btm/security_device_record.h"
 #include "stack/include/acl_api.h"
 #include "stack/include/acl_hci_link_interface.h"
 #include "stack/include/btm_status.h"
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ extern bool btm_ble_init_pseudo_addr(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec,
 extern void bta_dm_remove_device(const RawAddress& bd_addr);
 extern void bta_dm_process_remove_device(const RawAddress& bd_addr);
 extern void btm_inq_clear_ssp(void);
+extern void HACK_acl_check_sm4(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC& p_dev_rec);
 
 /*******************************************************************************
  *             L O C A L    F U N C T I O N     P R O T O T Y P E S            *
@@ -4214,18 +4216,31 @@ uint16_t BTM_GetClockOffset(const RawAddress& remote_bda) {
  *
  ******************************************************************************/
 tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
-  BTM_TRACE_EVENT(
-      "btm_sec_execute_procedure: Required:0x%x Flags:0x%x State:%d",
-      p_dev_rec->security_required, p_dev_rec->sec_flags, p_dev_rec->sec_state);
+  CHECK(p_dev_rec != nullptr);
+  LOG_DEBUG(
+      "security_required:0x%x security_flags:0x%x security_state:%s[%hhu]",
+      p_dev_rec->security_required, p_dev_rec->sec_flags,
+      security_state_text(static_cast<tSECURITY_STATE>(p_dev_rec->sec_state))
+          .c_str(),
+      p_dev_rec->sec_state);
 
-  /* There is a chance that we are getting name.  Wait until done. */
-  if (p_dev_rec->sec_state != 0) return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+  if (p_dev_rec->sec_state != BTM_SEC_STATE_IDLE) {
+    LOG_DEBUG(
+        "Security state is idle indicating remote name request is outstanding");
+    return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+  }
+
+  if (!bluetooth::shim::is_gd_acl_enabled()) {
+    // Load the SM4 values  //
+    HACK_acl_check_sm4(*p_dev_rec);
+  }
 
   /* If any security is required, get the name first */
   if (!(p_dev_rec->sec_flags & BTM_SEC_NAME_KNOWN) &&
       (p_dev_rec->hci_handle != HCI_INVALID_HANDLE)) {
-    BTM_TRACE_EVENT("Security Manager: Start get name");
+    LOG_DEBUG("Security Manager: Start get name");
     if (!btm_sec_start_get_name(p_dev_rec)) {
+      LOG_WARN("Unable to start remote name request");
       return (BTM_NO_RESOURCES);
     }
     return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
@@ -4249,7 +4264,7 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
      * authenticated connections, hence we cannot distinguish here.
      */
 
-    BTM_TRACE_EVENT("Security Manager: Start authentication");
+    LOG_DEBUG("Security Manager: Start authentication");
 
     /*
      * If we do have a link-key, but we end up here because we need an
@@ -4273,6 +4288,8 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
 
     btm_sec_start_authentication(p_dev_rec);
     return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+  } else {
+    LOG_DEBUG("Authentication not required");
   }
 
   /* If connection is not encrypted and encryption is required */
@@ -4288,6 +4305,8 @@ tBTM_STATUS btm_sec_execute_procedure(tBTM_SEC_DEV_REC* p_dev_rec) {
     btsnd_hcic_set_conn_encrypt(p_dev_rec->hci_handle, true);
     p_dev_rec->sec_state = BTM_SEC_STATE_ENCRYPTING;
     return (BTM_CMD_STARTED);
+  } else {
+    LOG_DEBUG("Encryption not required");
   }
 
   if ((p_dev_rec->security_required & BTM_SEC_MODE4_LEVEL4) &&