bpf: Add BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT.

commit e9ee9efc0d176512cdce9d27ff8549d7ffa2bfcd upstream

Often we want to write tests cases that check things like bad context
offset accesses.  And one way to do this is to use an odd offset on,
for example, a 32-bit load.

This unfortunately triggers the alignment checks first on platforms
that do not set CONFIG_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS.  So the test
case see the alignment failure rather than what it was testing for.

It is often not completely possible to respect the original intention
of the test, or even test the same exact thing, while solving the
alignment issue.

Another option could have been to check the alignment after the
context and other validations are performed by the verifier, but
that is a non-trivial change to the verifier.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 71ca8c4..8481fc7 100644 (file)
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -228,6 +228,20 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
  */
 #define BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT (1U << 0)
 
+/* If BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT is used in BPF_PROF_LOAD command, the
+ * verifier will allow any alignment whatsoever.  On platforms
+ * with strict alignment requirements for loads ands stores (such
+ * as sparc and mips) the verifier validates that all loads and
+ * stores provably follow this requirement.  This flag turns that
+ * checking and enforcement off.
+ *
+ * It is mostly used for testing when we want to validate the
+ * context and memory access aspects of the verifier, but because
+ * of an unaligned access the alignment check would trigger before
+ * the one we are interested in.
+ */
+#define BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT    (1U << 1)
+
 /* when bpf_ldimm64->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, bpf_ldimm64->imm == fd */
 #define BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD      1
 

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 21a366a..353a8d6 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -1367,9 +1367,14 @@ static int bpf_prog_load(union bpf_attr *attr)
        if (CHECK_ATTR(BPF_PROG_LOAD))
                return -EINVAL;
 
-       if (attr->prog_flags & ~BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT)
+       if (attr->prog_flags & ~(BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT | BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS) &&
+           (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT) &&
+           !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+               return -EPERM;
+
        /* copy eBPF program license from user space */
        if (strncpy_from_user(license, u64_to_user_ptr(attr->license),
                              sizeof(license) - 1) < 0)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 1f4c88c..4ce032c 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -6440,6 +6440,9 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr)
        if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS))
                env->strict_alignment = true;
 
+       if (attr->prog_flags & BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT)
+               env->strict_alignment = false;
+
        ret = replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(env);
        if (ret < 0)
                goto skip_full_check;

diff --git a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 1394497..9e060c6 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -226,6 +226,20 @@ enum bpf_attach_type {
  */
 #define BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT (1U << 0)
 
+/* If BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT is used in BPF_PROF_LOAD command, the
+ * verifier will allow any alignment whatsoever.  On platforms
+ * with strict alignment requirements for loads ands stores (such
+ * as sparc and mips) the verifier validates that all loads and
+ * stores provably follow this requirement.  This flag turns that
+ * checking and enforcement off.
+ *
+ * It is mostly used for testing when we want to validate the
+ * context and memory access aspects of the verifier, but because
+ * of an unaligned access the alignment check would trigger before
+ * the one we are interested in.
+ */
+#define BPF_F_ANY_ALIGNMENT    (1U << 1)
+
 /* when bpf_ldimm64->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD, bpf_ldimm64->imm == fd */
 #define BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD      1
 

diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
index 482025b..f28ae6a 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.c
@@ -261,9 +261,9 @@ int bpf_load_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
 }
 
 int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
-                      size_t insns_cnt, int strict_alignment,
-                      const char *license, __u32 kern_version,
-                      char *log_buf, size_t log_buf_sz, int log_level)
+                      size_t insns_cnt, __u32 prog_flags, const char *license,
+                      __u32 kern_version, char *log_buf, size_t log_buf_sz,
+                      int log_level)
 {
        union bpf_attr attr;
 
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
        attr.log_level = log_level;
        log_buf[0] = 0;
        attr.kern_version = kern_version;
-       attr.prog_flags = strict_alignment ? BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT : 0;
+       attr.prog_flags = prog_flags;
 
        return sys_bpf_prog_load(&attr, sizeof(attr));
 }

diff --git a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
index c3145ab..7f2e947 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
+++ b/tools/lib/bpf/bpf.h
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int bpf_load_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
                     __u32 kern_version, char *log_buf,
                     size_t log_buf_sz);
 int bpf_verify_program(enum bpf_prog_type type, const struct bpf_insn *insns,
-                      size_t insns_cnt, int strict_alignment,
+                      size_t insns_cnt, __u32 prog_flags,
                       const char *license, __u32 kern_version,
                       char *log_buf, size_t log_buf_sz, int log_level);
 

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
index 5f377ec..3c789d0 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_align.c
@@ -620,8 +620,8 @@ static int do_test_single(struct bpf_align_test *test)
 
        prog_len = probe_filter_length(prog);
        fd_prog = bpf_verify_program(prog_type ? : BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER,
-                                    prog, prog_len, 1, "GPL", 0,
-                                    bpf_vlog, sizeof(bpf_vlog), 2);
+                                    prog, prog_len, BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT,
+                                    "GPL", 0, bpf_vlog, sizeof(bpf_vlog), 2);
        if (fd_prog < 0 && test->result != REJECT) {
                printf("Failed to load program.\n");
                printf("%s", bpf_vlog);

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index 809d8e9..919f97a 100644 (file)
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -12862,7 +12862,8 @@ static void do_test_single(struct bpf_test *test, bool unpriv,
        prog_len = probe_filter_length(prog);
 
        fd_prog = bpf_verify_program(prog_type, prog, prog_len,
-                                    test->flags & F_LOAD_WITH_STRICT_ALIGNMENT,
+                                    test->flags & F_LOAD_WITH_STRICT_ALIGNMENT ?
+                                    BPF_F_STRICT_ALIGNMENT : 0,
                                     "GPL", 0, bpf_vlog, sizeof(bpf_vlog), 1);
 
        expected_ret = unpriv && test->result_unpriv != UNDEF ?