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Nicolai Stange [Sat, 21 Jul 2018 20:16:56 +0000 (22:16 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Don't set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush()
vmx_l1d_flush() gets invoked only if l1tf_flush_l1d is true. There's no
point in setting l1tf_flush_l1d to true from there again.
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Josh Poimboeuf [Tue, 24 Jul 2018 16:17:40 +0000 (18:17 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS
If SMT is disabled in BIOS, the CPU code doesn't properly detect it.
The /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control file shows 'on', and the 'l1tf'
vulnerabilities file shows SMT as vulnerable.
Fix it by forcing 'cpu_smt_control' to CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED in such a
case. Unfortunately the detection can only be done after bringing all
the CPUs online, so we have to overwrite any previous writes to the
variable.
Reported-by: Joe Mario <jmario@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Fixes:
f048c399e0f7 ("x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Tony Luck [Thu, 19 Jul 2018 20:49:58 +0000 (13:49 -0700)]
Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos
Fix spelling and other typos
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Nicolai Stange [Wed, 18 Jul 2018 17:07:38 +0000 (19:07 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages' content
The slow path in vmx_l1d_flush() reads from vmx_l1d_flush_pages in order
to evict the L1d cache.
However, these pages are never cleared and, in theory, their data could be
leaked.
More importantly, KSM could merge a nested hypervisor's vmx_l1d_flush_pages
to fewer than 1 << L1D_CACHE_ORDER host physical pages and this would break
the L1d flushing algorithm: L1D on x86_64 is tagged by physical addresses.
Fix this by initializing the individual vmx_l1d_flush_pages with a
different pattern each.
Rename the "empty_zp" asm constraint identifier in vmx_l1d_flush() to
"flush_pages" to reflect this change.
Fixes:
a47dd5f06714 ("x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Jiri Kosina [Sat, 14 Jul 2018 19:56:13 +0000 (21:56 +0200)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures
pfn_modify_allowed() and arch_has_pfn_modify_check() are outside of the
!__ASSEMBLY__ section in include/asm-generic/pgtable.h, which confuses
assembler on archs that don't have __HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED (e.g.
ia64) and breaks build:
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h: Assembler messages:
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:538: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool pfn_modify_allowed(unsigned long pfn,pgprot_t prot)'
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:540: Error: Unknown opcode `return true'
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:543: Error: Unknown opcode `static inline bool arch_has_pfn_modify_check(void)'
include/asm-generic/pgtable.h:545: Error: Unknown opcode `return false'
arch/ia64/kernel/entry.S:69: Error: `mov' does not fit into bundle
Move those two static inlines into the !__ASSEMBLY__ section so that they
don't confuse the asm build pass.
Fixes:
42e4089c7890 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:26 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities
Add documentation for the L1TF vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms:
- Explain the problem and risks
- Document the mitigation mechanisms
- Document the command line controls
- Document the sysfs files
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.287429944@linutronix.de
Jiri Kosina [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:25 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations
Introduce the 'l1tf=' kernel command line option to allow for boot-time
switching of mitigation that is used on processors affected by L1TF.
The possible values are:
full
Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF vulnerability. Disables
SMT and enables all mitigations in the hypervisors. SMT control via
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible after boot.
Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in
a potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
disabled.
full,force
Same as 'full', but disables SMT control. Implies the 'nosmt=force'
command line option. sysfs control of SMT and the hypervisor flush
control is disabled.
flush
Leaves SMT enabled and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation.
Hypervisors will issue a warning when the first VM is started in a
potentially insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
disabled.
flush,nosmt
Disables SMT and enables the conditional hypervisor mitigation. SMT
control via /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control is still possible
after boot. If SMT is reenabled or flushing disabled at runtime
hypervisors will issue a warning.
flush,nowarn
Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when
a VM is started in a potentially insecure configuration.
off
Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any warnings.
Default is 'flush'.
Let KVM adhere to these semantics, which means:
- 'lt1f=full,force' : Performe L1D flushes. No runtime control
possible.
- 'l1tf=full'
- 'l1tf-flush'
- 'l1tf=flush,nosmt' : Perform L1D flushes and warn on VM start if
SMT has been runtime enabled or L1D flushing
has been run-time enabled
- 'l1tf=flush,nowarn' : Perform L1D flushes and no warnings are emitted.
- 'l1tf=off' : L1D flushes are not performed and no warnings
are emitted.
KVM can always override the L1D flushing behavior using its 'vmentry_l1d_flush'
module parameter except when lt1f=full,force is set.
This makes KVM's private 'nosmt' option redundant, and as it is a bit
non-systematic anyway (this is something to control globally, not on
hypervisor level), remove that option.
Add the missing Documentation entry for the l1tf vulnerability sysfs file
while at it.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.202758176@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:24 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early
The CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED state is set (if the processor does not support
SMT) when the sysfs SMT control file is initialized.
That was fine so far as this was only required to make the output of the
control file correct and to prevent writes in that case.
With the upcoming l1tf command line parameter, this needs to be set up
before the L1TF mitigation selection and command line parsing happens.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.121795971@linutronix.de
Jiri Kosina [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:23 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function
The L1TF mitigation will gain a commend line parameter which allows to set
a combination of hypervisor mitigation and SMT control.
Expose cpu_smt_disable() so the command line parser can tweak SMT settings.
[ tglx: Split out of larger patch and made it preserve an already existing
force off state ]
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.039715135@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:22 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush
All mitigation modes can be switched at run time with a static key now:
- Use sysfs_streq() instead of strcmp() to handle the trailing new line
from sysfs writes correctly.
- Make the static key management handle multiple invocations properly.
- Set the module parameter file to RW
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.954525119@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:21 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter
Writes to the parameter files are not serialized at the sysfs core
level, so local serialization is required.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.873642605@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:20 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always
Avoid the conditional in the L1D flush control path.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.790914912@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:19 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function
In preparation of allowing run time control for L1D flushing, move the
setup code to the module parameter handler.
In case of pre module init parsing, just store the value and let vmx_init()
do the actual setup after running kvm_init() so that enable_ept is having
the correct state.
During run-time invoke it directly from the parameter setter to prepare for
run-time control.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.694063239@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:18 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper
If Extended Page Tables (EPT) are disabled or not supported, no L1D
flushing is required. The setup function can just avoid setting up the L1D
flush for the EPT=n case.
Invoke it after the hardware setup has be done and enable_ept has the
correct state and expose the EPT disabled state in the mitigation status as
well.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.612160168@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:17 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach
The VMX module parameter to control the L1D flush should become
writeable.
The MSR list is set up at VM init per guest VCPU, but the run time
switching is based on a static key which is global. Toggling the MSR list
at run time might be feasible, but for now drop this optimization and use
the regular MSR write to make run-time switching possible.
The default mitigation is the conditional flush anyway, so for extra
paranoid setups this will add some small overhead, but the extra code
executed is in the noise compared to the flush itself.
Aside of that the EPT disabled case is not handled correctly at the moment
and the MSR list magic is in the way for fixing that as well.
If it's really providing a significant advantage, then this needs to be
revisited after the code is correct and the control is writable.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.516940445@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 13 Jul 2018 14:23:16 +0000 (16:23 +0200)]
x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable
Store the effective mitigation of VMX in a status variable and use it to
report the VMX state in the l1tf sysfs file.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.433098358@linutronix.de
Thomas Gleixner [Sat, 7 Jul 2018 09:40:18 +0000 (11:40 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on
Writing 'off' to /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control offlines all SMT
siblings. Writing 'on' merily enables the abilify to online them, but does
not online them automatically.
Make 'on' more useful by onlining all offline siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 28 Jun 2018 21:10:36 +0000 (17:10 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required
If the L1D flush module parameter is set to 'always' and the IA32_FLUSH_CMD
MSR is available, optimize the VMENTER code with the MSR save list.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 02:01:22 +0000 (22:01 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs
The IA32_FLUSH_CMD MSR needs only to be written on VMENTER. Extend
add_atomic_switch_msr() with an entry_only parameter to allow storing the
MSR only in the guest (ENTRY) MSR array.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 02:00:47 +0000 (22:00 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting
This allows to load a different number of MSRs depending on the context:
VMEXIT or VMENTER.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 00:11:39 +0000 (20:11 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function
.. to help find the MSR on either the guest or host MSR list.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 20 Jun 2018 17:58:37 +0000 (13:58 -0400)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers
There is no semantic change but this change allows an unbalanced amount of
MSRs to be loaded on VMEXIT and VMENTER, i.e. the number of MSRs to save or
restore on VMEXIT or VMENTER may be different.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Paolo Bonzini [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 11:07:14 +0000 (13:07 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic
Add the logic for flushing L1D on VMENTER. The flush depends on the static
key being enabled and the new l1tf_flush_l1d flag being set.
The flags is set:
- Always, if the flush module parameter is 'always'
- Conditionally at:
- Entry to vcpu_run(), i.e. after executing user space
- From the sched_in notifier, i.e. when switching to a vCPU thread.
- From vmexit handlers which are considered unsafe, i.e. where
sensitive data can be brought into L1D:
- The emulator, which could be a good target for other speculative
execution-based threats,
- The MMU, which can bring host page tables in the L1 cache.
- External interrupts
- Nested operations that require the MMU (see above). That is
vmptrld, vmptrst, vmclear,vmwrite,vmread.
- When handling invept,invvpid
[ tglx: Split out from combo patch and reduced to a single flag ]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Paolo Bonzini [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 11:03:48 +0000 (13:03 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush
336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf defines a new MSR
(IA32_FLUSH_CMD aka 0x10B) which has similar write-only semantics to other
MSRs defined in the document.
The semantics of this MSR is to allow "finer granularity invalidation of
caching structures than existing mechanisms like WBINVD. It will writeback
and invalidate the L1 data cache, including all cachelines brought in by
preceding instructions, without invalidating all caches (eg. L2 or
LLC). Some processors may also invalidate the first level level instruction
cache on a L1D_FLUSH command. The L1 data and instruction caches may be
shared across the logical processors of a core."
Use it instead of the loop based L1 flush algorithm.
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
[ tglx: Avoid allocating pages when the MSR is available ]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Paolo Bonzini [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 10:47:38 +0000 (12:47 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm
To mitigate the L1 Terminal Fault vulnerability it's required to flush L1D
on VMENTER to prevent rogue guests from snooping host memory.
CPUs will have a new control MSR via a microcode update to flush L1D with a
single MSR write, but in the absence of microcode a fallback to a software
based flush algorithm is required.
Add a software flush loop which is based on code from Intel.
[ tglx: Split out from combo patch ]
[ bpetkov: Polish the asm code ]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Mon, 2 Jul 2018 10:29:30 +0000 (12:29 +0200)]
x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation
Add a mitigation mode parameter "vmentry_l1d_flush" for CVE-2018-3620, aka
L1 terminal fault. The valid arguments are:
- "always" L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
- "cond" Conditional L1D cache flush, explained below
- "never" Disable the L1D cache flush mitigation
"cond" is trying to avoid L1D cache flushes on VMENTER if the code executed
between VMEXIT and VMENTER is considered safe, i.e. is not bringing any
interesting information into L1D which might exploited.
[ tglx: Split out from a larger patch ]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 20 Jun 2018 15:29:53 +0000 (11:29 -0400)]
x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present
If the L1TF CPU bug is present we allow the KVM module to be loaded as the
major of users that use Linux and KVM have trusted guests and do not want a
broken setup.
Cloud vendors are the ones that are uncomfortable with CVE 2018-3620 and as
such they are the ones that should set nosmt to one.
Setting 'nosmt' means that the system administrator also needs to disable
SMT (Hyper-threading) in the BIOS, or via the 'nosmt' command line
parameter, or via the /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control. See commit
05736e4ac13c ("cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT").
Other mitigations are to use task affinity, cpu sets, interrupt binding,
etc - anything to make sure that _only_ the same guests vCPUs are running
on sibling threads.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 29 Jun 2018 14:05:48 +0000 (16:05 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once
Due to the way Machine Check Exceptions work on X86 hyperthreads it's
required to boot up _all_ logical cores at least once in order to set the
CR4.MCE bit.
So instead of ignoring the sibling threads right away, let them boot up
once so they can configure themselves. After they came out of the initial
boot stage check whether its a "secondary" sibling and cancel the operation
which puts the CPU back into offline state.
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Thomas Gleixner [Fri, 29 Jun 2018 14:05:47 +0000 (16:05 +0200)]
Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force"
Dave Hansen reported, that it's outright dangerous to keep SMT siblings
disabled completely so they are stuck in the BIOS and wait for SIPI.
The reason is that Machine Check Exceptions are broadcasted to siblings and
the soft disabled sibling has CR4.MCE = 0. If a MCE is delivered to a
logical core with CR4.MCE = 0, it asserts IERR#, which shuts down or
reboots the machine. The MCE chapter in the SDM contains the following
blurb:
Because the logical processors within a physical package are tightly
coupled with respect to shared hardware resources, both logical
processors are notified of machine check errors that occur within a
given physical processor. If machine-check exceptions are enabled when
a fatal error is reported, all the logical processors within a physical
package are dispatched to the machine-check exception handler. If
machine-check exceptions are disabled, the logical processors enter the
shutdown state and assert the IERR# signal. When enabling machine-check
exceptions, the MCE flag in control register CR4 should be set for each
logical processor.
Reverting the commit which ignores siblings at enumeration time solves only
half of the problem. The core cpuhotplug logic needs to be adjusted as
well.
This thoughtful engineered mechanism also turns the boot process on all
Intel HT enabled systems into a MCE lottery. MCE is enabled on the boot CPU
before the secondary CPUs are brought up. Depending on the number of
physical cores the window in which this situation can happen is smaller or
larger. On a HSW-EX it's about 750ms:
MCE is enabled on the boot CPU:
[ 0.244017] mce: CPU supports 22 MCE banks
The corresponding sibling #72 boots:
[ 1.008005] .... node #0, CPUs: #72
That means if an MCE hits on physical core 0 (logical CPUs 0 and 72)
between these two points the machine is going to shutdown. At least it's a
known safe state.
It's obvious that the early boot can be hit by an MCE as well and then runs
into the same situation because MCEs are not yet enabled on the boot CPU.
But after enabling them on the boot CPU, it does not make any sense to
prevent the kernel from recovering.
Adjust the nosmt kernel parameter documentation as well.
Reverts:
2207def700f9 ("x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force")
Reported-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Michal Hocko [Wed, 27 Jun 2018 15:46:50 +0000 (17:46 +0200)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE
Jan has noticed that pte_pfn and co. resp. pfn_pte are incorrect for
CONFIG_PAE because phys_addr_t is wider than unsigned long and so the
pte_val reps. shift left would get truncated. Fix this up by using proper
types.
Fixes:
6b28baca9b1f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation")
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Vlastimil Babka [Fri, 22 Jun 2018 15:39:33 +0000 (17:39 +0200)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF
The PAE 3-level paging code currently doesn't mitigate L1TF by flipping the
offset bits, and uses the high PTE word, thus bits 32-36 for type, 37-63 for
offset. The lower word is zeroed, thus systems with less than 4GB memory are
safe. With 4GB to 128GB the swap type selects the memory locations vulnerable
to L1TF; with even more memory, also the swap offfset influences the address.
This might be a problem with 32bit PAE guests running on large 64bit hosts.
By continuing to keep the whole swap entry in either high or low 32bit word of
PTE we would limit the swap size too much. Thus this patch uses the whole PAE
PTE with the same layout as the 64bit version does. The macros just become a
bit tricky since they assume the arch-dependent swp_entry_t to be 32bit.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Borislav Petkov [Fri, 22 Jun 2018 09:34:11 +0000 (11:34 +0200)]
x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings
The TOPOEXT reenablement is a workaround for broken BIOSen which didn't
enable the CPUID bit. amd_get_topology_early(), however, relies on
that bit being set so that it can read out the CPUID leaf and set
smp_num_siblings properly.
Move the reenablement up to early_init_amd(). While at it, simplify
amd_get_topology_early().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 20 Jun 2018 20:42:58 +0000 (16:42 -0400)]
x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support.
336996-Speculative-Execution-Side-Channel-Mitigations.pdf defines a new MSR
(IA32_FLUSH_CMD) which is detected by CPUID.7.EDX[28]=1 bit being set.
This new MSR "gives software a way to invalidate structures with finer
granularity than other architectual methods like WBINVD."
A copy of this document is available at
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=199511
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Vlastimil Babka [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 10:36:29 +0000 (12:36 +0200)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit
The previous patch has limited swap file size so that large offsets cannot
clear bits above MAX_PA/2 in the pte and interfere with L1TF mitigation.
It assumed that offsets are encoded starting with bit 12, same as pfn. But
on x86_64, offsets are encoded starting with bit 9.
Thus the limit can be raised by 3 bits. That means 16TB with 42bit MAX_PA
and 256TB with 46bit MAX_PA.
Fixes:
377eeaa8e11f ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2")
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 12:00:11 +0000 (14:00 +0200)]
x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force
nosmt on the kernel command line merely prevents the onlining of the
secondary SMT siblings.
nosmt=force makes the APIC detection code ignore the secondary SMT siblings
completely, so they even do not show up as possible CPUs. That reduces the
amount of memory allocations for per cpu variables and saves other
resources from being allocated too large.
This is not fully equivalent to disabling SMT in the BIOS because the low
level SMT enabling in the BIOS can result in partitioning of resources
between the siblings, which is not undone by just ignoring them. Some CPUs
can use the full resources when their sibling is not onlined, but this is
depending on the CPU family and model and it's not well documented whether
this applies to all partitioned resources. That means depending on the
workload disabling SMT in the BIOS might result in better performance.
Linus analysis of the Intel manual:
The intel optimization manual is not very clear on what the partitioning
rules are.
I find:
"In general, the buffers for staging instructions between major pipe
stages are partitioned. These buffers include µop queues after the
execution trace cache, the queues after the register rename stage, the
reorder buffer which stages instructions for retirement, and the load
and store buffers.
In the case of load and store buffers, partitioning also provided an
easier implementation to maintain memory ordering for each logical
processor and detect memory ordering violations"
but some of that partitioning may be relaxed if the HT thread is "not
active":
"In Intel microarchitecture code name Sandy Bridge, the micro-op queue
is statically partitioned to provide 28 entries for each logical
processor, irrespective of software executing in single thread or
multiple threads. If one logical processor is not active in Intel
microarchitecture code name Ivy Bridge, then a single thread executing
on that processor core can use the 56 entries in the micro-op queue"
but I do not know what "not active" means, and how dynamic it is. Some of
that partitioning may be entirely static and depend on the early BIOS
disabling of HT, and even if we park the cores, the resources will just be
wasted.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:57:38 +0000 (00:57 +0200)]
x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. amd_get_topology() cannot be called before the APIC
driver is selected, so split out the part which initializes
smp_num_siblings and invoke it from amd_early_init().
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Borislav Petkov [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 18:48:39 +0000 (20:48 +0200)]
x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info
Old code used to check whether CPUID ext max level is >= 0x80000008 because
that last leaf contains the number of cores of the physical CPU. The three
functions called there now do not depend on that leaf anymore so the check
can go.
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 23:00:55 +0000 (01:00 +0200)]
x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early
Make use of the new early detection function to initialize smp_num_siblings
on the boot cpu before the MP-Table or ACPI/MADT scan happens. That's
required for force disabling SMT.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:55:39 +0000 (00:55 +0200)]
x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()
To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_extended_topology() cannot be called before
the APIC driver is selected, so split out the part which initializes
smp_num_siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:53:57 +0000 (00:53 +0200)]
x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()
To support force disabling of SMT it's required to know the number of
thread siblings early. detect_ht() cannot be called before the APIC driver
is selected, so split out the part which initializes smp_num_siblings.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:47:10 +0000 (00:47 +0200)]
x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call
Real 32bit AMD CPUs do not have SMT and the only value of the call was to
reach the magic printout which got removed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 5 Jun 2018 22:36:15 +0000 (00:36 +0200)]
x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout
The value of this printout is dubious at best and there is no point in
having it in two different places along with convoluted ways to reach it.
Remove it completely.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:48:27 +0000 (17:48 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.
The command line options are:
'nosmt': Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them
'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
via MP table and ACPI/MADT.
The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):
'on': SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
'off': SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
cannot be onlined
'forceoff': SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
file are rejected.
'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU
The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.
The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.
When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.
When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.
When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.
When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file
are rejected.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:49:05 +0000 (17:49 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down()
Split out the inner workings of do_cpu_down() to allow reuse of that
function for the upcoming SMT disabling mechanism.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 17:05:25 +0000 (19:05 +0200)]
cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric
The asymmetry caused a warning to trigger if the bootup was stopped in state
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_IDLE. The warning no longer triggers as kthread_park() can
now be invoked on already or still parked threads. But there is still no
reason to have this be asymmetric.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Thu, 21 Jun 2018 08:37:20 +0000 (10:37 +0200)]
x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()
Provide information whether SMT is supoorted by the CPUs. Preparatory patch
for SMT control mechanism.
Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Thomas Gleixner [Tue, 29 May 2018 15:50:22 +0000 (17:50 +0200)]
x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()
If the CPU is supporting SMT then the primary thread can be found by
checking the lower APIC ID bits for zero. smp_num_siblings is used to build
the mask for the APIC ID bits which need to be taken into account.
This uses the MPTABLE or ACPI/MADT supplied APIC ID, which can be different
than the initial APIC ID in CPUID. But according to AMD the lower bits have
to be consistent. Intel gave a tentative confirmation as well.
Preparatory patch to support disabling SMT at boot/runtime.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Peter Zijlstra [Tue, 29 May 2018 14:43:46 +0000 (16:43 +0200)]
sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime
The static key sched_smt_present is only updated at boot time when SMT
siblings have been detected. Booting with maxcpus=1 and bringing the
siblings online after boot rebuilds the scheduling domains correctly but
does not update the static key, so the SMT code is not enabled.
Let the key be updated in the scheduler CPU hotplug code to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk [Wed, 20 Jun 2018 20:42:57 +0000 (16:42 -0400)]
x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly
The pr_warn in l1tf_select_mitigation would have used the prior pr_fmt
which was defined as "Spectre V2 : ".
Move the function to be past SSBD and also define the pr_fmt.
Fixes:
17dbca119312 ("x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf")
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:28 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2
For the L1TF workaround its necessary to limit the swap file size to below
MAX_PA/2, so that the higher bits of the swap offset inverted never point
to valid memory.
Add a mechanism for the architecture to override the swap file size check
in swapfile.c and add a x86 specific max swapfile check function that
enforces that limit.
The check is only enabled if the CPU is vulnerable to L1TF.
In VMs with 42bit MAX_PA the typical limit is 2TB now, on a native system
with 46bit PA it is 32TB. The limit is only per individual swap file, so
it's always possible to exceed these limits with multiple swap files or
partitions.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:27 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings
For L1TF PROT_NONE mappings are protected by inverting the PFN in the page
table entry. This sets the high bits in the CPU's address space, thus
making sure to point to not point an unmapped entry to valid cached memory.
Some server system BIOSes put the MMIO mappings high up in the physical
address space. If such an high mapping was mapped to unprivileged users
they could attack low memory by setting such a mapping to PROT_NONE. This
could happen through a special device driver which is not access
protected. Normal /dev/mem is of course access protected.
To avoid this forbid PROT_NONE mappings or mprotect for high MMIO mappings.
Valid page mappings are allowed because the system is then unsafe anyways.
It's not expected that users commonly use PROT_NONE on MMIO. But to
minimize any impact this is only enforced if the mapping actually refers to
a high MMIO address (defined as the MAX_PA-1 bit being set), and also skip
the check for root.
For mmaps this is straight forward and can be handled in vm_insert_pfn and
in remap_pfn_range().
For mprotect it's a bit trickier. At the point where the actual PTEs are
accessed a lot of state has been changed and it would be difficult to undo
on an error. Since this is a uncommon case use a separate early page talk
walk pass for MMIO PROT_NONE mappings that checks for this condition
early. For non MMIO and non PROT_NONE there are no changes.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:26 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf
L1TF core kernel workarounds are cheap and normally always enabled, However
they still should be reported in sysfs if the system is vulnerable or
mitigated. Add the necessary CPU feature/bug bits.
- Extend the existing checks for Meltdowns to determine if the system is
vulnerable. All CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown are also not
vulnerable to L1TF
- Check for 32bit non PAE and emit a warning as there is no practical way
for mitigation due to the limited physical address bits
- If the system has more than MAX_PA/2 physical memory the invert page
workarounds don't protect the system against the L1TF attack anymore,
because an inverted physical address will also point to valid
memory. Print a warning in this case and report that the system is
vulnerable.
Add a function which returns the PFN limit for the L1TF mitigation, which
will be used in follow up patches for sanity and range checks.
[ tglx: Renamed the CPU feature bit to L1TF_PTEINV ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:25 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved
The L1TF workaround doesn't make any attempt to mitigate speculate accesses
to the first physical page for zeroed PTEs. Normally it only contains some
data from the early real mode BIOS.
It's not entirely clear that the first page is reserved in all
configurations, so add an extra reservation call to make sure it is really
reserved. In most configurations (e.g. with the standard reservations)
it's likely a nop.
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:24 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation
When PTEs are set to PROT_NONE the kernel just clears the Present bit and
preserves the PFN, which creates attack surface for L1TF speculation
speculation attacks.
This is important inside guests, because L1TF speculation bypasses physical
page remapping. While the host has its own migitations preventing leaking
data from other VMs into the guest, this would still risk leaking the wrong
page inside the current guest.
This uses the same technique as Linus' swap entry patch: while an entry is
is in PROTNONE state invert the complete PFN part part of it. This ensures
that the the highest bit will point to non existing memory.
The invert is done by pte/pmd_modify and pfn/pmd/pud_pte for PROTNONE and
pte/pmd/pud_pfn undo it.
This assume that no code path touches the PFN part of a PTE directly
without using these primitives.
This doesn't handle the case that MMIO is on the top of the CPU physical
memory. If such an MMIO region was exposed by an unpriviledged driver for
mmap it would be possible to attack some real memory. However this
situation is all rather unlikely.
For 32bit non PAE the inversion is not done because there are really not
enough bits to protect anything.
Q: Why does the guest need to be protected when the HyperVisor already has
L1TF mitigations?
A: Here's an example:
Physical pages 1 2 get mapped into a guest as
GPA 1 -> PA 2
GPA 2 -> PA 1
through EPT.
The L1TF speculation ignores the EPT remapping.
Now the guest kernel maps GPA 1 to process A and GPA 2 to process B, and
they belong to different users and should be isolated.
A sets the GPA 1 PA 2 PTE to PROT_NONE to bypass the EPT remapping and
gets read access to the underlying physical page. Which in this case
points to PA 2, so it can read process B's data, if it happened to be in
L1, so isolation inside the guest is broken.
There's nothing the hypervisor can do about this. This mitigation has to
be done in the guest itself.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Linus Torvalds [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:23 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF
With L1 terminal fault the CPU speculates into unmapped PTEs, and resulting
side effects allow to read the memory the PTE is pointing too, if its
values are still in the L1 cache.
For swapped out pages Linux uses unmapped PTEs and stores a swap entry into
them.
To protect against L1TF it must be ensured that the swap entry is not
pointing to valid memory, which requires setting higher bits (between bit
36 and bit 45) that are inside the CPUs physical address space, but outside
any real memory.
To do this invert the offset to make sure the higher bits are always set,
as long as the swap file is not too big.
Note there is no workaround for 32bit !PAE, or on systems which have more
than MAX_PA/2 worth of memory. The later case is very unlikely to happen on
real systems.
[AK: updated description and minor tweaks by. Split out from the original
patch ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Linus Torvalds [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:22 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry
If pages are swapped out, the swap entry is stored in the corresponding
PTE, which has the Present bit cleared. CPUs vulnerable to L1TF speculate
on PTE entries which have the present bit set and would treat the swap
entry as phsyical address (PFN). To mitigate that the upper bits of the PTE
must be set so the PTE points to non existent memory.
The swap entry stores the type and the offset of a swapped out page in the
PTE. type is stored in bit 9-13 and offset in bit 14-63. The hardware
ignores the bits beyond the phsyical address space limit, so to make the
mitigation effective its required to start 'offset' at the lowest possible
bit so that even large swap offsets do not reach into the physical address
space limit bits.
Move offset to bit 9-58 and type to bit 59-63 which are the bits that
hardware generally doesn't care about.
That, in turn, means that if you on desktop chip with only 40 bits of
physical addressing, now that the offset starts at bit 9, there needs to be
30 bits of offset actually *in use* until bit 39 ends up being set, which
means when inverted it will again point into existing memory.
So that's 4 terabyte of swap space (because the offset is counted in pages,
so 30 bits of offset is 42 bits of actual coverage). With bigger physical
addressing, that obviously grows further, until the limit of the offset is
hit (at 50 bits of offset - 62 bits of actual swap file coverage).
This is a preparatory change for the actual swap entry inversion to protect
against L1TF.
[ AK: Updated description and minor tweaks. Split into two parts ]
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Andi Kleen [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 22:48:21 +0000 (15:48 -0700)]
x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT
L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) is a speculation related vulnerability. The CPU
speculates on PTE entries which do not have the PRESENT bit set, if the
content of the resulting physical address is available in the L1D cache.
The OS side mitigation makes sure that a !PRESENT PTE entry points to a
physical address outside the actually existing and cachable memory
space. This is achieved by inverting the upper bits of the PTE. Due to the
address space limitations this only works for 64bit and 32bit PAE kernels,
but not for 32bit non PAE.
This mitigation applies to both host and guest kernels, but in case of a
64bit host (hypervisor) and a 32bit PAE guest, inverting the upper bits of
the PAE address space (44bit) is not enough if the host has more than 43
bits of populated memory address space, because the speculation treats the
PTE content as a physical host address bypassing EPT.
The host (hypervisor) protects itself against the guest by flushing L1D as
needed, but pages inside the guest are not protected against attacks from
other processes inside the same guest.
For the guest the inverted PTE mask has to match the host to provide the
full protection for all pages the host could possibly map into the
guest. The hosts populated address space is not known to the guest, so the
mask must cover the possible maximal host address space, i.e. 52 bit.
On 32bit PAE the maximum PTE mask is currently set to 44 bit because that
is the limit imposed by 32bit unsigned long PFNs in the VMs. This limits
the mask to be below what the host could possible use for physical pages.
The L1TF PROT_NONE protection code uses the PTE masks to determine which
bits to invert to make sure the higher bits are set for unmapped entries to
prevent L1TF speculation attacks against EPT inside guests.
In order to invert all bits that could be used by the host, increase
__PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT to 52 to match 64bit.
The real limit for a 32bit PAE kernel is still 44 bits because all Linux
PTEs are created from unsigned long PFNs, so they cannot be higher than 44
bits on a 32bit kernel. So these extra PFN bits should be never set. The
only users of this macro are using it to look at PTEs, so it's safe.
[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]
Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 23:04:49 +0000 (08:04 +0900)]
Linux 4.18-rc1
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:37:55 +0000 (05:37 +0900)]
Merge tag 'for-linus-
20180616' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block
Pull block fixes from Jens Axboe:
"A collection of fixes that should go into -rc1. This contains:
- bsg_open vs bsg_unregister race fix (Anatoliy)
- NVMe pull request from Christoph, with fixes for regressions in
this window, FC connect/reconnect path code unification, and a
trace point addition.
- timeout fix (Christoph)
- remove a few unused functions (Christoph)
- blk-mq tag_set reinit fix (Roman)"
* tag 'for-linus-
20180616' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block:
bsg: fix race of bsg_open and bsg_unregister
block: remov blk_queue_invalidate_tags
nvme-fabrics: fix and refine state checks in __nvmf_check_ready
nvme-fabrics: handle the admin-only case properly in nvmf_check_ready
nvme-fabrics: refactor queue ready check
blk-mq: remove blk_mq_tagset_iter
nvme: remove nvme_reinit_tagset
nvme-fc: fix nulling of queue data on reconnect
nvme-fc: remove reinit_request routine
blk-mq: don't time out requests again that are in the timeout handler
nvme-fc: change controllers first connect to use reconnect path
nvme: don't rely on the changed namespace list log
nvmet: free smart-log buffer after use
nvme-rdma: fix error flow during mapping request data
nvme: add bio remapping tracepoint
nvme: fix NULL pointer dereference in nvme_init_subsystem
blk-mq: reinit q->tag_set_list entry only after grace period
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:25:18 +0000 (05:25 +0900)]
Merge tag 'docs-broken-links' of git://linuxtv.org/mchehab/experimental
Pull documentation fixes from Mauro Carvalho Chehab:
"This solves a series of broken links for files under Documentation,
and improves a script meant to detect such broken links (see
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check).
The changes on this series are:
- can.rst: fix a footnote reference;
- crypto_engine.rst: Fix two parsing warnings;
- Fix a lot of broken references to Documentation/*;
- improve the scripts/documentation-file-ref-check script, in order
to help detecting/fixing broken references, preventing
false-positives.
After this patch series, only 33 broken references to doc files are
detected by scripts/documentation-file-ref-check"
* tag 'docs-broken-links' of git://linuxtv.org/mchehab/experimental: (26 commits)
fix a series of Documentation/ broken file name references
Documentation: rstFlatTable.py: fix a broken reference
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove a broken reference
devicetree: fix a series of wrong file references
devicetree: fix name of pinctrl-bindings.txt
devicetree: fix some bindings file names
MAINTAINERS: fix location of DT npcm files
MAINTAINERS: fix location of some display DT bindings
kernel-parameters.txt: fix pointers to sound parameters
bindings: nvmem/zii: Fix location of nvmem.txt
docs: Fix more broken references
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: check tools/*/Documentation
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: get rid of false-positives
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: hint: dash or underline
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: add a fix logic for DT
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: accept more wildcards at filenames
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: fix help message
media: max2175: fix location of driver's companion documentation
media: v4l: fix broken video4linux docs locations
media: dvb: point to the location of the old README.dvb-usb file
...
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:06:18 +0000 (05:06 +0900)]
Merge tag 'fsnotify_for_v4.18-rc1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs
Pull fsnotify updates from Jan Kara:
"fsnotify cleanups unifying handling of different watch types.
This is the shortened fsnotify series from Amir with the last five
patches pulled out. Amir has modified those patches to not change
struct inode but obviously it's too late for those to go into this
merge window"
* tag 'fsnotify_for_v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jack/linux-fs:
fsnotify: add fsnotify_add_inode_mark() wrappers
fanotify: generalize fanotify_should_send_event()
fsnotify: generalize send_to_group()
fsnotify: generalize iteration of marks by object type
fsnotify: introduce marks iteration helpers
fsnotify: remove redundant arguments to handle_event()
fsnotify: use type id to identify connector object type
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 20:00:24 +0000 (05:00 +0900)]
Merge tag 'fbdev-v4.18' of git://github.com/bzolnier/linux
Pull fbdev updates from Bartlomiej Zolnierkiewicz:
"There is nothing really major here, few small fixes, some cleanups and
dead drivers removal:
- mark omapfb drivers as orphans in MAINTAINERS file (Tomi Valkeinen)
- add missing module license tags to omap/omapfb driver (Arnd
Bergmann)
- add missing GPIOLIB dependendy to omap2/omapfb driver (Arnd
Bergmann)
- convert savagefb, aty128fb & radeonfb drivers to use msleep & co.
(Jia-Ju Bai)
- allow COMPILE_TEST build for viafb driver (media part was reviewed
by media subsystem Maintainer)
- remove unused MERAM support from sh_mobile_lcdcfb and shmob-drm
drivers (drm parts were acked by shmob-drm driver Maintainer)
- remove unused auo_k190xfb drivers
- misc cleanups (Souptick Joarder, Wolfram Sang, Markus Elfring, Andy
Shevchenko, Colin Ian King)"
* tag 'fbdev-v4.18' of git://github.com/bzolnier/linux: (26 commits)
fb_omap2: add gpiolib dependency
video/omap: add module license tags
MAINTAINERS: make omapfb orphan
video: fbdev: pxafb: match_string() conversion fixup
video: fbdev: nvidia: fix spelling mistake: "scaleing" -> "scaling"
video: fbdev: fix spelling mistake: "frambuffer" -> "framebuffer"
video: fbdev: pxafb: Convert to use match_string() helper
video: fbdev: via: allow COMPILE_TEST build
video: fbdev: remove unused sh_mobile_meram driver
drm: shmobile: remove unused MERAM support
video: fbdev: sh_mobile_lcdcfb: remove unused MERAM support
video: fbdev: remove unused auo_k190xfb drivers
video: omap: Improve a size determination in omapfb_do_probe()
video: sm501fb: Improve a size determination in sm501fb_probe()
video: fbdev-MMP: Improve a size determination in path_init()
video: fbdev-MMP: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in two functions
video: auo_k190x: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in auok190x_common_probe()
video: sh_mobile_lcdcfb: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in two functions
video: sh_mobile_meram: Delete an error message for a failed memory allocation in sh_mobile_meram_probe()
video: fbdev: sh_mobile_meram: Drop SUPERH platform dependency
...
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 07:32:04 +0000 (16:32 +0900)]
Merge branch 'afs-proc' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull AFS updates from Al Viro:
"Assorted AFS stuff - ended up in vfs.git since most of that consists
of David's AFS-related followups to Christoph's procfs series"
* 'afs-proc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
afs: Optimise callback breaking by not repeating volume lookup
afs: Display manually added cells in dynamic root mount
afs: Enable IPv6 DNS lookups
afs: Show all of a server's addresses in /proc/fs/afs/servers
afs: Handle CONFIG_PROC_FS=n
proc: Make inline name size calculation automatic
afs: Implement network namespacing
afs: Mark afs_net::ws_cell as __rcu and set using rcu functions
afs: Fix a Sparse warning in xdr_decode_AFSFetchStatus()
proc: Add a way to make network proc files writable
afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c to remove remaining predeclarations.
afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c to move the show routines up
afs: Rearrange fs/afs/proc.c by moving fops and open functions down
afs: Move /proc management functions to the end of the file
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 07:21:50 +0000 (16:21 +0900)]
Merge branch 'work.compat' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull compat updates from Al Viro:
"Some biarch patches - getting rid of assorted (mis)uses of
compat_alloc_user_space().
Not much in that area this cycle..."
* 'work.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
orangefs: simplify compat ioctl handling
signalfd: lift sigmask copyin and size checks to callers of do_signalfd4()
vmsplice(): lift importing iovec into vmsplice(2) and compat counterpart
Linus Torvalds [Sat, 16 Jun 2018 07:11:40 +0000 (16:11 +0900)]
Merge branch 'work.aio' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull aio fixes from Al Viro:
"Assorted AIO followups and fixes"
* 'work.aio' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
eventpoll: switch to ->poll_mask
aio: only return events requested in poll_mask() for IOCB_CMD_POLL
eventfd: only return events requested in poll_mask()
aio: mark __aio_sigset::sigmask const
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 22:39:34 +0000 (07:39 +0900)]
Merge git://git./linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Various netfilter fixlets from Pablo and the netfilter team.
2) Fix regression in IPVS caused by lack of PMTU exceptions on local
routes in ipv6, from Julian Anastasov.
3) Check pskb_trim_rcsum for failure in DSA, from Zhouyang Jia.
4) Don't crash on poll in TLS, from Daniel Borkmann.
5) Revert SO_REUSE{ADDR,PORT} change, it regresses various things
including Avahi mDNS. From Bart Van Assche.
6) Missing of_node_put in qcom/emac driver, from Yue Haibing.
7) We lack checking of the TCP checking in one special case during SYN
receive, from Frank van der Linden.
8) Fix module init error paths of mac80211 hwsim, from Johannes Berg.
9) Handle 802.1ad properly in stmmac driver, from Elad Nachman.
10) Must grab HW caps before doing quirk checks in stmmac driver, from
Jose Abreu.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (81 commits)
net: stmmac: Run HWIF Quirks after getting HW caps
neighbour: skip NTF_EXT_LEARNED entries during forced gc
net: cxgb3: add error handling for sysfs_create_group
tls: fix waitall behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg
tls: fix use-after-free in tls_push_record
l2tp: filter out non-PPP sessions in pppol2tp_tunnel_ioctl()
l2tp: reject creation of non-PPP sessions on L2TPv2 tunnels
mlxsw: spectrum_switchdev: Fix port_vlan refcounting
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Align with new route replace logic
mlxsw: spectrum_router: Allow appending to dev-only routes
ipv6: Only emit append events for appended routes
stmmac: added support for 802.1ad vlan stripping
cfg80211: fix rcu in cfg80211_unregister_wdev
mac80211: Move up init of TXQs
mac80211_hwsim: fix module init error paths
cfg80211: initialize sinfo in cfg80211_get_station
nl80211: fix some kernel doc tag mistakes
hv_netvsc: Fix the variable sizes in ipsecv2 and rsc offload
rds: avoid unenecessary cong_update in loop transport
l2tp: clean up stale tunnel or session in pppol2tp_connect's error path
...
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 22:36:39 +0000 (07:36 +0900)]
Merge tag 'modules-for-v4.18' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux
Pull module updates from Jessica Yu:
"Minor code cleanup and also allow sig_enforce param to be shown in
sysfs with CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE"
* tag 'modules-for-v4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeyu/linux:
module: Allow to always show the status of modsign
module: Do not access sig_enforce directly
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 21:50:51 +0000 (06:50 +0900)]
Merge branch 'for-linus-4.18-rc1' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/rw/uml
Pull uml updates from Richard Weinberger:
"Minor updates for UML:
- fixes for our new vector network driver by Anton
- initcall cleanup by Alexander
- We have a new mailinglist, sourceforge.net sucks"
* 'for-linus-4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rw/uml:
um: Fix raw interface options
um: Fix initialization of vector queues
um: remove uml initcalls
um: Update mailing list address
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 21:42:43 +0000 (06:42 +0900)]
Merge tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.18-merge_window' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/palmer/riscv-linux
Pull RISC-V updates from Palmer Dabbelt:
"This contains some small RISC-V updates I'd like to target for 4.18.
They are all fairly small this time. Here's a short summary, there's
more info in the commits/merges:
- a fix to __clear_user to respect the passed arguments.
- enough support for the perf subsystem to work with RISC-V's ISA
defined performance counters.
- support for sparse and cleanups suggested by it.
- support for R_RISCV_32 (a relocation, not the 32-bit ISA).
- some MAINTAINERS cleanups.
- the addition of CONFIG_HVC_RISCV_SBI to our defconfig, as it's
always present.
I've given these a simple build+boot test"
* tag 'riscv-for-linus-4.18-merge_window' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/palmer/riscv-linux:
RISC-V: Add CONFIG_HVC_RISCV_SBI=y to defconfig
RISC-V: Handle R_RISCV_32 in modules
riscv/ftrace: Export _mcount when DYNAMIC_FTRACE isn't set
riscv: add riscv-specific predefines to CHECKFLAGS
riscv: split the declaration of __copy_user
riscv: no __user for probe_kernel_address()
riscv: use NULL instead of a plain 0
perf: riscv: Add Document for Future Porting Guide
perf: riscv: preliminary RISC-V support
MAINTAINERS: Update Albert's email, he's back at Berkeley
MAINTAINERS: Add myself as a maintainer for SiFive's drivers
riscv: Fix the bug in memory access fixup code
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 21:37:04 +0000 (06:37 +0900)]
Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git./virt/kvm/kvm
Pull more kvm updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Mostly the PPC part of the release, but also switching to Arnd's fix
for the hyperv config issue and a typo fix.
Main PPC changes:
- reimplement the MMIO instruction emulation
- transactional memory support for PR KVM
- improve radix page table handling"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (63 commits)
KVM: x86: VMX: redo fix for link error without CONFIG_HYPERV
KVM: x86: fix typo at kvm_arch_hardware_setup comment
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix failure status setting in tabort. emulation
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Enable use on POWER9 bare-metal hosts in HPT mode
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Don't let PAPR guest set MSR hypervisor bit
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix failure status setting in treclaim. emulation
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Fix MSR setting when delivering interrupts
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Handle additional interrupt types
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Enable kvmppc_get/set_one_reg_pr() for HTM registers
KVM: PPC: Book3S: Remove load/put vcpu for KVM_GET_REGS/KVM_SET_REGS
KVM: PPC: Remove load/put vcpu for KVM_GET/SET_ONE_REG ioctl
KVM: PPC: Move vcpu_load/vcpu_put down to each ioctl case in kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Enable HTM for PR KVM for KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION ioctl
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Support TAR handling for PR KVM HTM
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Add guard code to prevent returning to guest with PR=0 and Transactional state
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Add emulation for tabort. in privileged state
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Add emulation for trechkpt.
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Add emulation for treclaim.
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Restore NV regs after emulating mfspr from TM SPRs
KVM: PPC: Book3S PR: Always fail transactions in guest privileged state
...
Linus Torvalds [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 21:35:02 +0000 (06:35 +0900)]
Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost
Pull virtio updates from Michael Tsirkin:
"virtio, vhost: features, fixes
- PCI virtual function support for virtio
- DMA barriers for virtio strong barriers
- bugfixes"
* tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost:
virtio: update the comments for transport features
virtio_pci: support enabling VFs
vhost: fix info leak due to uninitialized memory
virtio_ring: switch to dma_XX barriers for rpmsg
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 15:34:32 +0000 (12:34 -0300)]
fix a series of Documentation/ broken file name references
As files move around, their previous links break. Fix the
references for them.
Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 15:33:06 +0000 (12:33 -0300)]
Documentation: rstFlatTable.py: fix a broken reference
The old HOWTO was removed a long time ago. The flat table
version is not metioned elsewhere, so just get rid of the
text.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 15:32:05 +0000 (12:32 -0300)]
ABI: sysfs-devices-system-cpu: remove a broken reference
This file doesn't exist anymore:
Documentation/cpu-freq/user-guide.txt
As the ABI already points to Documentation/cpu-freq, just
remove the broken link and the associated text.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 15:30:30 +0000 (12:30 -0300)]
devicetree: fix a series of wrong file references
As files got renamed, their references broke.
Manually fix a series of broken refs at the DT bindings.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 15:24:41 +0000 (12:24 -0300)]
devicetree: fix name of pinctrl-bindings.txt
Rename:
pinctrl-binding.txt -> pinctrl-bindings.txt
In order to match the current name of this file.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 12:39:01 +0000 (09:39 -0300)]
devicetree: fix some bindings file names
There were some file movements that changed the location for
some DT bindings. Fix them with:
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
After manually checking if the new file makes sense.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 11:59:37 +0000 (08:59 -0300)]
MAINTAINERS: fix location of DT npcm files
The specified locations are not right. Fix the wildcard logic
to point to the correct directories.
Without that, get-maintainer won't get things right:
$ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-git-fallback --no-r --no-n --no-l -f Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu-enable-method/nuvoton,npcm750-smp
robh+dt@kernel.org (maintainer:OPEN FIRMWARE AND FLATTENED DEVICE TREE BINDINGS)
mark.rutland@arm.com (maintainer:OPEN FIRMWARE AND FLATTENED DEVICE TREE BINDINGS)
After the patch, it will properly point to NPCM arch maintainers:
$ ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl --no-git-fallback --no-r --no-n --no-l -f Documentation/devicetree/bindings/arm/cpu-enable-method/nuvoton,npcm750-smp
avifishman70@gmail.com (supporter:ARM/NUVOTON NPCM ARCHITECTURE)
tmaimon77@gmail.com (supporter:ARM/NUVOTON NPCM ARCHITECTURE)
robh+dt@kernel.org (maintainer:OPEN FIRMWARE AND FLATTENED DEVICE TREE BINDINGS)
mark.rutland@arm.com (maintainer:OPEN FIRMWARE AND FLATTENED DEVICE TREE BINDINGS)
Cc: Avi Fishman <avifishman70@gmail.com>
Cc: Tomer Maimon <tmaimon77@gmail.com>
Cc: Patrick Venture <venture@google.com>
Cc: Nancy Yuen <yuenn@google.com>
Cc: Brendan Higgins <brendanhiggins@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 11:01:00 +0000 (08:01 -0300)]
MAINTAINERS: fix location of some display DT bindings
Those files got a manufacturer's name prepended and were moved around.
Adjust their references accordingly.
Also, due those movements, Documentation/devicetree/bindings/video
doesn't exist anymore.
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@linux.ie>
Cc: David Lechner <david@lechnology.com>
Cc: Peter Senna Tschudin <peter.senna@collabora.com>
Cc: Martin Donnelly <martin.donnelly@ge.com>
Cc: Martyn Welch <martyn.welch@collabora.co.uk>
Cc: Stefan Agner <stefan@agner.ch>
Cc: Alison Wang <alison.wang@nxp.com>
Cc: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 10:43:07 +0000 (07:43 -0300)]
kernel-parameters.txt: fix pointers to sound parameters
The alsa parameters file was renamed to alsa-configuration.rst.
With regards to OSS, it got retired as a hole by at changeset
727dede0ba8a ("sound: Retire OSS"). So, it doesn't make sense
to keep mentioning it at kernel-parameters.txt.
Fixes:
727dede0ba8a ("sound: Retire OSS")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 10:18:45 +0000 (07:18 -0300)]
bindings: nvmem/zii: Fix location of nvmem.txt
The location pointed there is missing "bindings/" on its path.
Acked-by: Srinivas Kandagatla <srinivas.kandagatla@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 18:14:57 +0000 (15:14 -0300)]
docs: Fix more broken references
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked that produced results are valid.
Acked-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
Acked-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <miguel.ojeda.sandonis@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 14:06:08 +0000 (11:06 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: check tools/*/Documentation
Some files, like tools/memory-model/README has references to
a Documentation file that is locale to it. Handle references
that are relative to them too.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 13:47:29 +0000 (10:47 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: get rid of false-positives
Now that the number of broken refs are smaller, improve the logic
that gets rid of false-positives.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 13:14:54 +0000 (10:14 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: hint: dash or underline
Sometimes, people use dash instead of underline or vice-versa.
Try to autocorrect it.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 12:36:35 +0000 (09:36 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: add a fix logic for DT
There are several links broken due to DT file movements. Add
a hint logic to seek for those changes.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 10:48:22 +0000 (07:48 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: accept more wildcards at filenames
at MAINTAINERS, some filename paths use '?' and things like [7,9].
So, accept more wildcards, in order to avoid false-positives.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 10:11:02 +0000 (07:11 -0300)]
scripts/documentation-file-ref-check: fix help message
The name of the --fix option was renamed, but it was not
changed at the quick help message.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Thu, 14 Jun 2018 10:34:51 +0000 (07:34 -0300)]
media: max2175: fix location of driver's companion documentation
There's a missing ".rst" at the doc's file name.
Acked-by: Ramesh Shanmugasundaram <Ramesh.shanmugasundaram@bp.renesas.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 22:41:44 +0000 (19:41 -0300)]
media: v4l: fix broken video4linux docs locations
There are several places pointing to old documentation files:
Documentation/video4linux/API.html
Documentation/video4linux/bttv/
Documentation/video4linux/cx2341x/fw-encoder-api.txt
Documentation/video4linux/m5602.txt
Documentation/video4linux/v4l2-framework.txt
Documentation/video4linux/videobuf
Documentation/video4linux/Zoran
Make them point to the new location where available, removing
otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 21:29:30 +0000 (18:29 -0300)]
media: dvb: point to the location of the old README.dvb-usb file
This file got renamed, but the references still point to the
old place.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 21:10:05 +0000 (18:10 -0300)]
media: dvb: fix location of get_dvb_firmware script
This script was moved out of Documentation/dvb, but the
links weren't updated.
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 18:14:57 +0000 (15:14 -0300)]
docs: Fix some broken references
As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of
them via this script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few
false-positives.
Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com>
Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Mauro Carvalho Chehab [Tue, 8 May 2018 21:54:36 +0000 (18:54 -0300)]
docs: fix broken references with multiple hints
The script:
./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix
Gives multiple hints for broken references on some files.
Manually use the one that applies for some files.
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Jose Abreu [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 15:17:27 +0000 (16:17 +0100)]
net: stmmac: Run HWIF Quirks after getting HW caps
Currently we were running HWIF quirks before getting HW capabilities.
This is not right because some HWIF callbacks depend on HW caps.
Lets save the quirks callback and use it in a later stage.
This fixes Altera socfpga.
Signed-off-by: Jose Abreu <joabreu@synopsys.com>
Fixes:
5f0456b43140 ("net: stmmac: Implement logic to automatically select HW Interface")
Reported-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinh.linux@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Joao Pinto <jpinto@synopsys.com>
Cc: Vitor Soares <soares@synopsys.com>
Cc: Giuseppe Cavallaro <peppe.cavallaro@st.com>
Cc: Alexandre Torgue <alexandre.torgue@st.com>
Cc: Dinh Nguyen <dinh.linux@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Roopa Prabhu [Wed, 13 Jun 2018 04:26:10 +0000 (21:26 -0700)]
neighbour: skip NTF_EXT_LEARNED entries during forced gc
Commit
9ce33e46531d ("neighbour: support for NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag")
added support for NTF_EXT_LEARNED for neighbour entries.
NTF_EXT_LEARNED entries are neigh entries managed by control
plane (eg: Ethernet VPN implementation in FRR routing suite).
Periodic gc already excludes these entries. This patch extends
it to forced gc which the earlier patch missed.
Fixes:
9ce33e46531d ("neighbour: support for NTF_EXT_LEARNED flag")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Zhouyang Jia [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 03:06:17 +0000 (11:06 +0800)]
net: cxgb3: add error handling for sysfs_create_group
When sysfs_create_group fails, the lack of error-handling code may
cause unexpected results.
This patch adds error-handling code after calling sysfs_create_group.
Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia <jiazhouyang09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
David S. Miller [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 16:14:31 +0000 (09:14 -0700)]
Merge branch 'tls-fixes'
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
Two tls fixes
First one is syzkaller trigered uaf and second one noticed
while writing test code with tls ulp. For details please see
individual patches.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Daniel Borkmann [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 01:07:46 +0000 (03:07 +0200)]
tls: fix waitall behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg
Current behavior in tls_sw_recvmsg() is to wait for incoming tls
messages and copy up to exactly len bytes of data that the user
provided. This is problematic in the sense that i) if no packet
is currently queued in strparser we keep waiting until one has been
processed and pushed into tls receive layer for tls_wait_data() to
wake up and push the decrypted bits to user space. Given after
tls decryption, we're back at streaming data, use sock_rcvlowat()
hint from tcp socket instead. Retain current behavior with MSG_WAITALL
flag and otherwise use the hint target for breaking the loop and
returning to application. This is done if currently no ctx->recv_pkt
is ready, otherwise continue to process it from our strparser
backlog.
Fixes:
c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Daniel Borkmann [Fri, 15 Jun 2018 01:07:45 +0000 (03:07 +0200)]
tls: fix use-after-free in tls_push_record
syzkaller managed to trigger a use-after-free in tls like the
following:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
Write of size 1 at addr
ffff88037aa08000 by task a.out/2317
CPU: 3 PID: 2317 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.17.0+ #144
Hardware name: LENOVO 20FBCTO1WW/20FBCTO1WW, BIOS N1FET47W (1.21 ) 11/28/2016
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x71/0xab
print_address_description+0x6a/0x280
kasan_report+0x258/0x380
? tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
tls_push_record.constprop.15+0x6a2/0x810 [tls]
tls_sw_push_pending_record+0x2e/0x40 [tls]
tls_sk_proto_close+0x3fe/0x710 [tls]
? tcp_check_oom+0x4c0/0x4c0
? tls_write_space+0x260/0x260 [tls]
? kmem_cache_free+0x88/0x1f0
inet_release+0xd6/0x1b0
__sock_release+0xc0/0x240
sock_close+0x11/0x20
__fput+0x22d/0x660
task_work_run+0x114/0x1a0
do_exit+0x71a/0x2780
? mm_update_next_owner+0x650/0x650
? handle_mm_fault+0x2f5/0x5f0
? __do_page_fault+0x44f/0xa50
? mm_fault_error+0x2d0/0x2d0
do_group_exit+0xde/0x300
__x64_sys_exit_group+0x3a/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x9a/0x300
? page_fault+0x8/0x30
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
This happened through fault injection where aead_req allocation in
tls_do_encryption() eventually failed and we returned -ENOMEM from
the function. Turns out that the use-after-free is triggered from
tls_sw_sendmsg() in the second tls_push_record(). The error then
triggers a jump to waiting for memory in sk_stream_wait_memory()
resp. returning immediately in case of MSG_DONTWAIT. What follows is
the trim_both_sgl(sk, orig_size), which drops elements from the sg
list added via tls_sw_sendmsg(). Now the use-after-free gets triggered
when the socket is being closed, where tls_sk_proto_close() callback
is invoked. The tls_complete_pending_work() will figure that there's
a pending closed tls record to be flushed and thus calls into the
tls_push_pending_closed_record() from there. ctx->push_pending_record()
is called from the latter, which is the tls_sw_push_pending_record()
from sw path. This again calls into tls_push_record(). And here the
tls_fill_prepend() will panic since the buffer address has been freed
earlier via trim_both_sgl(). One way to fix it is to move the aead
request allocation out of tls_do_encryption() early into tls_push_record().
This means we don't prep the tls header and advance state to the
TLS_PENDING_CLOSED_RECORD before allocation which could potentially
fail happened. That fixes the issue on my side.
Fixes:
3c4d7559159b ("tls: kernel TLS support")
Reported-by: syzbot+5c74af81c547738e1684@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+709f2810a6a05f11d4d3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>