1 .\" Copyright (c) 2002 by Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
3 .\" %%%LICENSE_START(VERBATIM)
4 .\" Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of this
5 .\" manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice are
6 .\" preserved on all copies.
8 .\" Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this
9 .\" manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the
10 .\" entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a
11 .\" permission notice identical to this one.
13 .\" Since the Linux kernel and libraries are constantly changing, this
14 .\" manual page may be incorrect or out-of-date. The author(s) assume no
15 .\" responsibility for errors or omissions, or for damages resulting from
16 .\" the use of the information contained herein. The author(s) may not
17 .\" have taken the same level of care in the production of this manual,
18 .\" which is licensed free of charge, as they might when working
21 .\" Formatted or processed versions of this manual, if unaccompanied by
22 .\" the source, must acknowledge the copyright and authors of this work.
25 .\" 6 Aug 2002 - Initial Creation
26 .\" Modified 2003-05-23, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
27 .\" Modified 2004-05-27, Michael Kerrisk, <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
28 .\" 2004-12-08, mtk Added O_NOATIME for CAP_FOWNER
29 .\" 2005-08-16, mtk, Added CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL and CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
30 .\" 2008-07-15, Serge Hallyn <serue@us.bbm.com>
31 .\" Document file capabilities, per-process capability
32 .\" bounding set, changed semantics for CAP_SETPCAP,
33 .\" and other changes in 2.6.2[45].
34 .\" Add CAP_MAC_ADMIN, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, CAP_SETFCAP.
36 .\" Add text describing circumstances in which CAP_SETPCAP
37 .\" (theoretically) permits a thread to change the
38 .\" capability sets of another thread.
39 .\" Add section describing rules for programmatically
40 .\" adjusting thread capability sets.
41 .\" Describe rationale for capability bounding set.
42 .\" Document "securebits" flags.
43 .\" Add text noting that if we set the effective flag for one file
44 .\" capability, then we must also set the effective flag for all
45 .\" other capabilities where the permitted or inheritable bit is set.
46 .\" 2011-09-07, mtk/Serge hallyn: Add CAP_SYSLOG
48 .TH CAPABILITIES 7 2014-05-21 "Linux" "Linux Programmer's Manual"
50 capabilities \- overview of Linux capabilities
52 For the purpose of performing permission checks,
53 traditional UNIX implementations distinguish two categories of processes:
55 processes (whose effective user ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root),
58 processes (whose effective UID is nonzero).
59 Privileged processes bypass all kernel permission checks,
60 while unprivileged processes are subject to full permission
61 checking based on the process's credentials
62 (usually: effective UID, effective GID, and supplementary group list).
64 Starting with kernel 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally
65 associated with superuser into distinct units, known as
67 which can be independently enabled and disabled.
68 Capabilities are a per-thread attribute.
71 The following list shows the capabilities implemented on Linux,
72 and the operations or behaviors that each capability permits:
74 .BR CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL " (since Linux 2.6.11)"
75 Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter rules;
76 retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.
78 .BR CAP_AUDIT_WRITE " (since Linux 2.6.11)"
79 Write records to kernel auditing log.
81 .BR CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND " (since Linux 3.5)"
82 Employ features that can block system suspend
85 .IR /proc/sys/wake_lock ).
88 Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see
92 Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks.
93 (DAC is an abbreviation of "discretionary access control".)
95 .B CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
99 Bypass file read permission checks and
100 directory read and execute permission checks;
103 .BR open_by_handle_at (2).
112 Bypass permission checks on operations that normally
113 require the filesystem UID of the process to match the UID of
117 excluding those operations covered by
120 .BR CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH ;
122 set extended file attributes (see
126 set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files;
128 ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion;
132 for arbitrary files in
140 Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID permission
141 bits when a file is modified;
142 set the set-group-ID bit for a file whose GID does not match
143 the filesystem or any of the supplementary GIDs of the calling process.
146 .\" FIXME As at Linux 3.2, there are some strange uses of this capability
147 .\" in other places; they probably should be replaced with something else.
155 Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.
158 Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see
160 This includes use of the
164 .\" FIXME CAP_KILL also has an effect for threads + setting child
165 .\" termination signal to other than SIGCHLD: without this
166 .\" capability, the termination signal reverts to SIGCHLD
167 .\" if the child does an exec(). What is the rationale
170 .BR CAP_LEASE " (since Linux 2.4)"
171 Establish leases on arbitrary files (see
174 .B CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
179 .\" These attributes are now available on ext2, ext3, Reiserfs, XFS, JFS
183 .BR CAP_MAC_ADMIN " (since Linux 2.6.25)"
184 Override Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
185 Implemented for the Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).
187 .BR CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE " (since Linux 2.6.25)"
188 Allow MAC configuration or state changes.
189 Implemented for the Smack LSM.
191 .BR CAP_MKNOD " (since Linux 2.4)"
192 Create special files using
196 Perform various network-related operations:
200 interface configuration;
202 administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and accounting;
204 modify routing tables;
206 bind to any address for transparent proxying;
208 set type-of-service (TOS)
210 clear driver statistics;
212 set promiscuous mode;
214 enabling multicasting;
218 to set the following socket options:
222 (for a priority outside the range 0 to 6),
229 .B CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
230 Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports
231 (port numbers less than 1024).
234 (Unused) Make socket broadcasts, and listen to multicasts.
240 use RAW and PACKET sockets;
242 bind to any address for transparent proxying.
245 .\" Also various IP options and setsockopt(SO_BINDTODEVICE)
248 Make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary GID list;
249 forge GID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets.
251 .BR CAP_SETFCAP " (since Linux 2.6.24)"
252 Set file capabilities.
255 If file capabilities are not supported:
256 grant or remove any capability in the
257 caller's permitted capability set to or from any other process.
260 is not available when the kernel is configured to support
261 file capabilities, since
263 has entirely different semantics for such kernels.)
265 If file capabilities are supported:
266 add any capability from the calling thread's bounding set
267 to its inheritable set;
268 drop capabilities from the bounding set (via
270 .BR PR_CAPBSET_DROP );
276 Make arbitrary manipulations of process UIDs
281 make forged UID when passing socket credentials via UNIX domain sockets.
282 .\" FIXME CAP_SETUID also an effect in exec(); document this.
288 Perform a range of system administration operations including:
296 .BR setdomainname (2);
300 operations (since Linux 2.6.37,
302 should be used to permit such operations);
313 operations on arbitrary System V IPC objects;
315 perform operations on
319 Extended Attributes (see
323 .BR lookup_dcookie (2);
329 and (before Linux 2.6.25)
331 I/O scheduling classes;
333 forge UID when passing socket credentials;
336 .IR /proc/sys/fs/file-max ,
337 the system-wide limit on the number of open files,
338 in system calls that open files (e.g.,
346 flags that create new namespaces with
352 .BR perf_event_open (2);
362 .BR fanotify_init (2);
379 to insert characters into the input queue of a terminal other than
380 the caller's controlling terminal.
390 perform various privileged block-device
394 perform various privileged filesystem
398 perform administrative operations on many device drivers.
413 Load and unload kernel modules
417 .BR delete_module (2));
418 in kernels before 2.6.25:
419 drop capabilities from the system-wide capability bounding set.
425 Raise process nice value
428 and change the nice value for arbitrary processes;
430 set real-time scheduling policies for calling process,
431 and set scheduling policies and priorities for arbitrary processes
432 .RB ( sched_setscheduler (2),
433 .BR sched_setparam (2),
434 .BR shed_setattr (2));
436 set CPU affinity for arbitrary processes
437 .RB ( sched_setaffinity (2));
439 set I/O scheduling class and priority for arbitrary processes
440 .RB ( ioprio_set (2));
443 .BR migrate_pages (2)
444 to arbitrary processes and allow processes
445 to be migrated to arbitrary nodes;
446 .\" FIXME CAP_SYS_NICE also has the following effect for
447 .\" migrate_pages(2):
448 .\" do_migrate_pages(mm, &old, &new,
449 .\" capable(CAP_SYS_NICE) ? MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL : MPOL_MF_MOVE);
453 to arbitrary processes;
469 Trace arbitrary processes using
472 .BR get_robust_list (2)
473 to arbitrary processes;
474 inspect processes using
481 Perform I/O port operations
494 open devices for accessing x86 model-specific registers (MSRs, see
498 .IR /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr ;
500 create memory mappings at addresses below the value specified by
501 .IR /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr ;
511 perform various SCSI device commands;
513 perform certain operations on
519 perform a range of device-specific operations on other devices.
527 Use reserved space on ext2 filesystems;
531 calls controlling ext3 journaling;
533 override disk quota limits;
535 increase resource limits (see
542 override maximum number of consoles on console allocation;
544 override maximum number of keymaps;
546 allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock;
550 limit for a System V message queue above the limit in
551 .I /proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb
558 .I /proc/sys/fs/pipe-size-max
559 limit when setting the capacity of a pipe using the
566 to increase the capacity of a pipe above the limit specified by
567 .IR /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size ;
570 .I /proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max
571 limit when creating POSIX message queues (see
572 .BR mq_overview (7));
580 .IR /proc/PID/oom_score_adj
581 to a value lower than the value last set by a process with
582 .BR CAP_SYS_RESOURCE .
588 .RB ( settimeofday (2),
591 set real-time (hardware) clock.
593 .B CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
596 employ various privileged
598 operations on virtual terminals.
600 .BR CAP_SYSLOG " (since Linux 2.6.37)"
607 for information on which operations require privilege.
609 View kernel addresses exposed via
611 and other interfaces when
612 .IR /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict
614 (See the discussion of the
619 .BR CAP_WAKE_ALARM " (since Linux 3.0)"
620 Trigger something that will wake up the system (set
621 .B CLOCK_REALTIME_ALARM
623 .B CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM
626 .SS Past and current implementation
627 A full implementation of capabilities requires that:
629 For all privileged operations,
630 the kernel must check whether the thread has the required
631 capability in its effective set.
633 The kernel must provide system calls allowing a thread's capability sets to
634 be changed and retrieved.
636 The filesystem must support attaching capabilities to an executable file,
637 so that a process gains those capabilities when the file is executed.
639 Before kernel 2.6.24, only the first two of these requirements are met;
640 since kernel 2.6.24, all three requirements are met.
642 .SS Thread capability sets
643 Each thread has three capability sets containing zero or more
644 of the above capabilities:
647 This is a limiting superset for the effective
648 capabilities that the thread may assume.
649 It is also a limiting superset for the capabilities that
650 may be added to the inheritable set by a thread that does not have the
652 capability in its effective set.
654 If a thread drops a capability from its permitted set,
655 it can never reacquire that capability (unless it
657 either a set-user-ID-root program, or
658 a program whose associated file capabilities grant that capability).
661 This is a set of capabilities preserved across an
663 It provides a mechanism for a process to assign capabilities
664 to the permitted set of the new program during an
668 This is the set of capabilities used by the kernel to
669 perform permission checks for the thread.
673 inherits copies of its parent's capability sets.
674 See below for a discussion of the treatment of capabilities during
679 a thread may manipulate its own capability sets (see below).
681 Since Linux 3.2, the file
682 .I /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap
683 .\" commit 73efc0394e148d0e15583e13712637831f926720
684 exposes the numerical value of the highest capability
685 supported by the running kernel;
686 this can be used to determine the highest bit
687 that may be set in a capability set.
689 .SS File capabilities
690 Since kernel 2.6.24, the kernel supports
691 associating capability sets with an executable file using
693 The file capability sets are stored in an extended attribute (see
696 .IR "security.capability" .
697 Writing to this extended attribute requires the
700 The file capability sets,
701 in conjunction with the capability sets of the thread,
702 determine the capabilities of a thread after an
705 The three file capability sets are:
707 .IR Permitted " (formerly known as " forced ):
708 These capabilities are automatically permitted to the thread,
709 regardless of the thread's inheritable capabilities.
711 .IR Inheritable " (formerly known as " allowed ):
712 This set is ANDed with the thread's inheritable set to determine which
713 inheritable capabilities are enabled in the permitted set of
718 This is not a set, but rather just a single bit.
719 If this bit is set, then during an
721 all of the new permitted capabilities for the thread are
722 also raised in the effective set.
723 If this bit is not set, then after an
725 none of the new permitted capabilities is in the new effective set.
727 Enabling the file effective capability bit implies
728 that any file permitted or inheritable capability that causes a
729 thread to acquire the corresponding permitted capability during an
731 (see the transformation rules described below) will also acquire that
732 capability in its effective set.
733 Therefore, when assigning capabilities to a file
735 .BR cap_set_file (3),
737 if we specify the effective flag as being enabled for any capability,
738 then the effective flag must also be specified as enabled
739 for all other capabilities for which the corresponding permitted or
740 inheritable flags is enabled.
742 .SS Transformation of capabilities during execve()
746 the kernel calculates the new capabilities of
747 the process using the following algorithm:
751 P'(permitted) = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
752 (F(permitted) & cap_bset)
754 P'(effective) = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : 0
756 P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable) [i.e., unchanged]
763 denotes the value of a thread capability set before the
766 denotes the value of a capability set after the
769 denotes a file capability set
771 is the value of the capability bounding set (described below).
774 .SS Capabilities and execution of programs by root
775 In order to provide an all-powerful
777 using capability sets, during an
780 If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed,
781 or the real user ID of the process is 0 (root)
782 then the file inheritable and permitted sets are defined to be all ones
783 (i.e., all capabilities enabled).
785 If a set-user-ID-root program is being executed,
786 then the file effective bit is defined to be one (enabled).
788 The upshot of the above rules,
789 combined with the capabilities transformations described above,
790 is that when a process
792 a set-user-ID-root program, or when a process with an effective UID of 0
795 it gains all capabilities in its permitted and effective capability sets,
796 except those masked out by the capability bounding set.
797 .\" If a process with real UID 0, and nonzero effective UID does an
798 .\" exec(), then it gets all capabilities in its
799 .\" permitted set, and no effective capabilities
800 This provides semantics that are the same as those provided by
801 traditional UNIX systems.
802 .SS Capability bounding set
803 The capability bounding set is a security mechanism that can be used
804 to limit the capabilities that can be gained during an
806 The bounding set is used in the following ways:
810 the capability bounding set is ANDed with the file permitted
811 capability set, and the result of this operation is assigned to the
812 thread's permitted capability set.
813 The capability bounding set thus places a limit on the permitted
814 capabilities that may be granted by an executable file.
817 The capability bounding set acts as a limiting superset for
818 the capabilities that a thread can add to its inheritable set using
820 This means that if a capability is not in the bounding set,
821 then a thread can't add this capability to its
822 inheritable set, even if it was in its permitted capabilities,
823 and thereby cannot have this capability preserved in its
824 permitted set when it
826 a file that has the capability in its inheritable set.
828 Note that the bounding set masks the file permitted capabilities,
829 but not the inherited capabilities.
830 If a thread maintains a capability in its inherited set
831 that is not in its bounding set,
832 then it can still gain that capability in its permitted set
833 by executing a file that has the capability in its inherited set.
835 Depending on the kernel version, the capability bounding set is either
836 a system-wide attribute, or a per-process attribute.
838 .B "Capability bounding set prior to Linux 2.6.25"
840 In kernels before 2.6.25, the capability bounding set is a system-wide
841 attribute that affects all threads on the system.
842 The bounding set is accessible via the file
843 .IR /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound .
844 (Confusingly, this bit mask parameter is expressed as a
845 signed decimal number in
846 .IR /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound .)
850 process may set capabilities in the capability bounding set;
851 other than that, the superuser (more precisely: programs with the
853 capability) may only clear capabilities from this set.
855 On a standard system the capability bounding set always masks out the
858 To remove this restriction (dangerous!), modify the definition of
861 .I include/linux/capability.h
862 and rebuild the kernel.
864 The system-wide capability bounding set feature was added
865 to Linux starting with kernel version 2.2.11.
868 .B "Capability bounding set from Linux 2.6.25 onward"
870 From Linux 2.6.25, the
871 .I "capability bounding set"
872 is a per-thread attribute.
873 (There is no longer a system-wide capability bounding set.)
875 The bounding set is inherited at
877 from the thread's parent, and is preserved across an
880 A thread may remove capabilities from its capability bounding set using the
883 operation, provided it has the
886 Once a capability has been dropped from the bounding set,
887 it cannot be restored to that set.
888 A thread can determine if a capability is in its bounding set using the
893 Removing capabilities from the bounding set is supported only if file
894 capabilities are compiled into the kernel.
895 In kernels before Linux 2.6.33,
896 file capabilities were an optional feature configurable via the
897 CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES
899 Since Linux 2.6.33, the configuration option has been removed
900 and file capabilities are always part of the kernel.
901 When file capabilities are compiled into the kernel, the
903 process (the ancestor of all processes) begins with a full bounding set.
904 If file capabilities are not compiled into the kernel, then
906 begins with a full bounding set minus
908 because this capability has a different meaning when there are
909 no file capabilities.
911 Removing a capability from the bounding set does not remove it
912 from the thread's inherited set.
913 However it does prevent the capability from being added
914 back into the thread's inherited set in the future.
917 .SS Effect of user ID changes on capabilities
918 To preserve the traditional semantics for transitions between
919 0 and nonzero user IDs,
920 the kernel makes the following changes to a thread's capability
921 sets on changes to the thread's real, effective, saved set,
922 and filesystem user IDs (using
927 If one or more of the real, effective or saved set user IDs
928 was previously 0, and as a result of the UID changes all of these IDs
929 have a nonzero value,
930 then all capabilities are cleared from the permitted and effective
933 If the effective user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero,
934 then all capabilities are cleared from the effective set.
936 If the effective user ID is changed from nonzero to 0,
937 then the permitted set is copied to the effective set.
939 If the filesystem user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero (see
941 then the following capabilities are cleared from the effective set:
943 .BR CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE ,
944 .BR CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH ,
947 .B CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
948 (since Linux 2.6.30),
949 .BR CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE ,
952 (since Linux 2.6.30).
953 If the filesystem UID is changed from nonzero to 0,
954 then any of these capabilities that are enabled in the permitted set
955 are enabled in the effective set.
957 If a thread that has a 0 value for one or more of its user IDs wants
958 to prevent its permitted capability set being cleared when it resets
959 all of its user IDs to nonzero values, it can do so using the
964 .SS Programmatically adjusting capability sets
965 A thread can retrieve and change its capability sets using the
973 .BR cap_set_proc (3),
977 is preferred for this purpose.
978 The following rules govern changes to the thread capability sets:
980 If the caller does not have the
983 the new inheritable set must be a subset of the combination
984 of the existing inheritable and permitted sets.
987 The new inheritable set must be a subset of the combination of the
988 existing inheritable set and the capability bounding set.
990 The new permitted set must be a subset of the existing permitted set
991 (i.e., it is not possible to acquire permitted capabilities
992 that the thread does not currently have).
994 The new effective set must be a subset of the new permitted set.
995 .SS The securebits flags: establishing a capabilities-only environment
996 .\" For some background:
997 .\" see http://lwn.net/Articles/280279/ and
998 .\" http://article.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel.lsm/5476/
999 Starting with kernel 2.6.26,
1000 and with a kernel in which file capabilities are enabled,
1001 Linux implements a set of per-thread
1003 flags that can be used to disable special handling of capabilities for UID 0
1005 These flags are as follows:
1008 Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs to retain
1009 its capabilities when it switches all of its UIDs to a nonzero value.
1010 If this flag is not set,
1011 then such a UID switch causes the thread to lose all capabilities.
1012 This flag is always cleared on an
1014 (This flag provides the same functionality as the older
1019 .B SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
1020 Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting capability sets when
1021 the threads's effective and filesystem UIDs are switched between
1022 zero and nonzero values.
1024 .IR "Effect of User ID Changes on Capabilities" .)
1027 If this bit is set, then the kernel does not grant capabilities
1028 when a set-user-ID-root program is executed, or when a process with
1029 an effective or real UID of 0 calls
1032 .IR "Capabilities and execution of programs by root" .)
1034 Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked" flag.
1035 Setting any of the "locked" flags is irreversible,
1036 and has the effect of preventing further changes to the
1037 corresponding "base" flag.
1038 The locked flags are:
1039 .BR SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED ,
1040 .BR SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED ,
1042 .BR SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED .
1046 flags can be modified and retrieved using the
1048 .B PR_SET_SECUREBITS
1050 .B PR_GET_SECUREBITS
1054 capability is required to modify the flags.
1058 flags are inherited by child processes.
1061 all of the flags are preserved, except
1063 which is always cleared.
1065 An application can use the following call to lock itself,
1066 and all of its descendants,
1067 into an environment where the only way of gaining capabilities
1068 is by executing a program with associated file capabilities:
1072 prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
1073 SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED |
1074 SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
1075 SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED |
1077 SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED);
1082 No standards govern capabilities, but the Linux capability implementation
1083 is based on the withdrawn POSIX.1e draft standard; see
1084 .UR http://wt.tuxomania.net\:/publications\:/posix.1e/
1087 Since kernel 2.5.27, capabilities are an optional kernel component,
1088 and can be enabled/disabled via the CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPABILITIES
1089 kernel configuration option.
1092 .I /proc/PID/task/TID/status
1093 file can be used to view the capability sets of a thread.
1096 file shows the capability sets of a process's main thread.
1097 Before Linux 3.8, nonexistent capabilities were shown as being
1098 enabled (1) in these sets.
1100 .\" 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744
1101 all nonexistent capabilities (above
1103 are shown as disabled (0).
1107 package provides a suite of routines for setting and
1108 getting capabilities that is more comfortable and less likely
1109 to change than the interface provided by
1113 This package also provides the
1120 .UR http://www.kernel.org\:/pub\:/linux\:/libs\:/security\:/linux-privs
1123 Before kernel 2.6.24, and since kernel 2.6.24 if
1124 file capabilities are not enabled, a thread with the
1126 capability can manipulate the capabilities of threads other than itself.
1127 However, this is only theoretically possible,
1128 since no thread ever has
1130 in either of these cases:
1132 In the pre-2.6.25 implementation the system-wide capability bounding set,
1133 .IR /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound ,
1134 always masks out this capability, and this can not be changed
1135 without modifying the kernel source and rebuilding.
1137 If file capabilities are disabled in the current implementation, then
1139 starts out with this capability removed from its per-process bounding
1140 set, and that bounding set is inherited by all other processes
1141 created on the system.
1148 .BR cap_copy_ext (3),
1149 .BR cap_from_text (3),
1150 .BR cap_get_file (3),
1151 .BR cap_get_proc (3),
1156 .BR credentials (7),
1161 .I include/linux/capability.h
1162 in the Linux kernel source tree
1164 This page is part of release 3.67 of the Linux
1167 A description of the project,
1168 information about reporting bugs,
1169 and the latest version of this page,
1171 \%http://www.kernel.org/doc/man\-pages/.