// ソフトウェア自動更新\r
// リリースバージョンはリリース予定年(10進数4桁)+月(2桁)+日(2桁)+通し番号(0スタート2桁)とする\r
// 2014年7月31日中の30個目のリリースは2014073129\r
-#define RELEASE_VERSION_NUM 2016022000 /* リリースバージョン */\r
+#define RELEASE_VERSION_NUM 2016030500 /* リリースバージョン */\r
\r
\r
// SourceForge.JPによるフォーク\r
OpenSSL CHANGES
_______________
+ Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not
+ provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers.
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2
+ is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with
+ "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used,
+ users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method()
+ will need to explicitly call either of:
+
+ SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+ or
+ SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
+
+ as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application
+ explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and
+ server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key
+ recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT
+ ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available.
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ [Viktor Dukhovni]
+
+ *) Fix a double-free in DSA code
+
+ A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private
+ keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications
+ that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is
+ considered rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using
+ libFuzzer.
+ (CVE-2016-0705)
+ [Stephen Henson]
+
+ *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak.
+
+ Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly.
+
+ SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour.
+ In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user
+ was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed
+ is configured.
+
+ Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in
+ SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note
+ also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide
+ invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake
+ credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong
+ guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from
+ that of a valid user.
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
+ *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+
+ In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an
+ int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For
+ large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
+ memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data
+ field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values
+ of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|.
+ In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it
+ is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists
+ in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn
+ is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data.
+ This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence.
+
+ All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected
+ to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
+ arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
+ on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
+ consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions
+
+ The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in
+ the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a
+ string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings.
+
+ Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an
+ OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a
+ memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where
+ the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this
+ could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can
+ also occur.
+
+ The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour.
+ These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data
+ is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions
+ in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these
+ functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore
+ applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from
+ untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be
+ vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed
+ as command line arguments.
+
+ Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc
+ received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to
+ trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken.
+ (CVE-2016-0799)
+ [Matt Caswell]
+
+ *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation
+
+ A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on
+ the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery
+ of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on
+ an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same
+ hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions.
+
+ This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of
+ Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and
+ Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at
+ http://cachebleed.info.
+ (CVE-2016-0702)
+ [Andy Polyakov]
+
+ *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default,
+ if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an
+ omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation
+ apps to use 2048 bits by default.
+ [Emilia Käsper]
+
Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
*) DH small subgroups
[Emilia Käsper]
*) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short,
- return an error
+ use a random seed, as already documented.
[Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen <ismo.puustinen@intel.com>]
Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015]
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
+ Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016]
+
+ o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL.
+ o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers
+ (CVE-2016-0800)
+ o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705)
+ o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak
+ (CVE-2016-0798)
+ o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption
+ (CVE-2016-0797)
+ o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799)
+ o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702)
+
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016]
o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701)
- OpenSSL 1.0.2f 28 Jan 2016
+ OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
# define BIO_get_conn_hostname(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,0)
# define BIO_get_conn_port(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,1)
# define BIO_get_conn_ip(b) BIO_ptr_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,2)
-# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,0,NULL)
+# define BIO_get_conn_int_port(b) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_GET_CONNECT,3,NULL)
# define BIO_set_nbio(b,n) BIO_ctrl(b,BIO_C_SET_NBIO,(n),NULL)
long argl, long ret);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void);
-BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(void *buf, int len);
+BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_socket(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_connect(void);
BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_accept(void);
#ifndef HEADER_BN_H
# define HEADER_BN_H
+# include <limits.h>
# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API
# include <stdio.h> /* FILE */
/* library internal functions */
-# define bn_expand(a,bits) ((((((bits+BN_BITS2-1))/BN_BITS2)) <= (a)->dmax)?\
- (a):bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2))
+# define bn_expand(a,bits) \
+ ( \
+ bits > (INT_MAX - BN_BITS2 + 1) ? \
+ NULL \
+ : \
+ (((bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) <= (a)->dmax) ? \
+ (a) \
+ : \
+ bn_expand2((a),(bits+BN_BITS2-1)/BN_BITS2) \
+ )
+
# define bn_wexpand(a,words) (((words) <= (a)->dmax)?(a):bn_expand2((a),(words)))
BIGNUM *bn_expand2(BIGNUM *a, int words);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED
* into a defined order as the return value when a != b is undefined, other
* than to be non-zero.
*/
-int CRYPTO_memcmp(const void *a, const void *b, size_t len);
+int CRYPTO_memcmp(const volatile void *a, const volatile void *b, size_t len);
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
/*
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02
-# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x03
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x04
/*
* primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE\r
# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE\r
#endif\r
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2\r
+# define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2\r
+#endif\r
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STORE\r
# define OPENSSL_NO_STORE\r
#endif\r
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST\r
# define OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST\r
#endif\r
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS\r
+# define OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS\r
+#endif\r
\r
#endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */\r
\r
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE) && !defined(NO_SSL_TRACE)\r
# define NO_SSL_TRACE\r
# endif\r
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) && !defined(NO_SSL2)\r
+# define NO_SSL2\r
+# endif\r
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_STORE) && !defined(NO_STORE)\r
# define NO_STORE\r
# endif\r
# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_UNIT_TEST) && !defined(NO_UNIT_TEST)\r
# define NO_UNIT_TEST\r
# endif\r
+# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS) && !defined(NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS)\r
+# define NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS\r
+# endif\r
#endif\r
\r
/* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */\r
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000206fL
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1000207fL
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2f-fips 28 Jan 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips 1 Mar 2016"
# else
-# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2f 28 Jan 2016"
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.0.2g 1 Mar 2016"
# endif
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache)
typedef struct SRP_user_pwd_st {
+ /* Owned by us. */
char *id;
BIGNUM *s;
BIGNUM *v;
+ /* Not owned by us. */
const BIGNUM *g;
const BIGNUM *N;
+ /* Owned by us. */
char *info;
} SRP_user_pwd;
DECLARE_STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd)
+void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd);
+
typedef struct SRP_VBASE_st {
STACK_OF(SRP_user_pwd) *users_pwd;
STACK_OF(SRP_gN_cache) *gN_cache;
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key);
int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb);
int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file);
+
+/* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user. */
SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+/* NOTE: unlike in SRP_VBASE_get_by_user, caller owns the returned pointer.*/
+SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username);
+
char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
char **verifier, const char *N, const char *g);
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_READ_BUFFER 156
# define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_WRITE_BUFFER 291
-# define SSL_F_SSL3_SHUTDOWN 396
# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158
# define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159
# define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN 318
#ifdef ENABLE_PROCESS_PROTECTION\r
// 同梱するOpenSSLのバージョンに合わせてSHA1ハッシュ値を変更すること\r
#if defined(_M_IX86)\r
- // ssleay32.dll 1.0.2f\r
- RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xB7\xA4\x25\x22\x73\x62\xC9\x0D\xAA\xBD\x1F\x11\x61\x16\x02\x8A\x5C\x23\xDE\x38");\r
- // libeay32.dll 1.0.2f\r
- RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x89\xE8\x42\x0E\xDE\x75\x31\x94\xF3\xD0\x54\x02\xD1\x29\x89\x28\x89\x41\xDF\x19");\r
+ // ssleay32.dll 1.0.2g\r
+ RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x96\x60\x94\xD8\x35\xB8\xAC\x1B\xEC\xCB\x45\xAD\x1B\x3E\x4C\x9F\xDC\x78\xA9\xDC");\r
+ // libeay32.dll 1.0.2g\r
+ RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xBD\x91\xB9\x36\xC1\xC5\x65\x6D\x8F\xAA\xCF\x6F\x84\x8B\xC7\x77\x23\x8D\xE6\x2B");\r
#elif defined(_M_AMD64)\r
- // ssleay32.dll 1.0.2f\r
- RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xB0\x89\xBB\x7C\x7A\xC1\x4E\x00\xC6\x9B\xEC\x36\xDE\x6C\xB6\x1F\xBE\x46\x55\x0E");\r
- // libeay32.dll 1.0.2f\r
- RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xC5\x59\x7B\x0C\x3C\xF6\x8E\xF8\x10\x18\x3D\x59\x8C\x47\x14\xCA\xB6\xD2\x58\x75");\r
+ // ssleay32.dll 1.0.2g\r
+ RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\xF8\x88\xEB\xC1\x2B\xE6\xE4\xFD\xFA\xCA\x9F\xAB\x2F\x46\x47\xC4\x56\x11\xF8\x21");\r
+ // libeay32.dll 1.0.2g\r
+ RegisterTrustedModuleSHA1Hash("\x70\xAD\x36\x15\xB1\x2C\x82\xAF\xD4\x93\x17\xD4\x82\xC7\x15\x4B\x89\x86\xE3\xE6");\r
#endif\r
#endif\r
g_hOpenSSL = LoadLibrary("ssleay32.dll");\r