git.osdn.net Git - android-x86/kernel.git/log

MAINTAINERS: update TPM driver infrastructure changes

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: alpha-sort CREDITS, per Randy]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170915223811.21368-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Marcel Selhorst <tpmdd@selhorst.net>
Cc: Ashley Lai <ashleydlai@gmail.com>
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@free-electrons.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Håvard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com>
Cc: Martin Kepplinger <martink@posteo.de>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Hans-Christian Noren Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Gertjan van Wingerde <gwingerde@gmail.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

sysctl: add register_sysctl() dummy helper

register_sysctl() has been around for five years with commit
fea478d4101a ("sysctl: Add register_sysctl for normal sysctl users") but
now that arm64 started using it, I ran into a compile error:

arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c: In function 'register_insn_emulation_sysctl':
arch/arm64/kernel/armv8_deprecated.c:257:2: error: implicit declaration of function 'register_sysctl'

This adds a inline function like we already have for
register_sysctl_paths() and register_sysctl_table().

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171106133700.558647-1-arnd@arndb.de
Fixes: 38b9aeb32fa7 ("arm64: Port deprecated instruction emulation to new sysctl interface")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Alex Benne <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge tag 'pci-v4.14-fixes-7' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci

Pull PCI maintainership updates from Bjorn Helgaas:
"Update MAINTAINERS for HiSilicon, Microsemi Switchtec, and native host
  bridge drivers (Gabriele Paoloni, Sebastian Andrzej Siewior).

  Note that starting with changes intended for v4.16, Lorenzo Pieralisi
  will maintain the drivers/pci/{dwc,endpoint,host} directories. My
  intent is to continue to merge those changes via my tree, so this
  should be transparent to you"

* tag 'pci-v4.14-fixes-7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/helgaas/pci:
  MAINTAINERS: Add Lorenzo Pieralisi for PCI host bridge drivers
  MAINTAINERS: Remove Gabriele Paoloni as HiSilicon PCI maintainer
  MAINTAINERS: Remove Stephen Bates as Microsemi Switchtec maintainer

Merge branch 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm

Pull ARM fix from Russell King:
"Last ARM fix for 4.14.

  This plugs a hole in dump_instr(), which, with certain conditions
  satisfied, can dump instructions from kernel space"

* 'fixes' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
  ARM: 8720/1: ensure dump_instr() checks addr_limit

Merge tag 'pm-final-4.14' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm

Pull final power management fixes from Rafael Wysocki:
"These fix a regression in the schedutil cpufreq governor introduced by
  a recent change and blacklist Dell XPS13 9360 from using the Low Power
  S0 Idle _DSM interface which triggers serious problems on one of these
  machines.

  Specifics:

   - Prevent the schedutil cpufreq governor from using the utilization
     of a wrong CPU in some cases which started to happen after one of
     the recent changes in it (Chris Redpath).

   - Blacklist Dell XPS13 9360 from using the Low Power S0 Idle _DSM
     interface as that causes serious issue (related to NVMe) to appear
     on one of these machines, even though the other Dells XPS13 9360 in
     somewhat different HW configurations behave correctly (Rafael
     Wysocki)"

* tag 'pm-final-4.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm:
  ACPI / PM: Blacklist Low Power S0 Idle _DSM for Dell XPS13 9360
  cpufreq: schedutil: Examine the correct CPU when we update util

Merge tag 'sound-4.14' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound

Pull sound fixes from Takashi Iwai:
"The amount of the changes isn't as quite small as wished, nevertheless
  they are straight fixes that deserve merging to 4.14 final.

  Most of fixes are about ALSA core bugs spotted by fuzzer: a follow-up
  fix for the previous nested rwsem patch, a fix to avoid the resource
  hogs due to too many concurrent ALSA timer invocations, and a fix for
  a crash with SYSEX MIDI transfer over OSS sequencer emulation that is
  used by none but fuzzer.

  The rest are usual HD-audio and USB-audio device-specific quirks,
  which are safe to apply"

* tag 'sound-4.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tiwai/sound:
  ALSA: hda - fix headset mic problem for Dell machines with alc274
  ALSA: seq: Fix OSS sysex delivery in OSS emulation
  ALSA: seq: Avoid invalid lockdep class warning
  ALSA: timer: Limit max instances per timer
  ALSA: usb-audio: support new Amanero Combo384 firmware version

Merge git://git./linux/kernel/git/davem/net

Pull networking fixes from David Miller:

1) Fix use-after-free in IPSEC input parsing, desintation address
    pointer was loaded before pskb_may_pull() which can change the SKB
    data pointers. From Florian Westphal.

2) Stack out-of-bounds read in xfrm_state_find(), from Steffen
    Klassert.

3) IPVS state of SKB is not properly reset when moving between
    namespaces, from Ye Yin.

4) Fix crash in asix driver suspend and resume, from Andrey Konovalov.

5) Don't deliver ipv6 l2tp tunnel packets to ipv4 l2tp tunnels, and
    vice versa, from Guillaume Nault.

6) Fix DSACK undo on non-dup ACKs, from Priyaranjan Jha.

7) Fix regression in bond_xmit_hash()'s behavior after the TCP port
    selection changes back in 4.2, from Hangbin Liu.

8) Two divide by zero bugs in USB networking drivers when parsing
    descriptors, from Bjorn Mork.

9) Fix bonding slaves being stuck in BOND_LINK_FAIL state, from Jay
    Vosburgh.

10) Missing skb_reset_mac_header() in qmi_wwan, from Kristian Evensen.

11) Fix the destruction of tc action object races properly, from Cong
    Wang.

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (31 commits)
  cls_u32: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_tcindex: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_rsvp: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_route: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_matchall: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_fw: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_flower: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_flow: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_cgroup: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_bpf: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  cls_basic: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()
  net_sched: introduce tcf_exts_get_net() and tcf_exts_put_net()
  Revert "net_sched: hold netns refcnt for each action"
  net: usb: asix: fill null-ptr-deref in asix_suspend
  Revert "net: usb: asix: fill null-ptr-deref in asix_suspend"
  qmi_wwan: Add missing skb_reset_mac_header-call
  bonding: fix slave stuck in BOND_LINK_FAIL state
  qrtr: Move to postcore_initcall
  net: qmi_wwan: fix divide by 0 on bad descriptors
  net: cdc_ether: fix divide by 0 on bad descriptors
  ...

ALSA: hda - fix headset mic problem for Dell machines with alc274

Confirmed with Kailang of Realtek, the pin 0x19 is for Headset Mic, and
the pin 0x1a is for Headphone Mic, he suggested to apply
ALC269_FIXUP_DELL1_MIC_NO_PRESENCE to fix this problem. And we
verified applying this FIXUP can fix this problem.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Kailang Yang <kailang@realtek.com>
Signed-off-by: Hui Wang <hui.wang@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

x86/build: Make the boot image generation less verbose

This change suppresses the 'dd' output and adds the '-quiet' parameter
to mkisofs tool. It also removes the 'Using ...' messages, as none of the
messages matter to the user normally.

"make V=1" can still be used for a more verbose build.

The new build messages are now a streamlined set of:

  $ make isoimage
  ...
  Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#75)
    GENIMAGE arch/x86/boot/image.iso
  Kernel: arch/x86/boot/image.iso is ready

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1510207751-22166-1-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'master' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec

Steffen Klassert says:

====================
pull request (net): ipsec 2017-11-09

1) Fix a use after free due to a reallocated skb head.
   From Florian Westphal.

2) Fix sporadic lookup failures on labeled IPSEC.
   From Florian Westphal.

3) Fix a stack out of bounds when a socket policy is applied
   to an IPv6 socket that sends IPv4 packets.

Please pull or let me know if there are problems.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge branch 'net-sched-race-fix'

Cong Wang says:

====================
net_sched: close the race between call_rcu() and cleanup_net()

This patchset tries to fix the race between call_rcu() and
cleanup_net() again. Without holding the netns refcnt the
tc_action_net_exit() in netns workqueue could be called before
filter destroy works in tc filter workqueue. This patchset
moves the netns refcnt from tc actions to tcf_exts, without
breaking per-netns tc actions.

Patch 1 reverts the previous fix, patch 2 introduces two new
API's to help to address the bug and the rest patches switch
to the new API's. Please see each patch for details.

I was not able to reproduce this bug, but now after adding
some delay in filter destroy work I manage to trigger the
crash. After this patchset, the crash is not reproducible
any more and the debugging printk's show the order is expected
too.
====================

Fixes: ddf97ccdd7cb ("net_sched: add network namespace support for tc actions")
Reported-by: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_u32: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_tcindex: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_rsvp: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_route: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_matchall: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_fw: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_flower: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_flow: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_cgroup: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_bpf: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

cls_basic: use tcf_exts_get_net() before call_rcu()

Hold netns refcnt before call_rcu() and release it after
the tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

Note, on ->destroy() path we have to respect the return value
of tcf_exts_get_net(), on other paths it should always return
true, so we don't need to care.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net_sched: introduce tcf_exts_get_net() and tcf_exts_put_net()

Instead of holding netns refcnt in tc actions, we can minimize
the holding time by saving it in struct tcf_exts instead. This
means we can just hold netns refcnt right before call_rcu() and
release it after tcf_exts_destroy() is done.

However, because on netns cleanup path we call tcf_proto_destroy()
too, obviously we can not hold netns for a zero refcnt, in this
case we have to do cleanup synchronously. It is fine for RCU too,
the caller cleanup_net() already waits for a grace period.

For other cases, refcnt is non-zero and we can safely grab it as
normal and release it after we are done.

This patch provides two new API for each filter to use:
tcf_exts_get_net() and tcf_exts_put_net(). And all filters now can
use the following pattern:

void __destroy_filter() {
  tcf_exts_destroy();
  tcf_exts_put_net();  // <== release netns refcnt
  kfree();
}
void some_work() {
  rtnl_lock();
  __destroy_filter();
  rtnl_unlock();
}
void some_rcu_callback() {
  tcf_queue_work(some_work);
}

if (tcf_exts_get_net())  // <== hold netns refcnt
  call_rcu(some_rcu_callback);
else
  __destroy_filter();

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Revert "net_sched: hold netns refcnt for each action"

This reverts commit ceffcc5e254b450e6159f173e4538215cebf1b59.
If we hold that refcnt, the netns can never be destroyed until
all actions are destroyed by user, this breaks our netns design
which we expect all actions are destroyed when we destroy the
whole netns.

Cc: Lucas Bates <lucasb@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net: usb: asix: fill null-ptr-deref in asix_suspend

When asix_suspend() is called dev->driver_priv might not have been
assigned a value, so we need to check that it's not NULL.

Similar issue is present in asix_resume(), this patch fixes it as well.

Found by syzkaller.

kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4-43422-geccacdd69a8c #400
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
task: ffff88006bb36300 task.stack: ffff88006bba8000
RIP: 0010:asix_suspend+0x76/0xc0 drivers/net/usb/asix_devices.c:629
RSP: 0018:ffff88006bbae718 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff880061ba3b80 RCX: 1ffff1000c34d644
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000402 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffff88006bbae738 R08: 1ffff1000d775cad R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8800630a8b40
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000402 R15: ffff880061ba3b80
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006c600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ff33cf89000 CR3: 0000000061c0a000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
usb_suspend_interface drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1209
usb_suspend_both+0x27f/0x7e0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1314
usb_runtime_suspend+0x41/0x120 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:1852
__rpm_callback+0x339/0xb60 drivers/base/power/runtime.c:334
rpm_callback+0x106/0x220 drivers/base/power/runtime.c:461
rpm_suspend+0x465/0x1980 drivers/base/power/runtime.c:596
__pm_runtime_suspend+0x11e/0x230 drivers/base/power/runtime.c:1009
pm_runtime_put_sync_autosuspend ./include/linux/pm_runtime.h:251
usb_new_device+0xa37/0x1020 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2487
hub_port_connect drivers/usb/core/hub.c:4903
hub_port_connect_change drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5009
port_event drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5115
hub_event+0x194d/0x3740 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:5195
process_one_work+0xc7f/0x1db0 kernel/workqueue.c:2119
worker_thread+0x221/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:2253
kthread+0x3a1/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:231
ret_from_fork+0x2a/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:431
Code: 8d 7c 24 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 75 5b 48 b8 00 00
00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 6c 24 20 49 8d 7d 08 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80>
3c 02 00 75 34 4d 8b 6d 08 4d 85 ed 74 0b e8 26 2b 51 fd 4c
RIP: asix_suspend+0x76/0xc0 RSP: ffff88006bbae718
---[ end trace dfc4f5649284342c ]---

Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Revert "net: usb: asix: fill null-ptr-deref in asix_suspend"

This reverts commit baedf68a068ca29624f241426843635920f16e1d.

There is an updated version of this fix which covers
the problem more thoroughly.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Merge branch 'pm-cpufreq-sched'

* pm-cpufreq-sched:
cpufreq: schedutil: Examine the correct CPU when we update util

x86/mm: Unbreak modules that rely on external PAGE_KERNEL availability

Commit 7744ccdbc16f0 ("x86/mm: Add Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
support") as a side-effect made PAGE_KERNEL all of a sudden unavailable
to modules which can't make use of EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL() symbols.

This is because once SME is enabled, sme_me_mask (which is introduced as
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL) makes its way to PAGE_KERNEL through _PAGE_ENC,
causing imminent build failure for all the modules which make use of all
the EXPORT-SYMBOL()-exported API (such as vmap(), __vmalloc(),
remap_pfn_range(), ...).

Exporting (as EXPORT_SYMBOL()) interfaces (and having done so for ages)
that take pgprot_t argument, while making it impossible to -- all of a
sudden -- pass PAGE_KERNEL to it, feels rather incosistent.

Restore the original behavior and make it possible to pass PAGE_KERNEL
to all its EXPORT_SYMBOL() consumers.

[ This is all so not wonderful. We shouldn't need that "sme_me_mask"
  access at all in all those places that really don't care about that
  level of detail, and just want _PAGE_KERNEL or whatever.

  We have some similar issues with _PAGE_CACHE_WP and _PAGE_NOCACHE,
  both of which hide a "cachemode2protval()" call, and which also ends
  up using another EXPORT_SYMBOL(), but at least that only triggers for
  the much more rare cases.

  Maybe we could move these dynamic page table bits to be generated much
  deeper down in the VM layer, instead of hiding them in the macros that
  everybody uses.

  So this all would merit some cleanup. But not today.   - Linus ]

Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Despised-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Merge branch 'fixes-v4.14-rc8' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull key handling fix from James Morris:
"Fix by Eric Biggers for the keys subsystem"

* 'fixes-v4.14-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
KEYS: fix NULL pointer dereference during ASN.1 parsing [ver #2]

apparmor: fix off-by-one comparison on MAXMAPPED_SIG

This came in yesterday, and I have verified our regression tests
were missing this and it can cause an oops. Please apply.

There is a an off-by-one comparision on sig against MAXMAPPED_SIG
that can lead to a read outside the sig_map array if sig
is MAXMAPPED_SIG. Fix this.

Verified that the check is an out of bounds case that can cause an oops.

Revised: add comparison fix to second case
Fixes: cd1dbf76b23d ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

MAINTAINERS: Add Lorenzo Pieralisi for PCI host bridge drivers

Add Lorenzo Pieralisi as maintainer for PCI native host bridge drivers and
the endpoint driver framework.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Lorenzo Pieralisi <lorenzo.pieralisi@arm.com>

KEYS: fix NULL pointer dereference during ASN.1 parsing [ver #2]

syzkaller reported a NULL pointer dereference in asn1_ber_decoder().  It
can be reproduced by the following command, assuming
CONFIG_PKCS7_TEST_KEY=y:

        keyctl add pkcs7_test desc '' @s

The bug is that if the data buffer is empty, an integer underflow occurs
in the following check:

        if (unlikely(dp >= datalen - 1))
                goto data_overrun_error;

This results in the NULL data pointer being dereferenced.

Fix it by checking for 'datalen - dp < 2' instead.

Also fix the similar check for 'dp >= datalen - n' later in the same
function.  That one possibly could result in a buffer overread.

The NULL pointer dereference was reproducible using the "pkcs7_test" key
type but not the "asymmetric" key type because the "asymmetric" key type
checks for a 0-length payload before calling into the ASN.1 decoder but
the "pkcs7_test" key type does not.

The bug report was:

    BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at           (null)
    IP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    PGD 7b708067 P4D 7b708067 PUD 7b6ee067 PMD 0
    Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
    Modules linked in:
    CPU: 0 PID: 522 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 #7
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.3-20171021_125229-anatol 04/01/2014
    task: ffff9b6b3798c040 task.stack: ffff9b6b37970000
    RIP: 0010:asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    RSP: 0018:ffff9b6b37973c78 EFLAGS: 00010216
    RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000000000000021c
    RDX: ffffffff814a04ed RSI: ffffb1524066e000 RDI: ffffffff910759e0
    RBP: ffff9b6b37973d60 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff9b6b3caa4180
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000002
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
    FS:  00007f10ed1f2700(0000) GS:ffff9b6b3ea00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
    CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
    CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000007b6f3000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
    Call Trace:
     pkcs7_parse_message+0xee/0x240 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c:139
     verify_pkcs7_signature+0x33/0x180 certs/system_keyring.c:216
     pkcs7_preparse+0x41/0x70 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_key_type.c:63
     key_create_or_update+0x180/0x530 security/keys/key.c:855
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xbf/0x250 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x4585c9
    RSP: 002b:00007f10ed1f1bd8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f10ed1f2700 RCX: 00000000004585c9
    RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000020008ffb RDI: 0000000020008000
    RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffffffffffff R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00007fff1b2260ae
    R13: 00007fff1b2260af R14: 00007f10ed1f2700 R15: 0000000000000000
    Code: dd ca ff 48 8b 45 88 48 83 e8 01 4c 39 f0 0f 86 a8 07 00 00 e8 53 dd ca ff 49 8d 46 01 48 89 85 58 ff ff ff 48 8b 85 60 ff ff ff <42> 0f b6 0c 30 89 c8 88 8d 75 ff ff ff 83 e0 1f 89 8d 28 ff ff
    RIP: asn1_ber_decoder+0x17f/0xe60 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233 RSP: ffff9b6b37973c78
    CR2: 0000000000000000

Fixes: 42d5ec27f873 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

selftests/x86: Add tests for the STR and SLDT instructions

The STR and SLDT instructions are not valid when running on virtual-8086
mode and generate an invalid operand exception. These two instructions are
protected by the Intel User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) security
feature. In protected mode, if UMIP is enabled, these instructions generate
a general protection fault if called from CPL > 0. Linux traps the general
protection fault and emulates the instructions sgdt, sidt and smsw; but not
str and sldt.

These tests are added to verify that the emulation code does not emulate
these two instructions but the expected invalid operand exception is
seen.

Tests fallback to exit with INT3 in case emulation does happen.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-13-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86: Add tests for User-Mode Instruction Prevention

Certain user space programs that run on virtual-8086 mode may utilize
instructions protected by the User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP)
security feature present in new Intel processors: SGDT, SIDT and SMSW. In
such a case, a general protection fault is issued if UMIP is enabled. When
such a fault happens, the kernel traps it and emulates the results of
these instructions with dummy values. The purpose of this new
test is to verify whether the impacted instructions can be executed
without causing such #GP. If no #GP exceptions occur, we expect to exit
virtual-8086 mode from INT3.

The instructions protected by UMIP are executed in representative use
cases:

a) displacement-only memory addressing
b) register-indirect memory addressing
c) results stored directly in operands

Unfortunately, it is not possible to check the results against a set of
expected values because no emulation will occur in systems that do not
have the UMIP feature. Instead, results are printed for verification. A
simple verification is done to ensure that results of all tests are
identical.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-12-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/traps: Fix up general protection faults caused by UMIP

If the User-Mode Instruction Prevention CPU feature is available and
enabled, a general protection fault will be issued if the instructions
sgdt, sldt, sidt, str or smsw are executed from user-mode context
(CPL > 0). If the fault was caused by any of the instructions protected
by UMIP, fixup_umip_exception() will emulate dummy results for these
instructions as follows: in virtual-8086 and protected modes, sgdt, sidt
and smsw are emulated; str and sldt are not emulated. No emulation is done
for user-space long mode processes.

If emulation is successful, the emulated result is passed to the user space
program and no SIGSEGV signal is emitted.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-11-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
[ Added curly braces. ]
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/umip: Enable User-Mode Instruction Prevention at runtime

User-Mode Instruction Prevention (UMIP) is enabled by setting/clearing a
bit in %cr4.

It makes sense to enable UMIP at some point while booting, before user
spaces come up. Like SMAP and SMEP, is not critical to have it enabled
very early during boot. This is because UMIP is relevant only when there is
a user space to be protected from. Given these similarities, UMIP can be
enabled along with SMAP and SMEP.

At the moment, UMIP is disabled by default at build time. It can be enabled
at build time by selecting CONFIG_X86_INTEL_UMIP. If enabled at build time,
it can be disabled at run time by adding clearcpuid=514 to the kernel
parameters.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-10-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/umip: Force a page fault when unable to copy emulated result to user

fixup_umip_exception() will be called from do_general_protection(). If the
former returns false, the latter will issue a SIGSEGV with SEND_SIG_PRIV.
However, when emulation is successful but the emulated result cannot be
copied to user space memory, it is more accurate to issue a SIGSEGV with
SEGV_MAPERR with the offending address. A new function, inspired in
force_sig_info_fault(), is introduced to model the page fault.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-9-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/umip: Add emulation code for UMIP instructions

The feature User-Mode Instruction Prevention present in recent Intel
processor prevents a group of instructions (sgdt, sidt, sldt, smsw, and
str) from being executed with CPL > 0. Otherwise, a general protection
fault is issued.

Rather than relaying to the user space the general protection fault caused
by the UMIP-protected instructions (in the form of a SIGSEGV signal), it
can be trapped and the instruction emulated to provide a dummy result.
This allows to both conserve the current kernel behavior and not reveal the
system resources that UMIP intends to protect (i.e., the locations of the
global descriptor and interrupt descriptor tables, the segment selectors of
the local descriptor table, the value of the task state register and the
contents of the CR0 register).

This emulation is needed because certain applications (e.g., WineHQ and
DOSEMU2) rely on this subset of instructions to function. Given that sldt
and str are not commonly used in programs that run on WineHQ or DOSEMU2,
they are not emulated. Also, emulation is provided only for 32-bit
processes; 64-bit processes that attempt to use the instructions that UMIP
protects will receive the SIGSEGV signal issued as a consequence of the
general protection fault.

The instructions protected by UMIP can be split in two groups. Those which
return a kernel memory address (sgdt and sidt) and those which return a
value (smsw, sldt and str; the last two not emulated).

For the instructions that return a kernel memory address, applications such
as WineHQ rely on the result being located in the kernel memory space, not
the actual location of the table. The result is emulated as a hard-coded
value that lies close to the top of the kernel memory. The limit for the
GDT and the IDT are set to zero.

The instruction smsw is emulated to return the value that the register CR0
has at boot time as set in the head_32.

Care is taken to appropriately emulate the results when segmentation is
used. That is, rather than relying on USER_DS and USER_CS, the function
insn_get_addr_ref() inspects the segment descriptor pointed by the
registers in pt_regs. This ensures that we correctly obtain the segment
base address and the address and operand sizes even if the user space
application uses a local descriptor table.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-8-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/cpufeature: Add User-Mode Instruction Prevention definitions

User-Mode Instruction Prevention is a security feature present in new
Intel processors that, when set, prevents the execution of a subset of
instructions if such instructions are executed in user mode (CPL > 0).
Attempting to execute such instructions causes a general protection
exception.

The subset of instructions comprises:

* SGDT - Store Global Descriptor Table
* SIDT - Store Interrupt Descriptor Table
* SLDT - Store Local Descriptor Table
* SMSW - Store Machine Status Word
* STR - Store Task Register

This feature is also added to the list of disabled-features to allow
a cleaner handling of build-time configuration.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-7-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 16-bit address encodings

Tasks running in virtual-8086 mode, in protected mode with code segment
descriptors that specify 16-bit default address sizes via the D bit, or via
an address override prefix will use 16-bit addressing form encodings as
described in the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architecture Software Developer's
Manual Volume 2A Section 2.1.5, Table 2-1.

16-bit addressing encodings differ in several ways from the 32-bit/64-bit
addressing form encodings: ModRM.rm points to different registers and, in
some cases, effective addresses are indicated by the addition of the value
of two registers. Also, there is no support for SIB bytes. Thus, a
separate function is needed to parse this form of addressing.

Three functions are introduced. get_reg_offset_16() obtains the
offset from the base of pt_regs of the registers indicated by the ModRM
byte of the address encoding. get_eff_addr_modrm_16() computes the
effective address from the value of the register operands.
get_addr_ref_16() computes the linear address using the obtained effective
address and the base address of the segment.

Segment limits are enforced when running in protected mode.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-6-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/insn-eval: Handle 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode

It is possible to utilize 32-bit address encodings in virtual-8086 mode via
an address override instruction prefix. However, the range of the
effective address is still limited to [0x-0xffff]. In such a case, return
error.

Also, linear addresses in virtual-8086 mode are limited to 20 bits. Enforce
such limit by truncating the most significant bytes of the computed linear
address.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-5-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/insn-eval: Add wrapper function for 32 and 64-bit addresses

The function insn_get_addr_ref() is capable of handling only 64-bit
addresses. A previous commit introduced a function to handle 32-bit
addresses. Invoke these two functions from a third wrapper function that
calls the appropriate routine based on the address size specified in the
instruction structure (obtained by looking at the code segment default
address size and the address override prefix, if present).

While doing this, rename the original function insn_get_addr_ref() with
the more appropriate name get_addr_ref_64(), ensure it is only used
for 64-bit addresses.

Also, since 64-bit addresses are not possible in 32-bit builds, provide
a dummy function such case.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-4-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/insn-eval: Add support to resolve 32-bit address encodings

32-bit and 64-bit address encodings are identical. Thus, the same logic
could be used to resolve the effective address. However, there are two key
differences: address size and enforcement of segment limits.

If running a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel, it is best to perform
the address calculation using 32-bit data types. In this manner hardware
is used for the arithmetic, including handling of signs and overflows.

32-bit addresses are generally used in protected mode; segment limits are
enforced in this mode. This implementation obtains the limit of the
segment associated with the instruction operands and prefixes. If the
computed address is outside the segment limits, an error is returned. It
is also possible to use 32-bit address in long mode and virtual-8086 mode
by using an address override prefix. In such cases, segment limits are not
enforced.

Support to use 32-bit arithmetic is added to the utility functions that
compute effective addresses. However, the end result is stored in a
variable of type long (which has a width of 8 bytes in 64-bit builds).
Hence, once a 32-bit effective address is computed, the 4 most significant
bytes are masked out to avoid sign extension.

The newly added function get_addr_ref_32() is almost identical to the
existing function insn_get_addr_ref() (used for 64-bit addresses). The only
difference is that it verifies that the effective address is within the
limits of the segment.

Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-3-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/insn-eval: Compute linear address in several utility functions

Computing a linear address involves several steps. The first step is to
compute the effective address. This requires determining the addressing
mode in use and perform arithmetic operations on the operands. Plus, each
addressing mode has special cases that must be handled.

Once the effective address is known, the base address of the applicable
segment is added to obtain the linear address.

Clearly, this is too much work for a single function. Instead, handle each
addressing mode in a separate utility function. This improves readability
and gives us the opportunity to handler errors better.

At the moment, arithmetic to compute the effective address uses 64-byte
variables. Thus, limit support to 64-bit addresses.

While reworking the function insn_get_addr_ref(), the variable addr_offset
is renamed as regoff to reflect its actual use (i.e., offset, from the
base of pt_regs, of the register used as operand).

Suggested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Adam Buchbinder <adam.buchbinder@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Chen Yucong <slaoub@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Huang Rui <ray.huang@amd.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lstoakes@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com>
Cc: Ravi V. Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: ricardo.neri@intel.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509935277-22138-2-git-send-email-ricardo.neri-calderon@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'x86/mpx' into x86/asm, to pick up dependent commits

The UMIP series is based on top of changes already queued up in the x86/mpx branch,
so merge it.

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

qmi_wwan: Add missing skb_reset_mac_header-call

When we receive a packet on a QMI device in raw IP mode, we should call
skb_reset_mac_header() to ensure that skb->mac_header contains a valid
offset in the packet. While it shouldn't really matter, the packets have
no MAC header and the interface is configured as-such, it seems certain
parts of the network stack expects a "good" value in skb->mac_header.

Without the skb_reset_mac_header() call added in this patch, for example
shaping traffic (using tc) triggers the following oops on the first
received packet:

[  303.642957] skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:8f137918 len:177 put:67 head:8e4b0f00 data:8e4b0eff tail:0x8e4b0fb0 end:0x8e4b1520 dev:wwan0
[  303.655045] Kernel bug detected[#1]:
[  303.658622] CPU: 1 PID: 1002 Comm: logd Not tainted 4.9.58 #0
[  303.664339] task: 8fdf05e0 task.stack: 8f15c000
[  303.668844] $ 0   : 00000000 00000001 0000007a 00000000
[  303.674062] $ 4   : 8149a2fc 8149a2fc 8149ce20 00000000
[  303.679284] $ 8   : 00000030 3878303a 31623465 20303235
[  303.684510] $12   : ded731e3 2626a277 00000000 03bd0000
[  303.689747] $16   : 8ef62b40 00000043 8f137918 804db5fc
[  303.694978] $20   : 00000001 00000004 8fc13800 00000003
[  303.700215] $24   : 00000001 8024ab10
[  303.705442] $28   : 8f15c000 8fc19cf0 00000043 802cc920
[  303.710664] Hi    : 00000000
[  303.713533] Lo    : 74e58000
[  303.716436] epc   : 802cc920 skb_panic+0x58/0x5c
[  303.721046] ra    : 802cc920 skb_panic+0x58/0x5c
[  303.725639] Status: 11007c03 KERNEL EXL IE
[  303.729823] Cause : 50800024 (ExcCode 09)
[  303.733817] PrId  : 0001992f (MIPS 1004Kc)
[  303.737892] Modules linked in: rt2800pci rt2800mmio rt2800lib qcserial ppp_async option usb_wwan rt2x00pci rt2x00mmio rt2x00lib rndis_host qmi_wwan ppp_generic nf_nat_pptp nf_conntrack_pptp nf_conntrack_ipv6 mt76x2i
Process logd (pid: 1002, threadinfo=8f15c000, task=8fdf05e0, tls=77b3eee4)
[  303.962509] Stack : 00000000 80408990 8f137918 000000b1 00000043 8e4b0f00 8e4b0eff 8e4b0fb0
[  303.970871]         8e4b1520 8fec1800 00000043 802cd2a4 6e000045 00000043 00000000 8ef62000
[  303.979219]         8eef5d00 8ef62b40 8fea7300 8f137918 00000000 00000000 0002bb01 793e5664
[  303.987568]         8ef08884 00000001 8fea7300 00000002 8fc19e80 8eef5d00 00000006 00000003
[  303.995934]         00000000 8030ba90 00000003 77ab3fd0 8149dc80 8004d1bc 8f15c000 8f383700
[  304.004324]         ...
[  304.006767] Call Trace:
[  304.009241] [<802cc920>] skb_panic+0x58/0x5c
[  304.013504] [<802cd2a4>] skb_push+0x78/0x90
[  304.017783] [<8f137918>] 0x8f137918
[  304.021269] Code: 00602825  0c02a3b4  24842888 <000c000d> 8c870060  8c8200a0  0007382b  00070336  8c88005c
[  304.031034]
[  304.032805] ---[ end trace b778c482b3f0bda9 ]---
[  304.041384] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[  304.051975] Rebooting in 3 seconds..

While the oops is for a 4.9-kernel, I was able to trigger the same oops with
net-next as of yesterday.

Fixes: 32f7adf633b9 ("net: qmi_wwan: support "raw IP" mode")
Signed-off-by: Kristian Evensen <kristian.evensen@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bonding: fix slave stuck in BOND_LINK_FAIL state

The bonding miimon logic has a flaw, in that a failure of the
rtnl_trylock can cause a slave to become permanently stuck in
BOND_LINK_FAIL state.

The sequence of events to cause this is as follows:

1) bond_miimon_inspect finds that a slave's link is down, and so
calls bond_propose_link_state, setting slave->new_link_state to
BOND_LINK_FAIL, then sets slave->new_link to BOND_LINK_DOWN and returns
non-zero.

2) In bond_mii_monitor, the rtnl_trylock fails, and the timer is
rescheduled.  No change is committed.

3) bond_miimon_inspect is called again, but this time the slave
from step 1 has recovered.  slave->new_link is reset to NOCHANGE, and, as
slave->link was never changed, the switch enters the BOND_LINK_UP case,
and does nothing.  The pending BOND_LINK_FAIL state from step 1 remains
pending, as new_link_state is not reset.

4) The state from step 3 persists until another slave changes link
state and causes bond_miimon_inspect to return non-zero.  At this point,
the BOND_LINK_FAIL state change on the slave from steps 1-3 is committed,
and the slave will remain stuck in BOND_LINK_FAIL state even though it
is actually link up.

The remedy for this is to initialize new_link_state on each entry
to bond_miimon_inspect, as is already done with new_link.

Fixes: fb9eb899a6dc ("bonding: handle link transition from FAIL to UP correctly")
Reported-by: Alex Sidorenko <alexandre.sidorenko@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Mahesh Bandewar <maheshb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

qrtr: Move to postcore_initcall

Registering qrtr with module_init makes the ability of typical platform
code to create AF_QIPCRTR socket during probe a matter of link order
luck. Moving qrtr to postcore_initcall() avoids this.

Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net: qmi_wwan: fix divide by 0 on bad descriptors

A CDC Ethernet functional descriptor with wMaxSegmentSize = 0 will
cause a divide error in usbnet_probe:

divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 24 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8-44453-g1fdc1a82c34f #56
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
task: ffff88006bef5c00 task.stack: ffff88006bf60000
RIP: 0010:usbnet_update_max_qlen+0x24d/0x390 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:355
RSP: 0018:ffff88006bf67508 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000000163c8 RBX: ffff8800621fce40 RCX: ffff8800621fcf34
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff837ecb7a RDI: ffff8800621fcf34
RBP: ffff88006bf67520 R08: ffff88006bef5c00 R09: ffffed000c43f881
R10: ffffed000c43f880 R11: ffff8800621fc406 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: ffffffff85c71de0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88006ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffe9c0d6dac CR3: 00000000614f4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
usbnet_probe+0x18b5/0x2790 drivers/net/usb/usbnet.c:1783
qmi_wwan_probe+0x133/0x220 drivers/net/usb/qmi_wwan.c:1338
usb_probe_interface+0x324/0x940 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:361
really_probe drivers/base/dd.c:413
driver_probe_device+0x522/0x740 drivers/base/dd.c:557

Fix by simply ignoring the bogus descriptor, as it is optional
for QMI devices anyway.

Fixes: 423ce8caab7e ("net: usb: qmi_wwan: New driver for Huawei QMI based WWAN devices")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net: cdc_ether: fix divide by 0 on bad descriptors

Setting dev->hard_mtu to 0 will cause a divide error in
usbnet_probe. Protect against devices with bogus CDC Ethernet
functional descriptors by ignoring a zero wMaxSegmentSize.

Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

bonding: discard lowest hash bit for 802.3ad layer3+4

After commit 07f4c90062f8 ("tcp/dccp: try to not exhaust ip_local_port_range
in connect()"), we will try to use even ports for connect(). Then if an
application (seen clearly with iperf) opens multiple streams to the same
destination IP and port, each stream will be given an even source port.

So the bonding driver's simple xmit_hash_policy based on layer3+4 addressing
will always hash all these streams to the same interface. And the total
throughput will limited to a single slave.

Change the tcp code will impact the whole tcp behavior, only for bonding
usage. Paolo Abeni suggested fix this by changing the bonding code only,
which should be more reasonable, and less impact.

Fix this by discarding the lowest hash bit because it contains little entropy.
After the fix we can re-balance between slaves.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net/mlx5e/core/en_fs: fix pointer dereference after free in mlx5e_execute_l2_action

hn is being kfree'd in mlx5e_del_l2_from_hash and then dereferenced
by accessing hn->ai.addr

Fix this by copying the MAC address into a local variable for its safe use
in all possible execution paths within function mlx5e_execute_l2_action.

Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1417789
Fixes: eeb66cdb6826 ("net/mlx5: Separate between E-Switch and MPFS")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <garsilva@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net: mvpp2: Prevent userspace from changing TX affinities

The mvpp2 driver can't cope at all with the TX affinities being
changed from userspace, and spit an endless stream of

[   91.779920] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing
[   91.779930] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing
[   91.780402] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing
[   91.780406] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing
[   91.780415] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing
[   91.780418] mvpp2 f4000000.ethernet eth2: wrong cpu on the end of Tx processing

rendering the box completely useless (I've measured around 600k
interrupts/s on a 8040 box) once irqbalance kicks in and start
doing its job.

Obviously, the driver was never designed with this in mind. So let's
work around the problem by preventing userspace from interacting
with these interrupts altogether.

Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

MAINTAINERS: Remove Gabriele Paoloni as HiSilicon PCI maintainer

Gabriele is now moving to a different role, so remove him as HiSilicon PCI
maintainer.

Signed-off-by: Gabriele Paoloni <gabriele.paoloni@huawei.com>
[bhelgaas: Thanks for all your help, Gabriele, and best wishes!]
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Acked-by: Zhou Wang <wangzhou1@hisilicon.com>

MAINTAINERS: Remove Stephen Bates as Microsemi Switchtec maintainer

Just sent an email there and received an autoreply because he no longer
works there.

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>

resource: Fix resource_size.cocci warnings

arch/x86/kernel/crash.c:627:34-37: ERROR: Missing resource_size with res
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c:528:16-19: ERROR: Missing resource_size with res

Use resource_size function on resource object
instead of explicit computation.

Generated by: scripts/coccinelle/api/resource_size.cocci

Fixes: 1d2e733b13b4 ("resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback")
Signed-off-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: kbuild-all@01.org
Cc: tipbuild@zytor.com
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107191801.GA91887@lkp-snb01

drivers/ide-cd: Handle missing driver data during status check gracefully

The 0day bot reports the below failure which happens occasionally, with
their randconfig testing (once every ~100 boots).  The Code points at
the private pointer ->driver_data being NULL, which hints at a race of
sorts where the private driver_data descriptor has disappeared by the
time we get to run the workqueue.

So let's check that pointer before we continue with issuing the command
to the drive.

This fix is of the brown paper bag nature but considering that IDE is
long deprecated, let's do that so that random testing which happens to
enable CONFIG_IDE during randconfig builds, doesn't fail because of
this.

Besides, failing the TEST_UNIT_READY command because the drive private
data is gone is something which we could simply do anyway, to denote
that there was a problem communicating with the device.

  BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 000001c0
  IP: cdrom_check_status
  *pde = 00000000
  Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
  CPU: 1 PID: 155 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc8 #127
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1 04/01/2014
  Workqueue: events_freezable_power_ disk_events_workfn
  task: 4fe90980 task.stack: 507ac000
  EIP: cdrom_check_status+0x2c/0x90
  EFLAGS: 00210246 CPU: 1
  EAX: 00000000 EBX: 4fefec00 ECX: 00000000 EDX: 00000000
  ESI: 00000003 EDI: ffffffff EBP: 467a9340 ESP: 507aded0
   DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: 000001c0 CR3: 06e0f000 CR4: 00000690
  Call Trace:
   ? ide_cdrom_check_events_real
   ? cdrom_check_events
   ? disk_check_events
   ? process_one_work
   ? process_one_work
   ? worker_thread
   ? kthread
   ? process_one_work
   ? __kthread_create_on_node
   ? ret_from_fork
  Code: 53 83 ec 14 89 c3 89 d1 be 03 00 00 00 65 a1 14 00 00 00 89 44 24 10 31 c0 8b 43 18 c7 44 24 04 00 00 00 00 c7 04 24 00 00 00 00 <8a> 80 c0 01 00 00 c7 44 24 08 00 00 00 00 83 e0 03 c7 44 24 0c
  EIP: cdrom_check_status+0x2c/0x90 SS:ESP: 0068:507aded0
  CR2: 00000000000001c0
  ---[ end trace 2410e586dd8f88b2 ]---

Reported-and-tested-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Revert "scsi: make 'state' device attribute pollable"

This reverts commit 8a97712e5314aefe16b3ffb4583a34deaa49de04.

This commit added a call to sysfs_notify() from within
scsi_device_set_state(), which in turn turns out to make libata very
unhappy, because ata_eh_detach_dev() does

        spin_lock_irqsave(ap->lock, flags);
        ..
        if (ata_scsi_offline_dev(dev)) {
                dev->flags |= ATA_DFLAG_DETACHED;
                ap->pflags |= ATA_PFLAG_SCSI_HOTPLUG;
        }

and ata_scsi_offline_dev() then does that scsi_device_set_state() to set
it offline.

So now we called sysfs_notify() from within a spinlocked region, which
really doesn't work.  The 0day robot reported this as:

   BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:238

because sysfs_notify() ends up calling kernfs_find_and_get_ns() which
then does mutex_lock(&kernfs_mutex)..

The pollability of the device state isn't critical, so revert this all
for now, and maybe we'll do it differently in the future.

Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

ALSA: seq: Fix OSS sysex delivery in OSS emulation

The SYSEX event delivery in OSS sequencer emulation assumed that the
event is encoded in the variable-length data with the straight
buffering. This was the normal behavior in the past, but during the
development, the chained buffers were introduced for carrying more
data, while the OSS code was left intact. As a result, when a SYSEX
event with the chained buffer data is passed to OSS sequencer port,
it may end up with the wrong memory access, as if it were having a too
large buffer.

This patch addresses the bug, by applying the buffer data expansion by
the generic snd_seq_dump_var_event() helper function.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reported-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@android.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>

X86/KVM: Clear encryption attribute when SEV is active

The guest physical memory area holding the struct pvclock_wall_clock and
struct pvclock_vcpu_time_info are shared with the hypervisor. It
periodically updates the contents of the memory.

When SEV is active, the encryption attributes from the shared memory pages
must be cleared so that both hypervisor and guest can access the data.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-18-brijesh.singh@amd.com

X86/KVM: Decrypt shared per-cpu variables when SEV is active

When SEV is active, guest memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, a
guest memory region shared with the hypervisor must be mapped as decrypted
before it can be shared.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-17-brijesh.singh@amd.com

percpu: Introduce DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED

KVM guest defines three per-CPU variables (steal-time, apf_reason, and
kvm_pic_eoi) which are shared between a guest and a hypervisor.

When SEV is active, memory is encrypted with a guest-specific key, and if
the guest OS wants to share the memory region with the hypervisor then it
must clear the C-bit (i.e set decrypted) before sharing it.

DEFINE_PER_CPU_DECRYPTED can be used to define the per-CPU variables
which will be shared between a guest and a hypervisor.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-16-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot

Some KVM-specific custom MSRs share the guest physical address with the
hypervisor in early boot. When SEV is active, the shared physical address
must be mapped with memory encryption attribute cleared so that both
hypervisor and guest can access the data.

Add APIs to change the memory encryption attribute in early boot code.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-15-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/io: Unroll string I/O when SEV is active

Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) does not support string I/O, so
unroll the string I/O operation into a loop operating on one element at
a time.

[ tglx: Gave the static key a real name instead of the obscure __sev ]

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-14-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/boot: Add early boot support when running with SEV active

Early in the boot process, add checks to determine if the kernel is
running with Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) active.

Checking for SEV requires checking that the kernel is running under a
hypervisor (CPUID 0x00000001, bit 31), that the SEV feature is available
(CPUID 0x8000001f, bit 1) and then checking a non-interceptable SEV MSR
(0xc0010131, bit 0).

This check is required so that during early compressed kernel booting the
pagetables (both the boot pagetables and KASLR pagetables (if enabled) are
updated to include the encryption mask so that when the kernel is
decompressed into encrypted memory, it can boot properly.

After the kernel is decompressed and continues booting the same logic is
used to check if SEV is active and set a flag indicating so. This allows
to distinguish between SME and SEV, each of which have unique differences
in how certain things are handled: e.g. DMA (always bounce buffered with
SEV) or EFI tables (always access decrypted with SME).

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-13-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm: Add DMA support for SEV memory encryption

DMA access to encrypted memory cannot be performed when SEV is active.
In order for DMA to properly work when SEV is active, the SWIOTLB bounce
buffers must be used.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>C
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-12-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm, resource: Use PAGE_KERNEL protection for ioremap of memory pages

In order for memory pages to be properly mapped when SEV is active, it's
necessary to use the PAGE_KERNEL protection attribute as the base
protection. This ensures that memory mapping of, e.g. ACPI tables,
receives the proper mapping attributes.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-11-brijesh.singh@amd.com

resource: Provide resource struct in resource walk callback

In preperation for a new function that will need additional resource
information during the resource walk, update the resource walk callback to
pass the resource structure. Since the current callback start and end
arguments are pulled from the resource structure, the callback functions
can obtain them from the resource structure directly.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-10-brijesh.singh@amd.com

resource: Consolidate resource walking code

The walk_iomem_res_desc(), walk_system_ram_res() and walk_system_ram_range()
functions each have much of the same code.

Create a new function that consolidates the common code from these
functions in one place to reduce the amount of duplicated code.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-9-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active

EFI data is encrypted when the kernel is run under SEV. Update the
page table references to be sure the EFI memory areas are accessed
encrypted.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm: Include SEV for encryption memory attribute changes

The current code checks only for sme_active() when determining whether
to perform the encryption attribute change. Include sev_active() in this
check so that memory attribute changes can occur under SME and SEV.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-7-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm: Use encrypted access of boot related data with SEV

When Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) is active, boot data (such as
EFI related data, setup data) is encrypted and needs to be accessed as
such when mapped. Update the architecture override in early_memremap to
keep the encryption attribute when mapping this data.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-6-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/realmode: Don't decrypt trampoline area under SEV

When SEV is active the trampoline area will need to be in encrypted
memory so only mark the area decrypted if SME is active.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-5-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm: Don't attempt to encrypt initrd under SEV

When SEV is active the initrd/initramfs will already have already been
placed in memory encrypted so do not try to encrypt it.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-4-brijesh.singh@amd.com

x86/mm: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support

Provide support for Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV). This initial
support defines a flag that is used by the kernel to determine if it is
running with SEV active.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-3-brijesh.singh@amd.com

Documentation/x86: Add AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) description

Update the AMD memory encryption document describing the Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) feature.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171020143059.3291-2-brijesh.singh@amd.com

kprobes, x86/alternatives: Use text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules

We use alternatives_text_reserved() to check if the address is in
the fixed pieces of alternative reserved, but the problem is that
we don't hold the smp_alt mutex when call this function. So the list
traversal may encounter a deleted list_head if another path is doing
alternatives_smp_module_del().

One solution is that we can hold smp_alt mutex before call this
function, but the difficult point is that the callers of this
functions, arch_prepare_kprobe() and arch_prepare_optimized_kprobe(),
are called inside the text_mutex. So we must hold smp_alt mutex
before we go into these arch dependent code. But we can't now,
the smp_alt mutex is the arch dependent part, only x86 has it.
Maybe we can export another arch dependent callback to solve this.

But there is a simpler way to handle this problem. We can reuse the
text_mutex to protect smp_alt_modules instead of using another mutex.
And all the arch dependent checks of kprobes are inside the text_mutex,
so it's safe now.

Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: bp@suse.de
Fixes: 2cfa197 "ftrace/alternatives: Introducing *_text_reserved functions"
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509585501-79466-1-git-send-email-zhouchengming1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/mm: Remove unnecessary TLB flush for SME in-place encryption

A TLB flush is not required when doing in-place encryption or decryption
since the area's pagetable attributes are not being altered. To avoid
confusion between what the routine is doing and what is documented in
the AMD APM, delete the local_flush_tlb() call.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171101165426.1388.24866.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/build: Add more generated files to the .gitignore file

Some of the files generated by the build process were not listed.

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-5-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/build: Specify -input-charset=utf-8 for mkisofs

It avoids the following warning triggered by newer versions of mkisofs:

-input-charset not specified, using utf-8 (detected in locale settings)

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-4-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/build: Add new paths for isolinux.bin and ldlinux.c32

Recently I failed to build isoimage target, because the path of isolinux.bin
changed to /usr/xxx/ISOLINUX/isolinux.bin, as well as ldlinux.c32 which
changed to /usr/xxx/syslinux/modules/bios/ldlinux.c32.

This patch improves the file search logic:
- Show a error message instead of silent fail.
- Add above new paths.

Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-3-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/build: Factor out fdimage/isoimage generation commands to standalone script

The build messages for fdimage/isoimage generation are pretty unstructured,
just the raw shell command blocks are printed.

Emit shortened messages similar to existing kbuild messages, and move
the Makefile commands into a separate shell script - which is much
easier to handle.

This patch factors out the commands used for fdimage/isoimage generation
from arch/x86/boot/Makefile to a new script arch/x86/boot/genimage.sh.
Then it adds the new kbuild command 'genimage' which invokes the new script.
All fdimages/isoimage files are now generated by a call to 'genimage' with
different parameters.

Now 'make isoimage' becomes:

...
Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#30)
  GENIMAGE arch/x86/boot/image.iso
Size of boot image is 4 sectors -> No emulation
15.37% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
30.68% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
46.04% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
61.35% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
76.69% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
92.00% done, estimate finish Sun Nov  5 23:36:57 2017
Total translation table size: 2048
Total rockridge attributes bytes: 659
Total directory bytes: 0
Path table size(bytes): 10
Max brk space used 0
32608 extents written (63 MB)
Kernel: arch/x86/boot/image.iso is ready

Before:

Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#63)
rm -rf arch/x86/boot/isoimage
mkdir arch/x86/boot/isoimage
for i in lib lib64 share end ; do \
if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin ] ; then \
cp /usr/$i/syslinux/isolinux.bin arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \
if [ -f /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 ]; then \
cp /usr/$i/syslinux/ldlinux.c32 arch/x86/boot/isoimage ; \
fi ; \
break ; \
fi ; \
if [ $i = end ] ; then exit 1 ; fi ; \
done
...

Suggested-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Changbin Du <changbin.du@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509939179-7556-2-git-send-email-changbin.du@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

mm/sparsemem: Fix ARM64 boot crash when CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y

Since commit:

83e3c48729d9 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")

we allocate the mem_section array dynamically in sparse_memory_present_with_active_regions(),
but some architectures, like arm64, don't call the routine to initialize sparsemem.

Let's move the initialization into memory_present() it should cover all
architectures.

Reported-and-tested-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Tested-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Fixes: 83e3c48729d9 ("mm/sparsemem: Allocate mem_section at runtime for CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171107083337.89952-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86/ldt_get: Add a few additional tests for limits

We weren't testing the .limit and .limit_in_pages fields very well.
Add more tests.

This addition seems to trigger the "bits 16:19 are undefined" issue
that was fixed in an earlier patch. I think that, at least on my
CPU, the high nibble of the limit ends in LAR bits 16:19.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/5601c15ea9b3113d288953fd2838b18bedf6bc67.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Run most existing LDT test cases against the GDT as well

Now that the main test infrastructure supports the GDT, run tests
that will pass the kernel's GDT permission tests against the GDT.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/686a1eda63414da38fcecc2412db8dba1ae40581.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Add infrastructure to test set_thread_area()

Much of the test design could apply to set_thread_area() (i.e. GDT),
not just modify_ldt(). Add set_thread_area() to the
install_valid_mode() helper.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/02c23f8fba5547007f741dc24c3926e5284ede02.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86/ldt_gdt: Robustify against set_thread_area() and LAR oddities

Bits 19:16 of LAR's result are undefined, and some upcoming
improvements to the test case seem to trigger this.  Mask off those
bits to avoid spurious failures.

commit 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS
segments") adds a valid case in which LAR's output doesn't quite
agree with set_thread_area()'s input.  This isn't triggered in the
test as is, but it will be if we start calling set_thread_area()
with the accessed bit clear.  Work around this discrepency.

I've added a Fixes tag so that -stable can pick this up if neccesary.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 5b781c7e317f ("x86/tls: Forcibly set the accessed bit in TLS segments")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b82f3f89c034b53580970ac865139fd8863f44e2.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

selftests/x86/protection_keys: Fix syscall NR redefinition warnings

On new enough glibc, the pkey syscalls numbers are available. Check
first before defining them to avoid warnings like:

protection_keys.c:198:0: warning: "SYS_pkey_alloc" redefined

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1fbef53a9e6befb7165ff855fc1a7d4788a191d6.1509794321.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/cpufeatures: Fix various details in the feature definitions

Kept this commit separate from the re-tabulation changes, to make
the changes easier to review:

- add better explanation for entries with no explanation
- fix/enhance the text of some of the entries
- fix the vertical alignment of some of the feature number definitions
- fix inconsistent capitalization
- ... and lots of other small details

i.e. make it all more of a coherent unit, instead of a patchwork of years of additions.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-4-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

x86/cpufeatures: Re-tabulate the X86_FEATURE definitions

Over the years asm/cpufeatures.h has become somewhat of a mess: the original
tabulation style was too narrow, while x86 feature names also kept growing
in length, creating frequent field width overflows.

Re-tabulate it to make it wider and easier to read/modify. Also harmonize
the tabulation of the other defines in this file to match it.

Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171031121723.28524-3-mingo@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'x86/build' into x86/asm, to fix up conflicts

Conflicts:
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/Makefile

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

Merge branch 'linus' into x86/asm, to pick up fixes and resolve conflicts

Conflicts:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/Makefile

Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

ACPI / PM: Blacklist Low Power S0 Idle _DSM for Dell XPS13 9360

At least one Dell XPS13 9360 is reported to have serious issues with
the Low Power S0 Idle _DSM interface and since this machine model
generally can do ACPI S3 just fine, add a blacklist entry to disable
that interface for Dell XPS13 9360.

Fixes: 8110dd281e15 (ACPI / sleep: EC-based wakeup from suspend-to-idle on recent systems)
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=196907
Reported-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Tested-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Cc: 4.13+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.13+

Merge branch 'for-4.14-fixes' of git://git./linux/kernel/git/tj/wq

Pull workqueue fix from Tejun Heo:
"Another fix for a really old bug.

  It only affects drain_workqueue() which isn't used often and even then
  triggers only during a pretty small race window, so it isn't too
  surprising that it stayed hidden for so long.

  The fix is straight-forward and low-risk. Kudos to Li Bin for
  reporting and fixing the bug"

* 'for-4.14-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq:
  workqueue: Fix NULL pointer dereference

scripts: add leaking_addresses.pl

Currently we are leaking addresses from the kernel to user space. This
script is an attempt to find some of those leakages. Script parses
`dmesg` output and /proc and /sys files for hex strings that look like
kernel addresses.

Only works for 64 bit kernels, the reason being that kernel addresses on
64 bit kernels have 'ffff' as the leading bit pattern making greping
possible. On 32 kernels we don't have this luxury.

Scripts is _slightly_ smarter than a straight grep, we check for false
positives (all 0's or all 1's, and vsyscall start/finish addresses).

[ I think there is a lot of room for improvement here, but it's already
  useful, so I'm merging it as-is. The whole "hash %p format" series is
  expected to go into 4.15, but will not fix %x users, and will not
  incentivize people to look at what they are leaking.     - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

ALSA: seq: Avoid invalid lockdep class warning

The recent fix for adding rwsem nesting annotation was using the given
"hop" argument as the lock subclass key.  Although the idea itself
works, it may trigger a kernel warning like:
  BUG: looking up invalid subclass: 8
  ....
since the lockdep has a smaller number of subclasses (8) than we
currently allow for the hops there (10).

The current definition is merely a sanity check for avoiding the too
deep delivery paths, and the 8 hops are already enough.  So, as a
quick fix, just follow the max hops as same as the max lockdep
subclasses.

Fixes: 1f20f9ff57ca ("ALSA: seq: Fix nested rwsem annotation for lockdep splat")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>