X-Git-Url: http://git.osdn.net/view?p=bytom%2Fvapor.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=vendor%2Fgithub.com%2Fbytom%2Fcrypto%2Fsm2%2Fverify.go;fp=vendor%2Fgithub.com%2Fbytom%2Fcrypto%2Fsm2%2Fverify.go;h=ec23e4821e7751b1e7df7b28a163329819af5dc3;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hb=8da5d90ecadf13f1510dbbc4bce05645684142a2;hpb=0bd22d212b767702bd1c99edb05d5f3a57cb572c

diff --git a/vendor/github.com/bytom/crypto/sm2/verify.go b/vendor/github.com/bytom/crypto/sm2/verify.go
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ec23e482
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/github.com/bytom/crypto/sm2/verify.go
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+package sm2
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"net"
+	"runtime"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+	"unicode/utf8"
+)
+
+type InvalidReason int
+
+const (
+	// NotAuthorizedToSign results when a certificate is signed by another
+	// which isn't marked as a CA certificate.
+	NotAuthorizedToSign InvalidReason = iota
+	// Expired results when a certificate has expired, based on the time
+	// given in the VerifyOptions.
+	Expired
+	// CANotAuthorizedForThisName results when an intermediate or root
+	// certificate has a name constraint which doesn't include the name
+	// being checked.
+	CANotAuthorizedForThisName
+	// TooManyIntermediates results when a path length constraint is
+	// violated.
+	TooManyIntermediates
+	// IncompatibleUsage results when the certificate's key usage indicates
+	// that it may only be used for a different purpose.
+	IncompatibleUsage
+	// NameMismatch results when the subject name of a parent certificate
+	// does not match the issuer name in the child.
+	NameMismatch
+)
+
+// CertificateInvalidError results when an odd error occurs. Users of this
+// library probably want to handle all these errors uniformly.
+type CertificateInvalidError struct {
+	Cert   *Certificate
+	Reason InvalidReason
+}
+
+func (e CertificateInvalidError) Error() string {
+	switch e.Reason {
+	case NotAuthorizedToSign:
+		return "x509: certificate is not authorized to sign other certificates"
+	case Expired:
+		return "x509: certificate has expired or is not yet valid"
+	case CANotAuthorizedForThisName:
+		return "x509: a root or intermediate certificate is not authorized to sign in this domain"
+	case TooManyIntermediates:
+		return "x509: too many intermediates for path length constraint"
+	case IncompatibleUsage:
+		return "x509: certificate specifies an incompatible key usage"
+	case NameMismatch:
+		return "x509: issuer name does not match subject from issuing certificate"
+	}
+	return "x509: unknown error"
+}
+
+// HostnameError results when the set of authorized names doesn't match the
+// requested name.
+type HostnameError struct {
+	Certificate *Certificate
+	Host        string
+}
+
+func (h HostnameError) Error() string {
+	c := h.Certificate
+
+	var valid string
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(h.Host); ip != nil {
+		// Trying to validate an IP
+		if len(c.IPAddresses) == 0 {
+			return "x509: cannot validate certificate for " + h.Host + " because it doesn't contain any IP SANs"
+		}
+		for _, san := range c.IPAddresses {
+			if len(valid) > 0 {
+				valid += ", "
+			}
+			valid += san.String()
+		}
+	} else {
+		if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 {
+			valid = strings.Join(c.DNSNames, ", ")
+		} else {
+			valid = c.Subject.CommonName
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(valid) == 0 {
+		return "x509: certificate is not valid for any names, but wanted to match " + h.Host
+	}
+	return "x509: certificate is valid for " + valid + ", not " + h.Host
+}
+
+// UnknownAuthorityError results when the certificate issuer is unknown
+type UnknownAuthorityError struct {
+	Cert *Certificate
+	// hintErr contains an error that may be helpful in determining why an
+	// authority wasn't found.
+	hintErr error
+	// hintCert contains a possible authority certificate that was rejected
+	// because of the error in hintErr.
+	hintCert *Certificate
+}
+
+func (e UnknownAuthorityError) Error() string {
+	s := "x509: certificate signed by unknown authority"
+	if e.hintErr != nil {
+		certName := e.hintCert.Subject.CommonName
+		if len(certName) == 0 {
+			if len(e.hintCert.Subject.Organization) > 0 {
+				certName = e.hintCert.Subject.Organization[0]
+			} else {
+				certName = "serial:" + e.hintCert.SerialNumber.String()
+			}
+		}
+		s += fmt.Sprintf(" (possibly because of %q while trying to verify candidate authority certificate %q)", e.hintErr, certName)
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// SystemRootsError results when we fail to load the system root certificates.
+type SystemRootsError struct {
+	Err error
+}
+
+func (se SystemRootsError) Error() string {
+	msg := "x509: failed to load system roots and no roots provided"
+	if se.Err != nil {
+		return msg + "; " + se.Err.Error()
+	}
+	return msg
+}
+
+// errNotParsed is returned when a certificate without ASN.1 contents is
+// verified. Platform-specific verification needs the ASN.1 contents.
+var errNotParsed = errors.New("x509: missing ASN.1 contents; use ParseCertificate")
+
+// VerifyOptions contains parameters for Certificate.Verify. It's a structure
+// because other PKIX verification APIs have ended up needing many options.
+type VerifyOptions struct {
+	DNSName       string
+	Intermediates *CertPool
+	Roots         *CertPool // if nil, the system roots are used
+	CurrentTime   time.Time // if zero, the current time is used
+	// KeyUsage specifies which Extended Key Usage values are acceptable.
+	// An empty list means ExtKeyUsageServerAuth. Key usage is considered a
+	// constraint down the chain which mirrors Windows CryptoAPI behavior,
+	// but not the spec. To accept any key usage, include ExtKeyUsageAny.
+	KeyUsages []ExtKeyUsage
+}
+
+const (
+	leafCertificate = iota
+	intermediateCertificate
+	rootCertificate
+)
+
+func matchNameConstraint(domain, constraint string) bool {
+	// The meaning of zero length constraints is not specified, but this
+	// code follows NSS and accepts them as valid for everything.
+	if len(constraint) == 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if len(domain) < len(constraint) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	prefixLen := len(domain) - len(constraint)
+	if !strings.EqualFold(domain[prefixLen:], constraint) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if prefixLen == 0 {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	isSubdomain := domain[prefixLen-1] == '.'
+	constraintHasLeadingDot := constraint[0] == '.'
+	return isSubdomain != constraintHasLeadingDot
+}
+
+// isValid performs validity checks on the c.
+func (c *Certificate) isValid(certType int, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) error {
+	if len(currentChain) > 0 {
+		child := currentChain[len(currentChain)-1]
+		if !bytes.Equal(child.RawIssuer, c.RawSubject) {
+			return CertificateInvalidError{c, NameMismatch}
+		}
+	}
+	now := opts.CurrentTime
+	if now.IsZero() {
+		now = time.Now()
+	}
+	if now.Before(c.NotBefore) || now.After(c.NotAfter) {
+		return CertificateInvalidError{c, Expired}
+	}
+	if len(c.PermittedDNSDomains) > 0 {
+		ok := false
+		for _, constraint := range c.PermittedDNSDomains {
+			ok = matchNameConstraint(opts.DNSName, constraint)
+			if ok {
+				break
+			}
+		}
+
+		if !ok {
+			return CertificateInvalidError{c, CANotAuthorizedForThisName}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// KeyUsage status flags are ignored. From Engineering Security, Peter
+	// Gutmann: A European government CA marked its signing certificates as
+	// being valid for encryption only, but no-one noticed. Another
+	// European CA marked its signature keys as not being valid for
+	// signatures. A different CA marked its own trusted root certificate
+	// as being invalid for certificate signing. Another national CA
+	// distributed a certificate to be used to encrypt data for the
+	// country’s tax authority that was marked as only being usable for
+	// digital signatures but not for encryption. Yet another CA reversed
+	// the order of the bit flags in the keyUsage due to confusion over
+	// encoding endianness, essentially setting a random keyUsage in
+	// certificates that it issued. Another CA created a self-invalidating
+	// certificate by adding a certificate policy statement stipulating
+	// that the certificate had to be used strictly as specified in the
+	// keyUsage, and a keyUsage containing a flag indicating that the RSA
+	// encryption key could only be used for Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+
+	if certType == intermediateCertificate && (!c.BasicConstraintsValid || !c.IsCA) {
+		return CertificateInvalidError{c, NotAuthorizedToSign}
+	}
+
+	if c.BasicConstraintsValid && c.MaxPathLen >= 0 {
+		numIntermediates := len(currentChain) - 1
+		if numIntermediates > c.MaxPathLen {
+			return CertificateInvalidError{c, TooManyIntermediates}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+// Verify attempts to verify c by building one or more chains from c to a
+// certificate in opts.Roots, using certificates in opts.Intermediates if
+// needed. If successful, it returns one or more chains where the first
+// element of the chain is c and the last element is from opts.Roots.
+//
+// If opts.Roots is nil and system roots are unavailable the returned error
+// will be of type SystemRootsError.
+//
+// WARNING: this doesn't do any revocation checking.
+func (c *Certificate) Verify(opts VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) {
+	// Platform-specific verification needs the ASN.1 contents so
+	// this makes the behavior consistent across platforms.
+	if len(c.Raw) == 0 {
+		return nil, errNotParsed
+	}
+	if opts.Intermediates != nil {
+		for _, intermediate := range opts.Intermediates.certs {
+			if len(intermediate.Raw) == 0 {
+				return nil, errNotParsed
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Use Windows's own verification and chain building.
+	if opts.Roots == nil && runtime.GOOS == "windows" {
+		return c.systemVerify(&opts)
+	}
+
+	if len(c.UnhandledCriticalExtensions) > 0 {
+		return nil, UnhandledCriticalExtension{}
+	}
+
+	if opts.Roots == nil {
+		opts.Roots = systemRootsPool()
+		if opts.Roots == nil {
+			return nil, SystemRootsError{systemRootsErr}
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = c.isValid(leafCertificate, nil, &opts)
+	if err != nil {
+		return
+	}
+
+	if len(opts.DNSName) > 0 {
+		err = c.VerifyHostname(opts.DNSName)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	var candidateChains [][]*Certificate
+	if opts.Roots.contains(c) {
+		candidateChains = append(candidateChains, []*Certificate{c})
+	} else {
+		if candidateChains, err = c.buildChains(make(map[int][][]*Certificate), []*Certificate{c}, &opts); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	keyUsages := opts.KeyUsages
+	if len(keyUsages) == 0 {
+		keyUsages = []ExtKeyUsage{ExtKeyUsageServerAuth}
+	}
+
+	// If any key usage is acceptable then we're done.
+	for _, usage := range keyUsages {
+		if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny {
+			chains = candidateChains
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	for _, candidate := range candidateChains {
+		if checkChainForKeyUsage(candidate, keyUsages) {
+			chains = append(chains, candidate)
+		}
+	}
+
+	if len(chains) == 0 {
+		err = CertificateInvalidError{c, IncompatibleUsage}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func appendToFreshChain(chain []*Certificate, cert *Certificate) []*Certificate {
+	n := make([]*Certificate, len(chain)+1)
+	copy(n, chain)
+	n[len(chain)] = cert
+	return n
+}
+
+func (c *Certificate) buildChains(cache map[int][][]*Certificate, currentChain []*Certificate, opts *VerifyOptions) (chains [][]*Certificate, err error) {
+	possibleRoots, failedRoot, rootErr := opts.Roots.findVerifiedParents(c)
+nextRoot:
+	for _, rootNum := range possibleRoots {
+		root := opts.Roots.certs[rootNum]
+
+		for _, cert := range currentChain {
+			if cert.Equal(root) {
+				continue nextRoot
+			}
+		}
+
+		err = root.isValid(rootCertificate, currentChain, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		chains = append(chains, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, root))
+	}
+
+	possibleIntermediates, failedIntermediate, intermediateErr := opts.Intermediates.findVerifiedParents(c)
+nextIntermediate:
+	for _, intermediateNum := range possibleIntermediates {
+		intermediate := opts.Intermediates.certs[intermediateNum]
+		for _, cert := range currentChain {
+			if cert.Equal(intermediate) {
+				continue nextIntermediate
+			}
+		}
+		err = intermediate.isValid(intermediateCertificate, currentChain, opts)
+		if err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		var childChains [][]*Certificate
+		childChains, ok := cache[intermediateNum]
+		if !ok {
+			childChains, err = intermediate.buildChains(cache, appendToFreshChain(currentChain, intermediate), opts)
+			cache[intermediateNum] = childChains
+		}
+		chains = append(chains, childChains...)
+	}
+
+	if len(chains) > 0 {
+		err = nil
+	}
+
+	if len(chains) == 0 && err == nil {
+		hintErr := rootErr
+		hintCert := failedRoot
+		if hintErr == nil {
+			hintErr = intermediateErr
+			hintCert = failedIntermediate
+		}
+		err = UnknownAuthorityError{c, hintErr, hintCert}
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func matchHostnames(pattern, host string) bool {
+	host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".")
+	pattern = strings.TrimSuffix(pattern, ".")
+
+	if len(pattern) == 0 || len(host) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	patternParts := strings.Split(pattern, ".")
+	hostParts := strings.Split(host, ".")
+
+	if len(patternParts) != len(hostParts) {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	for i, patternPart := range patternParts {
+		if i == 0 && patternPart == "*" {
+			continue
+		}
+		if patternPart != hostParts[i] {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// toLowerCaseASCII returns a lower-case version of in. See RFC 6125 6.4.1. We use
+// an explicitly ASCII function to avoid any sharp corners resulting from
+// performing Unicode operations on DNS labels.
+func toLowerCaseASCII(in string) string {
+	// If the string is already lower-case then there's nothing to do.
+	isAlreadyLowerCase := true
+	for _, c := range in {
+		if c == utf8.RuneError {
+			// If we get a UTF-8 error then there might be
+			// upper-case ASCII bytes in the invalid sequence.
+			isAlreadyLowerCase = false
+			break
+		}
+		if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
+			isAlreadyLowerCase = false
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	if isAlreadyLowerCase {
+		return in
+	}
+
+	out := []byte(in)
+	for i, c := range out {
+		if 'A' <= c && c <= 'Z' {
+			out[i] += 'a' - 'A'
+		}
+	}
+	return string(out)
+}
+
+// VerifyHostname returns nil if c is a valid certificate for the named host.
+// Otherwise it returns an error describing the mismatch.
+func (c *Certificate) VerifyHostname(h string) error {
+	// IP addresses may be written in [ ].
+	candidateIP := h
+	if len(h) >= 3 && h[0] == '[' && h[len(h)-1] == ']' {
+		candidateIP = h[1 : len(h)-1]
+	}
+	if ip := net.ParseIP(candidateIP); ip != nil {
+		// We only match IP addresses against IP SANs.
+		// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#appendix-B.2
+		for _, candidate := range c.IPAddresses {
+			if ip.Equal(candidate) {
+				return nil
+			}
+		}
+		return HostnameError{c, candidateIP}
+	}
+
+	lowered := toLowerCaseASCII(h)
+
+	if len(c.DNSNames) > 0 {
+		for _, match := range c.DNSNames {
+			if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(match), lowered) {
+				return nil
+			}
+		}
+		// If Subject Alt Name is given, we ignore the common name.
+	} else if matchHostnames(toLowerCaseASCII(c.Subject.CommonName), lowered) {
+		return nil
+	}
+
+	return HostnameError{c, h}
+}
+
+func checkChainForKeyUsage(chain []*Certificate, keyUsages []ExtKeyUsage) bool {
+	usages := make([]ExtKeyUsage, len(keyUsages))
+	copy(usages, keyUsages)
+
+	if len(chain) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	usagesRemaining := len(usages)
+
+	// We walk down the list and cross out any usages that aren't supported
+	// by each certificate. If we cross out all the usages, then the chain
+	// is unacceptable.
+
+NextCert:
+	for i := len(chain) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
+		cert := chain[i]
+		if len(cert.ExtKeyUsage) == 0 && len(cert.UnknownExtKeyUsage) == 0 {
+			// The certificate doesn't have any extended key usage specified.
+			continue
+		}
+
+		for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage {
+			if usage == ExtKeyUsageAny {
+				// The certificate is explicitly good for any usage.
+				continue NextCert
+			}
+		}
+
+		const invalidUsage ExtKeyUsage = -1
+
+	NextRequestedUsage:
+		for i, requestedUsage := range usages {
+			if requestedUsage == invalidUsage {
+				continue
+			}
+
+			for _, usage := range cert.ExtKeyUsage {
+				if requestedUsage == usage {
+					continue NextRequestedUsage
+				} else if requestedUsage == ExtKeyUsageServerAuth &&
+					(usage == ExtKeyUsageNetscapeServerGatedCrypto ||
+						usage == ExtKeyUsageMicrosoftServerGatedCrypto) {
+					// In order to support COMODO
+					// certificate chains, we have to
+					// accept Netscape or Microsoft SGC
+					// usages as equal to ServerAuth.
+					continue NextRequestedUsage
+				}
+			}
+
+			usages[i] = invalidUsage
+			usagesRemaining--
+			if usagesRemaining == 0 {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return true
+}