action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit
condition:= base | lsm [option]
base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=]
- [fowner]]
+ [euid=] [fowner=]]
lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
[obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio]
base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK]
[FIRMWARE_CHECK]
- mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+ mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND]
+ [[^]MAY_EXEC]
fsmagic:= hex value
fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6)
uid:= decimal value
+ euid:= decimal value
fowner:=decimal value
lsm: are LSM specific
option: appraise_type:= [imasig]
dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x01021994
# RAMFS_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0x858458f6
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x858458f6
+ # DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x1cd1
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x1cd1
+ # BINFMTFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x42494e4d
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x42494e4d
# SECURITYFS_MAGIC
dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
dont_appraise fsmagic=0x73636673
+ # SELINUX_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
+ # CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x27e0eb
+ # NSFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x6e736673
+ dont_appraise fsmagic=0x6e736673
measure func=BPRM_CHECK
measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
Examples of LSM specific definitions:
SELinux:
- # SELINUX_MAGIC
- dont_measure fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
- dont_appraise fsmagic=0xf97cff8c
-
dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
dont_appraise obj_type=var_log_t
dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
The list of supported hash algorithms is defined
in crypto/hash_info.h.
- ima_tcb [IMA]
+ ima_policy= [IMA]
+ The builtin measurement policy to load during IMA
+ setup. Specyfing "tcb" as the value, measures all
+ programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
+ opened with the read mode bit set by either the
+ effective uid (euid=0) or uid=0.
+ Format: "tcb"
+
+ ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead.
Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted
Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files
ima_template= [IMA]
Select one of defined IMA measurements template formats.
- Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" }
+ Formats: { "ima" | "ima-ng" | "ima-sig" }
Default: "ima-ng"
ima_template_fmt=
label. The format accepted on write is:
"%d.%d.%d.%d label" or "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d label".
onlycap
- This contains the label processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ This contains labels processes must have for CAP_MAC_ADMIN
and CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE to be effective. If this file is empty
these capabilities are effective at for processes with any
- label. The value is set by writing the desired label to the
- file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
+ label. The values are set by writing the desired labels, separated
+ by spaces, to the file or cleared by writing "-" to the file.
ptrace
This is used to define the current ptrace policy
0 - default: this is the policy that relies on Smack access rules.
extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
+extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+ size_t hexlen);
static inline
const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
{
return false;
}
+/* helper function can be called directly with pre-allocated memory */
+inline int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
+ size_t hexlen)
+{
+ match_id->len = hexlen;
+ return hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen);
+}
+
/**
* asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id - Convert a hex string into a key ID.
* @id: The ID as a hex string.
struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
{
struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
- size_t hexlen;
+ size_t asciihexlen;
int ret;
if (!*id)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- hexlen = strlen(id);
- if (hexlen & 1)
+ asciihexlen = strlen(id);
+ if (asciihexlen & 1)
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + hexlen / 2,
+ match_id = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + asciihexlen / 2,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!match_id)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- match_id->len = hexlen / 2;
- ret = hex2bin(match_id->data, id, hexlen / 2);
+ ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id, match_id, asciihexlen / 2);
if (ret < 0) {
kfree(match_id);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
#ifndef MODULE
+static struct {
+ struct asymmetric_key_id id;
+ unsigned char data[10];
+} cakey;
+
static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
{
if (!str) /* default system keyring */
return 1;
if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
- struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
- p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3);
- if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
- pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
- else if (!IS_ERR(p))
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *p = &cakey.id;
+ size_t hexlen = (strlen(str) - 3) / 2;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (hexlen == 0 || hexlen > sizeof(cakey.data)) {
+ pr_err("Missing or invalid ca_keys id\n");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str + 3, p, hexlen);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ pr_err("Unparsable ca_keys id hex string\n");
+ else
ca_keyid = p; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
} else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
use_builtin_keys = true;
memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->cmd_pa, 8);
pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
- priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+ priv->cmd = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
ioread32(&priv->cca->cmd_size));
if (!priv->cmd) {
dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the command buffer failed\n");
memcpy_fromio(&pa, &priv->cca->rsp_pa, 8);
pa = le64_to_cpu(pa);
- priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, le64_to_cpu(pa),
+ priv->rsp = devm_ioremap_nocache(dev, pa,
ioread32(&priv->cca->rsp_size));
if (!priv->rsp) {
dev_err(dev, "ioremap of the response buffer failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
+ ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
+ ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
+
crq_q = &ibmvtpm->crq_queue;
crq_q->crq_addr = (struct ibmvtpm_crq *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!crq_q->crq_addr) {
crq_q->index = 0;
- ibmvtpm->dev = dev;
- ibmvtpm->vdev = vio_dev;
TPM_VPRIV(chip) = (void *)ibmvtpm;
spin_lock_init(&ibmvtpm->rtce_lock);
basep = of_get_property(np, "linux,sml-base", NULL);
if (basep == NULL) {
- pr_err(KERN_ERR "%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
+ pr_err("%s: ERROR - SML not found\n", __func__);
goto cleanup_eio;
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
error = security_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
- if (error) {
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
- return error;
- }
+ if (error)
+ goto out;
error = inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, name);
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (!error) {
fsnotify_xattr(dentry);
evm_inode_post_removexattr(dentry, name);
}
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
return error;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(vfs_removexattr);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Linux Security Module interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 WireX Communications, Inc <chris@wirex.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 James Morris <jmorris@intercode.com.au>
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Silicon Graphics, Inc. (Trust Technology Group)
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Intel Corporation.
+ * Copyright (C) 2015 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Due to this file being licensed under the GPL there is controversy over
+ * whether this permits you to write a module that #includes this file
+ * without placing your module under the GPL. Please consult a lawyer for
+ * advice before doing this.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+#define __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+
+/**
+ * Security hooks for program execution operations.
+ *
+ * @bprm_set_creds:
+ * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
+ * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
+ * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
+ * transitions between security domains).
+ * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
+ * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
+ * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook
+ * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
+ * to replace it.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_check_security:
+ * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
+ * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
+ * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is
+ * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This
+ * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
+ * pass set_creds is called first.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @bprm_committing_creds:
+ * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
+ * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
+ * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
+ * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
+ * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
+ * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
+ * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately
+ * before commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_committed_creds:
+ * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
+ * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials
+ * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the
+ * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state
+ * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
+ * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds().
+ * @bprm_secureexec:
+ * Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
+ * is required. The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
+ * on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
+ * should enable secure mode.
+ * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
+ *
+ * @sb_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.
+ * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * allocated.
+ * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @sb_free_security:
+ * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.
+ * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
+ * @sb_statfs:
+ * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
+ * mountpoint.
+ * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_mount:
+ * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on
+ * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name
+ * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a
+ * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a
+ * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the
+ * pathname of the object being mounted.
+ * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted.
+ * @path contains the path for mount point object.
+ * @type contains the filesystem type.
+ * @flags contains the mount flags.
+ * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_copy_data:
+ * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem,
+ * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount
+ * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()).
+ * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security-
+ * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them.
+ * @type the type of filesystem being mounted.
+ * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
+ * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
+ * Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
+ * @sb_remount:
+ * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
+ * are being made to those options.
+ * @sb superblock being remounted
+ * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_umount:
+ * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
+ * @mnt contains the mounted file system.
+ * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_pivotroot:
+ * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
+ * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the
+ * current root (put_old).
+ * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
+ * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
+ * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for
+ * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
+ * @sb_clone_mnt_opts:
+ * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another
+ * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone
+ * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in
+ * @sb_parse_opts_str:
+ * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
+ * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
+ * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
+ * @dentry_init_security:
+ * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
+ * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
+ * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
+ * @mode mode used to determine resource type.
+ * @name name of the last path component used to create file
+ * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
+ * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
+ *
+ *
+ * Security hooks for inode operations.
+ *
+ * @inode_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The
+ * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
+ * allocated.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful.
+ * @inode_free_security:
+ * @inode contains the inode structure.
+ * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to
+ * NULL.
+ * @inode_init_security:
+ * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
+ * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.
+ * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
+ * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
+ * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function
+ * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ * being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ * If the security module does not use security attributes or does
+ * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
+ * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
+ * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
+ * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
+ * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
+ * @len will be set to the length of the value.
+ * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
+ * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
+ * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
+ * @inode_create:
+ * Check permission to create a regular file.
+ * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
+ * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_link:
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing
+ * link to the file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory
+ * of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_link:
+ * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
+ * to the file.
+ * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
+ * the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_unlink:
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_unlink:
+ * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_symlink:
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of
+ * the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_symlink:
+ * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
+ * the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
+ * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mkdir:
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ * associated with inode structure @dir.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be created.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mkdir:
+ * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
+ * associated with path structure @path.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be created.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
+ * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rmdir:
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory
+ * to be removed.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rmdir:
+ * Check the permission to remove a directory.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
+ * removed.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_mknod:
+ * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
+ * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation
+ * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called
+ * and not this hook.
+ * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ * @dev contains the device number.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_mknod:
+ * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
+ * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
+ * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
+ * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
+ * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
+ * the decoded device number.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_rename:
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_rename:
+ * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
+ * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
+ * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
+ * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
+ * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chmod:
+ * Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure.
+ * @mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
+ * @mode contains DAC's mode.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chown:
+ * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
+ * @path contains the path structure.
+ * @uid contains new owner's ID.
+ * @gid contains new group's ID.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_chroot:
+ * Check for permission to change root directory.
+ * @path contains the path structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_readlink:
+ * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_follow_link:
+ * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
+ * @inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
+ * @rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_permission:
+ * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the
+ * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
+ * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.
+ * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many
+ * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is
+ * called when the actual read/write operations are performed.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure to check.
+ * @mask contains the permission mask.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setattr:
+ * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel
+ * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever
+ * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
+ * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @path_truncate:
+ * Check permission before truncating a file.
+ * @path contains the path structure for the file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
+ * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
+ * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_setxattr:
+ * Check permission before setting the extended attributes
+ * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_post_setxattr:
+ * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
+ * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * @inode_getxattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
+ * identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_listxattr:
+ * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute
+ * names for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_removexattr:
+ * Check permission before removing the extended attribute
+ * identified by @name for @dentry.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @inode_getsecurity:
+ * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
+ * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that
+ * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix
+ * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a
+ * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on
+ * success.
+ * @inode_setsecurity:
+ * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the
+ * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the
+ * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0.
+ * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the
+ * security. prefix has been removed.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @inode_listsecurity:
+ * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels
+ * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer
+ * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request
+ * the size of the buffer required.
+ * Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
+ * @inode_need_killpriv:
+ * Called when an inode has been changed.
+ * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
+ * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
+ * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
+ * @inode_killpriv:
+ * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels.
+ * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
+ * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
+ * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
+ * causing setuid bit removal is failed.
+ * @inode_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the node.
+ * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for file operations
+ *
+ * @file_permission:
+ * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is
+ * called by various operations that read or write files. A security
+ * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these
+ * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege
+ * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the
+ * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the
+ * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as
+ * many other operations).
+ * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for
+ * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not
+ * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files.
+ * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such
+ * revalidation.
+ * @file contains the file structure being accessed.
+ * @mask contains the requested permissions.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.
+ * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ * created.
+ * @file contains the file structure to secure.
+ * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
+ * @file_free_security:
+ * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
+ * @file contains the file structure being modified.
+ * @file_ioctl:
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to perform.
+ * @arg contains the operational arguments.
+ * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg
+ * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a
+ * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
+ * should never be used by the security module.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_addr :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
+ * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @mmap_file :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_mprotect:
+ * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
+ * @vma contains the memory region to modify.
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_lock:
+ * Check permission before performing file locking operations.
+ * Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform
+ * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_fcntl:
+ * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd
+ * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes
+ * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple
+ * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should
+ * never be used by the security module.
+ * @file contains the file structure.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * @arg contains the operational arguments.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_set_fowner:
+ * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
+ * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
+ * @file contains the file structure to update.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @file_send_sigiotask:
+ * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
+ * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.
+ * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a
+ * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information)
+ * can always be obtained:
+ * container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner)
+ * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal.
+ * @fown contains the file owner information.
+ * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_receive:
+ * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
+ * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
+ * @file contains the file structure being received.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @file_open
+ * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
+ * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
+ * since inode_permission.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for task operations.
+ *
+ * @task_create:
+ * Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2)
+ * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
+ * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_free:
+ * @task task being freed
+ * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
+ * from interrupt context.)
+ * @cred_alloc_blank:
+ * @cred points to the credentials.
+ * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
+ * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
+ * @cred_free:
+ * @cred points to the credentials.
+ * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
+ * @cred_prepare:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
+ * @cred_transfer:
+ * @new points to the new credentials.
+ * @old points to the original credentials.
+ * Transfer data from original creds to new creds
+ * @kernel_act_as:
+ * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
+ * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_create_files_as:
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as
+ * the objective context of the specified inode.
+ * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
+ * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
+ * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_fw_from_file:
+ * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
+ * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
+ * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
+ * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
+ * @size length of the firmware contents.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @kernel_module_request:
+ * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
+ * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
+ * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
+ * Return 0 if successful.
+ * @kernel_module_from_file:
+ * Load a kernel module from userspace.
+ * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
+ * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
+ * this argument will be NULL.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_fix_setuid:
+ * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
+ * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter
+ * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If
+ * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications
+ * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
+ * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
+ * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
+ * Return 0 on success.
+ * @task_setpgid:
+ * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
+ * process @p to @pgid.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified.
+ * @pgid contains the new pgid.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getpgid:
+ * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the
+ * process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsid:
+ * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process
+ * @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getsecid:
+ * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * @task_setnice:
+ * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * @nice contains the new nice value.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setioprio
+ * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getioprio
+ * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct of process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setrlimit:
+ * Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
+ * process for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can
+ * be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
+ * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
+ * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_setscheduler:
+ * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
+ * process @p based on @policy and @lp.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * @policy contains the scheduling policy.
+ * @lp contains the scheduling parameters.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_getscheduler:
+ * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process
+ * @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_movememory
+ * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_kill:
+ * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL,
+ * the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or
+ * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming
+ * from the kernel and should typically be permitted.
+ * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in
+ * file_security_ops.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * @info contains the signal information.
+ * @sig contains the signal value.
+ * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_wait:
+ * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
+ * and collect its status information.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @task_prctl:
+ * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
+ * current process.
+ * @option contains the operation.
+ * @arg2 contains a argument.
+ * @arg3 contains a argument.
+ * @arg4 contains a argument.
+ * @arg5 contains a argument.
+ * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
+ * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
+ * @task_to_inode:
+ * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
+ * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
+ * @p contains the task_struct for the task.
+ * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
+ *
+ * @netlink_send:
+ * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission
+ * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security
+ * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the
+ * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine
+ * grained control over message transmission.
+ * @sk associated sock of task sending the message.
+ * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
+ * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
+ * is allowed to be transmitted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
+ *
+ * @unix_stream_connect:
+ * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
+ * between @sock and @other.
+ * @sock contains the sock structure.
+ * @other contains the peer sock structure.
+ * @newsk contains the new sock structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @unix_may_send:
+ * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
+ * @other.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @other contains the peer socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
+ * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
+ * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
+ * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
+ * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
+ * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient
+ * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
+ * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
+ * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for socket operations.
+ *
+ * @socket_create:
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
+ * @family contains the requested protocol family.
+ * @type contains the requested communications type.
+ * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_post_create:
+ * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
+ * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the
+ * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored
+ * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will
+ * allocate and and attach security information to
+ * sock->inode->i_security. This hook may be used to update the
+ * sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't
+ * available when the inode was allocated.
+ * @sock contains the newly created socket structure.
+ * @family contains the requested protocol family.
+ * @type contains the requested communications type.
+ * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
+ * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
+ * @socket_bind:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is
+ * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the
+ * @address parameter.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @address contains the address to bind to.
+ * @addrlen contains the length of address.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_connect:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation
+ * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @address contains the address of remote endpoint.
+ * @addrlen contains the length of address.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_listen:
+ * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_accept:
+ * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new
+ * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it,
+ * but the accept operation has not actually been performed.
+ * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
+ * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sendmsg:
+ * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @msg contains the message to be transmitted.
+ * @size contains the size of message.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_recvmsg:
+ * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @msg contains the message structure.
+ * @size contains the size of message structure.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockname:
+ * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
+ * @sock is retrieved.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getpeername:
+ * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object
+ * @sock is retrieved.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_getsockopt:
+ * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
+ * @sock.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from.
+ * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_setsockopt:
+ * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket
+ * @sock.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @level contains the protocol level to set options for.
+ * @optname contains the name of the option to set.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_shutdown:
+ * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket
+ * @sock is shut down.
+ * @sock contains the socket structure.
+ * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives
+ * are handled.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
+ * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
+ * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
+ * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
+ * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
+ * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
+ * @skb contains the incoming network data.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt
+ * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
+ * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
+ * @sock is the local socket.
+ * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
+ * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
+ * of the security state.
+ * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
+ * by the caller.
+ * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
+ * values.
+ * @socket_getpeersec_dgram:
+ * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
+ * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via
+ * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated
+ * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the
+ * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
+ * ancillary message type.
+ * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
+ * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
+ * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
+ * Return 0 on success, error on failure.
+ * @sk_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
+ * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
+ * @sk_free_security:
+ * Deallocate security structure.
+ * @sk_clone_security:
+ * Clone/copy security structure.
+ * @sk_getsecid:
+ * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching
+ * of network authorizations.
+ * @sock_graft:
+ * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
+ * @inet_conn_request:
+ * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken
+ * from peer sid.
+ * @inet_csk_clone:
+ * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @inet_conn_established:
+ * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
+ * @secmark_relabel_packet:
+ * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to
+ * the given secid
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
+ * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
+ * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
+ * @req_classify_flow:
+ * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
+ * @tun_dev_alloc_security:
+ * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN
+ * device.
+ * @security pointer to a security structure pointer.
+ * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ * @tun_dev_free_security:
+ * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN
+ * device.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure
+ * @tun_dev_create:
+ * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
+ * @tun_dev_attach_queue:
+ * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_attach:
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ * associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
+ * @sk contains the existing sock structure.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @tun_dev_open:
+ * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
+ * associated with the TUN device's security structure.
+ * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
+ *
+ * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security:
+ * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy
+ * Database used by the XFRM system.
+ * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
+ * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
+ * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation
+ * @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
+ * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old.
+ * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the
+ * information from the old_ctx structure.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate).
+ * @xfrm_policy_free_security:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx
+ * Deallocate xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
+ * Authorize deletion of xp->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ * Database by the XFRM system.
+ * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
+ * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ * (memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
+ * Database by the XFRM system.
+ * @polsec contains the policy's security context.
+ * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
+ * context.
+ * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
+ * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
+ * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
+ * (memory to allocate, legal context).
+ * @xfrm_state_free_security:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state.
+ * Deallocate x->security.
+ * @xfrm_state_delete_security:
+ * @x contains the xfrm_state.
+ * Authorize deletion of x->security.
+ * @xfrm_policy_lookup:
+ * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being
+ * checked.
+ * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
+ * access to the policy xp.
+ * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
+ * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
+ * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a
+ * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno
+ * on other errors.
+ * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
+ * @x contains the state to match.
+ * @xp contains the policy to check for a match.
+ * @fl contains the flow to check for a match.
+ * Return 1 if there is a match.
+ * @xfrm_decode_session:
+ * @skb points to skb to decode.
+ * @secid points to the flow key secid to set.
+ * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid.
+ * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
+ *
+ * @key_alloc:
+ * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does
+ * not have a serial number assigned at this point.
+ * @key points to the key.
+ * @flags is the allocation flags
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_free:
+ * Notification of destruction; free security data.
+ * @key points to the key.
+ * No return value.
+ * @key_permission:
+ * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
+ * key.
+ * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
+ * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
+ * evaluate the security data on the key.
+ * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
+ * @key_getsecurity:
+ * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
+ * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function
+ * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
+ * should free it.
+ * @key points to the key to be queried.
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ *
+ * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
+ *
+ * @ipc_permission:
+ * Check permissions for access to IPC
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
+ * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ipc_getsecid:
+ * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
+ * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
+ * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
+ * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
+ * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.
+ * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
+ * created.
+ * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_msg_free_security:
+ * Deallocate the security structure for this message.
+ * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues
+ *
+ * @msg_queue_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the
+ * msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to
+ * NULL when the structure is first created.
+ * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_free_security:
+ * Deallocate security structure for this message queue.
+ * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
+ * @msg_queue_associate:
+ * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the
+ * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the
+ * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a
+ * new message queue is created.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to act upon.
+ * @msqflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgctl:
+ * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd
+ * is to be performed on the message queue @msq.
+ * The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. May be NULL.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgsnd:
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message
+ * queue, @msq.
+ * @msq contains the message queue to send message to.
+ * @msg contains the message to be enqueued.
+ * @msqflg contains operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @msg_queue_msgrcv:
+ * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message
+ * queue, @msq. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the
+ * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current
+ * process when inline receives are being performed).
+ * @msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from.
+ * @msg contains the message destination.
+ * @target contains the task structure for recipient process.
+ * @type contains the type of message requested.
+ * @mode contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments
+ *
+ * @shm_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security
+ * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * first created.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @shm_free_security:
+ * Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shm_associate:
+ * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the
+ * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared
+ * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared
+ * memory region is created.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shmflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmctl:
+ * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by
+ * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp.
+ * The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO.
+ * @shp contains shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @shm_shmat:
+ * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
+ * shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process.
+ * The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
+ * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
+ * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to.
+ * @shmflg contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for System V Semaphores
+ *
+ * @sem_alloc_security:
+ * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security
+ * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
+ * first created.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure
+ * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
+ * @sem_free_security:
+ * deallocate security struct for this semaphore
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @sem_associate:
+ * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget
+ * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore
+ * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be
+ * created.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @semflg contains the operation control flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semctl:
+ * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
+ * performed on the semaphore @sma. The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for
+ * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure. May be NULL.
+ * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @sem_semop
+ * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the
+ * semaphore set @sma. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set
+ * may be modified.
+ * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
+ * @sops contains the operations to perform.
+ * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform.
+ * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @binder_set_context_mgr
+ * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
+ * @mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @binder_transaction
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call
+ * to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_binder
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ * @binder_transfer_file
+ * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
+ * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
+ * @file contains the struct file being transferred.
+ * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
+ *
+ * @ptrace_access_check:
+ * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
+ * @child process.
+ * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
+ * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
+ * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
+ * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
+ * attributes would be changed by the execve.
+ * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
+ * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @ptrace_traceme:
+ * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
+ * current process before allowing the current process to present itself
+ * to the @parent process for tracing.
+ * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @capget:
+ * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to
+ * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets
+ * of the @target process.
+ * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process.
+ * @effective contains the effective capability set.
+ * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
+ * @capset:
+ * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
+ * the current process.
+ * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
+ * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
+ * @effective contains the effective capability set.
+ * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
+ * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
+ * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
+ * @capable:
+ * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
+ * credentials.
+ * @cred contains the credentials to use.
+ * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
+ * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
+ * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
+ * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
+ * @syslog:
+ * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
+ * logging to the console.
+ * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
+ * @type contains the type of action.
+ * @from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @settime:
+ * Check permission to change the system time.
+ * struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h
+ * @ts contains new time
+ * @tz contains new timezone
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ * @vm_enough_memory:
+ * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.
+ * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to.
+ * @pages contains the number of pages.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ *
+ * @ismaclabel:
+ * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
+ * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
+ * attribute otherwise returns 0.
+ * @name full extended attribute name to check against
+ * LSM as a MAC label.
+ *
+ * @secid_to_secctx:
+ * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of
+ * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
+ * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
+ * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the
+ * secdata.
+ * @secid contains the security ID.
+ * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security
+ * context.
+ * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
+ * @secctx_to_secid:
+ * Convert security context to secid.
+ * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
+ * @secdata contains the security context.
+ *
+ * @release_secctx:
+ * Release the security context.
+ * @secdata contains the security context.
+ * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
+ *
+ * Security hooks for Audit
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_init:
+ * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
+ * @field contains the required Audit action.
+ * Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
+ * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
+ * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
+ * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
+ * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
+ * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_known:
+ * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to
+ * current LSM.
+ * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
+ * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_match:
+ * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
+ * by @audit_rule_known.
+ * @secid contains the security id in question.
+ * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
+ * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
+ * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
+ * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
+ * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
+ *
+ * @audit_rule_free:
+ * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
+ * audit_rule_init.
+ * @rule contains the allocated rule
+ *
+ * @inode_notifysecctx:
+ * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
+ * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the
+ * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes
+ * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
+ * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
+ * file's attributes to the client.
+ *
+ * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * @inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_setsecctx:
+ * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
+ * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
+ * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
+ * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes
+ * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
+ * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
+ * operation.
+ *
+ * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
+ *
+ * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
+ * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
+ * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
+ *
+ * @inode_getsecctx:
+ * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
+ * context for the given @inode.
+ *
+ * @inode we wish to get the security context of.
+ * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
+ * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
+ * This is the main security structure.
+ */
+
+union security_list_options {
+ int (*binder_set_context_mgr)(struct task_struct *mgr);
+ int (*binder_transaction)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to);
+ int (*binder_transfer_binder)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to);
+ int (*binder_transfer_file)(struct task_struct *from,
+ struct task_struct *to,
+ struct file *file);
+
+ int (*ptrace_access_check)(struct task_struct *child,
+ unsigned int mode);
+ int (*ptrace_traceme)(struct task_struct *parent);
+ int (*capget)(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capset)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ const kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
+ int (*capable)(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap, int audit);
+ int (*quotactl)(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*quota_on)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*syslog)(int type);
+ int (*settime)(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
+ int (*vm_enough_memory)(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
+
+ int (*bprm_set_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int (*bprm_check_security)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ int (*bprm_secureexec)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void (*bprm_committing_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+ void (*bprm_committed_creds)(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+
+ int (*sb_alloc_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+ void (*sb_free_security)(struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*sb_copy_data)(char *orig, char *copy);
+ int (*sb_remount)(struct super_block *sb, void *data);
+ int (*sb_kern_mount)(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
+ int (*sb_show_options)(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
+ int (*sb_statfs)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*sb_mount)(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
+ int (*sb_umount)(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+ int (*sb_pivotroot)(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path);
+ int (*sb_set_mnt_opts)(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
+ int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts)(const struct super_block *oldsb,
+ struct super_block *newsb);
+ int (*sb_parse_opts_str)(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
+ int (*dentry_init_security)(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
+ struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen);
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ int (*path_unlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*path_mkdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*path_rmdir)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*path_mknod)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, unsigned int dev);
+ int (*path_truncate)(struct path *path);
+ int (*path_symlink)(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name);
+ int (*path_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*path_rename)(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*path_chmod)(struct path *path, umode_t mode);
+ int (*path_chown)(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
+ int (*path_chroot)(struct path *path);
+#endif
+
+ int (*inode_alloc_security)(struct inode *inode);
+ void (*inode_free_security)(struct inode *inode);
+ int (*inode_init_security)(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ const char **name, void **value,
+ size_t *len);
+ int (*inode_create)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*inode_link)(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*inode_unlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_symlink)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name);
+ int (*inode_mkdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode);
+ int (*inode_rmdir)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_mknod)(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
+ int (*inode_rename)(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry);
+ int (*inode_readlink)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_follow_link)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
+ bool rcu);
+ int (*inode_permission)(struct inode *inode, int mask);
+ int (*inode_setattr)(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
+ int (*inode_getattr)(const struct path *path);
+ int (*inode_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
+ void (*inode_post_setxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags);
+ int (*inode_getxattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+ int (*inode_listxattr)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_removexattr)(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
+ int (*inode_need_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_killpriv)(struct dentry *dentry);
+ int (*inode_getsecurity)(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void **buffer, bool alloc);
+ int (*inode_setsecurity)(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size,
+ int flags);
+ int (*inode_listsecurity)(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size);
+ void (*inode_getsecid)(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+
+ int (*file_permission)(struct file *file, int mask);
+ int (*file_alloc_security)(struct file *file);
+ void (*file_free_security)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_ioctl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg);
+ int (*mmap_addr)(unsigned long addr);
+ int (*mmap_file)(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
+ int (*file_mprotect)(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot);
+ int (*file_lock)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
+ int (*file_fcntl)(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg);
+ void (*file_set_fowner)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_send_sigiotask)(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
+ int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
+ int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
+
+ int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
+ void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
+ int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
+ void (*cred_free)(struct cred *cred);
+ int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+ void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
+ int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+ int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
+ int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
+ int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
+ int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
+ int (*task_fix_setuid)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ int flags);
+ int (*task_setpgid)(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
+ int (*task_getpgid)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_getsid)(struct task_struct *p);
+ void (*task_getsecid)(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+ int (*task_setnice)(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
+ int (*task_setioprio)(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
+ int (*task_getioprio)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_setrlimit)(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
+ struct rlimit *new_rlim);
+ int (*task_setscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_getscheduler)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_movememory)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_kill)(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid);
+ int (*task_wait)(struct task_struct *p);
+ int (*task_prctl)(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
+ unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
+ void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
+
+ int (*ipc_permission)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
+
+ int (*msg_msg_alloc_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+ void (*msg_msg_free_security)(struct msg_msg *msg);
+
+ int (*msg_queue_alloc_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+ void (*msg_queue_free_security)(struct msg_queue *msq);
+ int (*msg_queue_associate)(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgctl)(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgsnd)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ int msqflg);
+ int (*msg_queue_msgrcv)(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target, long type,
+ int mode);
+
+ int (*shm_alloc_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+ void (*shm_free_security)(struct shmid_kernel *shp);
+ int (*shm_associate)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg);
+ int (*shm_shmctl)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd);
+ int (*shm_shmat)(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+ int shmflg);
+
+ int (*sem_alloc_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+ void (*sem_free_security)(struct sem_array *sma);
+ int (*sem_associate)(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg);
+ int (*sem_semctl)(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
+ int (*sem_semop)(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+ unsigned nsops, int alter);
+
+ int (*netlink_send)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+
+ void (*d_instantiate)(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
+
+ int (*getprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
+ int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
+ size_t size);
+ int (*ismaclabel)(const char *name);
+ int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
+ int (*secctx_to_secid)(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
+ void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+
+ int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
+ int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ int (*unix_stream_connect)(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
+ struct sock *newsk);
+ int (*unix_may_send)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
+
+ int (*socket_create)(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
+ int (*socket_post_create)(struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
+ int protocol, int kern);
+ int (*socket_bind)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen);
+ int (*socket_connect)(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen);
+ int (*socket_listen)(struct socket *sock, int backlog);
+ int (*socket_accept)(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
+ int (*socket_sendmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size);
+ int (*socket_recvmsg)(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size, int flags);
+ int (*socket_getsockname)(struct socket *sock);
+ int (*socket_getpeername)(struct socket *sock);
+ int (*socket_getsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+ int (*socket_setsockopt)(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
+ int (*socket_shutdown)(struct socket *sock, int how);
+ int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_stream)(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
+ int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram)(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
+ int (*sk_alloc_security)(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
+ void (*sk_free_security)(struct sock *sk);
+ void (*sk_clone_security)(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
+ void (*sk_getsecid)(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
+ void (*sock_graft)(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
+ int (*inet_conn_request)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req);
+ void (*inet_csk_clone)(struct sock *newsk,
+ const struct request_sock *req);
+ void (*inet_conn_established)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+ int (*secmark_relabel_packet)(u32 secid);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_inc)(void);
+ void (*secmark_refcount_dec)(void);
+ void (*req_classify_flow)(const struct request_sock *req,
+ struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*tun_dev_alloc_security)(void **security);
+ void (*tun_dev_free_security)(void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_create)(void);
+ int (*tun_dev_attach_queue)(void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_attach)(struct sock *sk, void *security);
+ int (*tun_dev_open)(void *security);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
+ gfp_t gfp);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
+ void (*xfrm_policy_free_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_state_alloc)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+ int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
+ u32 secid);
+ void (*xfrm_state_free_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+ int (*xfrm_state_delete_security)(struct xfrm_state *x);
+ int (*xfrm_policy_lookup)(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid,
+ u8 dir);
+ int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match)(struct xfrm_state *x,
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi *fl);
+ int (*xfrm_decode_session)(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ int (*key_alloc)(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags);
+ void (*key_free)(struct key *key);
+ int (*key_permission)(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned perm);
+ int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ int (*audit_rule_init)(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule);
+ int (*audit_rule_known)(struct audit_krule *krule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match)(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ void (*audit_rule_free)(void *lsmrule);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+struct security_hook_heads {
+ struct list_head binder_set_context_mgr;
+ struct list_head binder_transaction;
+ struct list_head binder_transfer_binder;
+ struct list_head binder_transfer_file;
+ struct list_head ptrace_access_check;
+ struct list_head ptrace_traceme;
+ struct list_head capget;
+ struct list_head capset;
+ struct list_head capable;
+ struct list_head quotactl;
+ struct list_head quota_on;
+ struct list_head syslog;
+ struct list_head settime;
+ struct list_head vm_enough_memory;
+ struct list_head bprm_set_creds;
+ struct list_head bprm_check_security;
+ struct list_head bprm_secureexec;
+ struct list_head bprm_committing_creds;
+ struct list_head bprm_committed_creds;
+ struct list_head sb_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sb_free_security;
+ struct list_head sb_copy_data;
+ struct list_head sb_remount;
+ struct list_head sb_kern_mount;
+ struct list_head sb_show_options;
+ struct list_head sb_statfs;
+ struct list_head sb_mount;
+ struct list_head sb_umount;
+ struct list_head sb_pivotroot;
+ struct list_head sb_set_mnt_opts;
+ struct list_head sb_clone_mnt_opts;
+ struct list_head sb_parse_opts_str;
+ struct list_head dentry_init_security;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ struct list_head path_unlink;
+ struct list_head path_mkdir;
+ struct list_head path_rmdir;
+ struct list_head path_mknod;
+ struct list_head path_truncate;
+ struct list_head path_symlink;
+ struct list_head path_link;
+ struct list_head path_rename;
+ struct list_head path_chmod;
+ struct list_head path_chown;
+ struct list_head path_chroot;
+#endif
+ struct list_head inode_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head inode_free_security;
+ struct list_head inode_init_security;
+ struct list_head inode_create;
+ struct list_head inode_link;
+ struct list_head inode_unlink;
+ struct list_head inode_symlink;
+ struct list_head inode_mkdir;
+ struct list_head inode_rmdir;
+ struct list_head inode_mknod;
+ struct list_head inode_rename;
+ struct list_head inode_readlink;
+ struct list_head inode_follow_link;
+ struct list_head inode_permission;
+ struct list_head inode_setattr;
+ struct list_head inode_getattr;
+ struct list_head inode_setxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_post_setxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_getxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_listxattr;
+ struct list_head inode_removexattr;
+ struct list_head inode_need_killpriv;
+ struct list_head inode_killpriv;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_setsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_listsecurity;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecid;
+ struct list_head file_permission;
+ struct list_head file_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head file_free_security;
+ struct list_head file_ioctl;
+ struct list_head mmap_addr;
+ struct list_head mmap_file;
+ struct list_head file_mprotect;
+ struct list_head file_lock;
+ struct list_head file_fcntl;
+ struct list_head file_set_fowner;
+ struct list_head file_send_sigiotask;
+ struct list_head file_receive;
+ struct list_head file_open;
+ struct list_head task_create;
+ struct list_head task_free;
+ struct list_head cred_alloc_blank;
+ struct list_head cred_free;
+ struct list_head cred_prepare;
+ struct list_head cred_transfer;
+ struct list_head kernel_act_as;
+ struct list_head kernel_create_files_as;
+ struct list_head kernel_fw_from_file;
+ struct list_head kernel_module_request;
+ struct list_head kernel_module_from_file;
+ struct list_head task_fix_setuid;
+ struct list_head task_setpgid;
+ struct list_head task_getpgid;
+ struct list_head task_getsid;
+ struct list_head task_getsecid;
+ struct list_head task_setnice;
+ struct list_head task_setioprio;
+ struct list_head task_getioprio;
+ struct list_head task_setrlimit;
+ struct list_head task_setscheduler;
+ struct list_head task_getscheduler;
+ struct list_head task_movememory;
+ struct list_head task_kill;
+ struct list_head task_wait;
+ struct list_head task_prctl;
+ struct list_head task_to_inode;
+ struct list_head ipc_permission;
+ struct list_head ipc_getsecid;
+ struct list_head msg_msg_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head msg_msg_free_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_free_security;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_associate;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgctl;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgsnd;
+ struct list_head msg_queue_msgrcv;
+ struct list_head shm_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head shm_free_security;
+ struct list_head shm_associate;
+ struct list_head shm_shmctl;
+ struct list_head shm_shmat;
+ struct list_head sem_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sem_free_security;
+ struct list_head sem_associate;
+ struct list_head sem_semctl;
+ struct list_head sem_semop;
+ struct list_head netlink_send;
+ struct list_head d_instantiate;
+ struct list_head getprocattr;
+ struct list_head setprocattr;
+ struct list_head ismaclabel;
+ struct list_head secid_to_secctx;
+ struct list_head secctx_to_secid;
+ struct list_head release_secctx;
+ struct list_head inode_notifysecctx;
+ struct list_head inode_setsecctx;
+ struct list_head inode_getsecctx;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ struct list_head unix_stream_connect;
+ struct list_head unix_may_send;
+ struct list_head socket_create;
+ struct list_head socket_post_create;
+ struct list_head socket_bind;
+ struct list_head socket_connect;
+ struct list_head socket_listen;
+ struct list_head socket_accept;
+ struct list_head socket_sendmsg;
+ struct list_head socket_recvmsg;
+ struct list_head socket_getsockname;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeername;
+ struct list_head socket_getsockopt;
+ struct list_head socket_setsockopt;
+ struct list_head socket_shutdown;
+ struct list_head socket_sock_rcv_skb;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeersec_stream;
+ struct list_head socket_getpeersec_dgram;
+ struct list_head sk_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head sk_free_security;
+ struct list_head sk_clone_security;
+ struct list_head sk_getsecid;
+ struct list_head sock_graft;
+ struct list_head inet_conn_request;
+ struct list_head inet_csk_clone;
+ struct list_head inet_conn_established;
+ struct list_head secmark_relabel_packet;
+ struct list_head secmark_refcount_inc;
+ struct list_head secmark_refcount_dec;
+ struct list_head req_classify_flow;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_free_security;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_create;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_attach_queue;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_attach;
+ struct list_head tun_dev_open;
+ struct list_head skb_owned_by;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_alloc_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_clone_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_free_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_delete_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_alloc_acquire;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_free_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_delete_security;
+ struct list_head xfrm_policy_lookup;
+ struct list_head xfrm_state_pol_flow_match;
+ struct list_head xfrm_decode_session;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ struct list_head key_alloc;
+ struct list_head key_free;
+ struct list_head key_permission;
+ struct list_head key_getsecurity;
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct list_head audit_rule_init;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_known;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_match;
+ struct list_head audit_rule_free;
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Security module hook list structure.
+ * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
+ */
+struct security_hook_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct list_head *head;
+ union security_list_options hook;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initializing a security_hook_list structure takes
+ * up a lot of space in a source file. This macro takes
+ * care of the common case and reduces the amount of
+ * text involved.
+ */
+#define LSM_HOOK_INIT(HEAD, HOOK) \
+ { .head = &security_hook_heads.HEAD, .hook = { .HEAD = HOOK } }
+
+extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;
+
+static inline void security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+ int count)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
+/*
+ * Assuring the safety of deleting a security module is up to
+ * the security module involved. This may entail ordering the
+ * module's hook list in a particular way, refusing to disable
+ * the module once a policy is loaded or any number of other
+ * actions better imagined than described.
+ *
+ * The name of the configuration option reflects the only module
+ * that currently uses the mechanism. Any developer who thinks
+ * disabling their module is a good idea needs to be at least as
+ * careful as the SELinux team.
+ */
+static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
+ int count)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+ list_del_rcu(&hooks[i].list);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE */
+
+extern int __init security_module_enable(const char *module);
+extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
extern void proc_caches_init(void);
extern void flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
-extern void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *);
extern void ignore_signals(struct task_struct *);
extern void flush_signal_handlers(struct task_struct *, int force_default);
extern int dequeue_signal(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *mask, siginfo_t *info);
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
struct linux_binprm;
struct cred;
struct xfrm_sec_ctx;
struct mm_struct;
-/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
-#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
-
/* If capable should audit the security request */
#define SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT 0
#define SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT 1
struct user_namespace;
struct timezone;
-/*
- * These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
- * as the default capabilities functions
- */
+/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, int audit);
extern int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx;
struct seq_file;
-extern int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-
-void reset_security_ops(void);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
extern unsigned long mmap_min_addr;
extern unsigned long dac_mmap_min_addr;
opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
}
-/**
- * struct security_operations - main security structure
- *
- * Security module identifier.
- *
- * @name:
- * A string that acts as a unique identifier for the LSM with max number
- * of characters = SECURITY_NAME_MAX.
- *
- * Security hooks for program execution operations.
- *
- * @bprm_set_creds:
- * Save security information in the bprm->security field, typically based
- * on information about the bprm->file, for later use by the apply_creds
- * hook. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for
- * transitions between security domains).
- * This hook may be called multiple times during a single execve, e.g. for
- * interpreters. The hook can tell whether it has already been called by
- * checking to see if @bprm->security is non-NULL. If so, then the hook
- * may decide either to retain the security information saved earlier or
- * to replace it.
- * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @bprm_check_security:
- * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will
- * begin. It allows a check the @bprm->security value which is set in the
- * preceding set_creds call. The primary difference from set_creds is
- * that the argv list and envp list are reliably available in @bprm. This
- * hook may be called multiple times during a single execve; and in each
- * pass set_creds is called first.
- * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @bprm_committing_creds:
- * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being
- * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials
- * pointed to by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by
- * the bprm_set_creds hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure.
- * This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such
- * as closing open file descriptors to which access will no longer be
- * granted when the attributes are changed. This is called immediately
- * before commit_creds().
- * @bprm_committed_creds:
- * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a
- * process being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials
- * have, by this point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the
- * linux_binprm structure. This hook is a good place to perform state
- * changes on the process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal
- * state. This is called immediately after commit_creds().
- * @bprm_secureexec:
- * Return a boolean value (0 or 1) indicating whether a "secure exec"
- * is required. The flag is passed in the auxiliary table
- * on the initial stack to the ELF interpreter to indicate whether libc
- * should enable secure mode.
- * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure.
- *
- * Security hooks for filesystem operations.
- *
- * @sb_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field.
- * The s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- * allocated.
- * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful.
- * @sb_free_security:
- * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field.
- * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified.
- * @sb_statfs:
- * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt
- * mountpoint.
- * @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_mount:
- * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on
- * the mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name
- * identifies a device if the file system type requires a device. For a
- * remount (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a
- * loopback/bind mount (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the
- * pathname of the object being mounted.
- * @dev_name contains the name for object being mounted.
- * @path contains the path for mount point object.
- * @type contains the filesystem type.
- * @flags contains the mount flags.
- * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_copy_data:
- * Allow mount option data to be copied prior to parsing by the filesystem,
- * so that the security module can extract security-specific mount
- * options cleanly (a filesystem may modify the data e.g. with strsep()).
- * This also allows the original mount data to be stripped of security-
- * specific options to avoid having to make filesystems aware of them.
- * @type the type of filesystem being mounted.
- * @orig the original mount data copied from userspace.
- * @copy copied data which will be passed to the security module.
- * Returns 0 if the copy was successful.
- * @sb_remount:
- * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes
- * are being made to those options.
- * @sb superblock being remounted
- * @data contains the filesystem-specific data.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_umount:
- * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted.
- * @mnt contains the mounted file system.
- * @flags contains the unmount flags, e.g. MNT_FORCE.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_pivotroot:
- * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem.
- * @old_path contains the path for the new location of the current root (put_old).
- * @new_path contains the path for the new root (new_root).
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sb_set_mnt_opts:
- * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock
- * @sb the superblock to set security mount options for
- * @opts binary data structure containing all lsm mount data
- * @sb_clone_mnt_opts:
- * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another
- * @oldsb old superblock which contain information to clone
- * @newsb new superblock which needs filled in
- * @sb_parse_opts_str:
- * Parse a string of security data filling in the opts structure
- * @options string containing all mount options known by the LSM
- * @opts binary data structure usable by the LSM
- * @dentry_init_security:
- * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available
- * since NFSv4 has no label backed by an EA anyway.
- * @dentry dentry to use in calculating the context.
- * @mode mode used to determine resource type.
- * @name name of the last path component used to create file
- * @ctx pointer to place the pointer to the resulting context in.
- * @ctxlen point to place the length of the resulting context.
- *
- *
- * Security hooks for inode operations.
- *
- * @inode_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The
- * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is
- * allocated.
- * @inode contains the inode structure.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful.
- * @inode_free_security:
- * @inode contains the inode structure.
- * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to
- * NULL.
- * @inode_init_security:
- * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly
- * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode.
- * This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
- * transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
- * the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS. The hook function
- * is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
- * being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
- * If the security module does not use security attributes or does
- * not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
- * then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
- * @inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
- * @qstr contains the last path component of the new object
- * @name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
- * @value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
- * @len will be set to the length of the value.
- * Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,
- * -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is needed, or
- * -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure.
- * @inode_create:
- * Check permission to create a regular file.
- * @dir contains inode structure of the parent of the new file.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file to be created.
- * @mode contains the file mode of the file to be created.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_link:
- * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
- * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link to the file.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory of the new link.
- * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_link:
- * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file.
- * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure for an existing link
- * to the file.
- * @new_dir contains the path structure of the parent directory of
- * the new link.
- * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure for the new link.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_unlink:
- * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the file.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_unlink:
- * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file.
- * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of the file.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for file to be unlinked.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_symlink:
- * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of parent directory of the symbolic link.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
- * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_symlink:
- * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file.
- * @dir contains the path structure of parent directory of
- * the symbolic link.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the symbolic link.
- * @old_name contains the pathname of file.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_mkdir:
- * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
- * associated with inode structure @dir.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be created.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
- * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_mkdir:
- * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory
- * associated with path structure @path.
- * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory
- * to be created.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of new directory.
- * @mode contains the mode of new directory.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_rmdir:
- * Check the permission to remove a directory.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the directory to be removed.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_rmdir:
- * Check the permission to remove a directory.
- * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the directory to be
- * removed.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of directory to be removed.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_mknod:
- * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo
- * file created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation
- * is being done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called
- * and not this hook.
- * @dir contains the inode structure of parent of the new file.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
- * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
- * @dev contains the device number.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_mknod:
- * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called
- * even if mknod operation is being done for a regular file.
- * @dir contains the path structure of parent of the new file.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure of the new file.
- * @mode contains the mode of the new file.
- * @dev contains the undecoded device number. Use new_decode_dev() to get
- * the decoded device number.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_rename:
- * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
- * @old_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the old link.
- * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
- * @new_dir contains the inode structure for parent of the new link.
- * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_rename:
- * Check for permission to rename a file or directory.
- * @old_dir contains the path structure for parent of the old link.
- * @old_dentry contains the dentry structure of the old link.
- * @new_dir contains the path structure for parent of the new link.
- * @new_dentry contains the dentry structure of the new link.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chmod:
- * Check for permission to change DAC's permission of a file or directory.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure.
- * @mnt contains the vfsmnt structure.
- * @mode contains DAC's mode.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chown:
- * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory.
- * @path contains the path structure.
- * @uid contains new owner's ID.
- * @gid contains new group's ID.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_chroot:
- * Check for permission to change root directory.
- * @path contains the path structure.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_readlink:
- * Check the permission to read the symbolic link.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file link.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_follow_link:
- * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
- * @inode contains the inode, which itself is not stable in RCU-walk
- * @rcu indicates whether we are in RCU-walk mode.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_permission:
- * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the
- * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to
- * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks.
- * Notice that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many
- * other operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is
- * called when the actual read/write operations are performed.
- * @inode contains the inode structure to check.
- * @mask contains the permission mask.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_setattr:
- * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel
- * call to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever
- * file attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod
- * operations, transferring disk quotas, etc).
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
- * @attr is the iattr structure containing the new file attributes.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @path_truncate:
- * Check permission before truncating a file.
- * @path contains the path structure for the file.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_getattr:
- * Check permission before obtaining file attributes.
- * @mnt is the vfsmount where the dentry was looked up
- * @dentry contains the dentry structure for the file.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_setxattr:
- * Check permission before setting the extended attributes
- * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_post_setxattr:
- * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation.
- * @value identified by @name for @dentry.
- * @inode_getxattr:
- * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes
- * identified by @name for @dentry.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_listxattr:
- * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute
- * names for @dentry.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_removexattr:
- * Check permission before removing the extended attribute
- * identified by @name for @dentry.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @inode_getsecurity:
- * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the
- * security label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that
- * @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix
- * has been removed. @alloc is used to specify of the call should return a
- * value via the buffer or just the value length Return size of buffer on
- * success.
- * @inode_setsecurity:
- * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the
- * extended attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the
- * @value in bytes. @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0.
- * Note that @name is the remainder of the attribute name after the
- * security. prefix has been removed.
- * Return 0 on success.
- * @inode_listsecurity:
- * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels
- * associated with @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer
- * is specified by @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request
- * the size of the buffer required.
- * Returns number of bytes used/required on success.
- * @inode_need_killpriv:
- * Called when an inode has been changed.
- * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
- * Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation.
- * Return 0 if inode_killpriv does not need to be called.
- * Return >0 if inode_killpriv does need to be called.
- * @inode_killpriv:
- * The setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels.
- * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held.
- * @dentry is the dentry being changed.
- * Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation
- * causing setuid bit removal is failed.
- * @inode_getsecid:
- * Get the secid associated with the node.
- * @inode contains a pointer to the inode.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
- * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * Security hooks for file operations
- *
- * @file_permission:
- * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is
- * called by various operations that read or write files. A security
- * module can use this hook to perform additional checking on these
- * operations, e.g. to revalidate permissions on use to support privilege
- * bracketing or policy changes. Notice that this hook is used when the
- * actual read/write operations are performed, whereas the
- * inode_security_ops hook is called when a file is opened (as well as
- * many other operations).
- * Caveat: Although this hook can be used to revalidate permissions for
- * various system call operations that read or write files, it does not
- * address the revalidation of permissions for memory-mapped files.
- * Security modules must handle this separately if they need such
- * revalidation.
- * @file contains the file structure being accessed.
- * @mask contains the requested permissions.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field.
- * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
- * created.
- * @file contains the file structure to secure.
- * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted.
- * @file_free_security:
- * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security.
- * @file contains the file structure being modified.
- * @file_ioctl:
- * @file contains the file structure.
- * @cmd contains the operation to perform.
- * @arg contains the operational arguments.
- * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg
- * sometimes represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a
- * simple integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it
- * should never be used by the security module.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @mmap_addr :
- * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr.
- * @addr contains virtual address that will be used for the operation.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @mmap_file :
- * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
- * if mapping anonymous memory.
- * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
- * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
- * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- * @flags contains the operational flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_mprotect:
- * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions.
- * @vma contains the memory region to modify.
- * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
- * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_lock:
- * Check permission before performing file locking operations.
- * Note: this hook mediates both flock and fcntl style locks.
- * @file contains the file structure.
- * @cmd contains the posix-translated lock operation to perform
- * (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK).
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_fcntl:
- * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd
- * from being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes
- * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple
- * integer value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should
- * never be used by the security module.
- * @file contains the file structure.
- * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- * @arg contains the operational arguments.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_set_fowner:
- * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in
- * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook.
- * @file contains the file structure to update.
- * Return 0 on success.
- * @file_send_sigiotask:
- * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the
- * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt.
- * Note that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a
- * struct file, so the file structure (and associated security information)
- * can always be obtained:
- * container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner)
- * @tsk contains the structure of task receiving signal.
- * @fown contains the file owner information.
- * @sig is the signal that will be sent. When 0, kernel sends SIGIO.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_receive:
- * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process
- * to receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC.
- * @file contains the file structure being received.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @file_open
- * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon
- * file_permission, and recheck access if anything has changed
- * since inode_permission.
- *
- * Security hooks for task operations.
- *
- * @task_create:
- * Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2)
- * manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
- * @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_free:
- * @task task being freed
- * Handle release of task-related resources. (Note that this can be called
- * from interrupt context.)
- * @cred_alloc_blank:
- * @cred points to the credentials.
- * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
- * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that
- * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM.
- * @cred_free:
- * @cred points to the credentials.
- * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials.
- * @cred_prepare:
- * @new points to the new credentials.
- * @old points to the original credentials.
- * @gfp indicates the atomicity of any memory allocations.
- * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set.
- * @cred_transfer:
- * @new points to the new credentials.
- * @old points to the original credentials.
- * Transfer data from original creds to new creds
- * @kernel_act_as:
- * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context).
- * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
- * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid.
- * Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_create_files_as:
- * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as
- * the objective context of the specified inode.
- * @new points to the credentials to be modified.
- * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference.
- * The current task must be the one that nominated @inode.
- * Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_fw_from_file:
- * Load firmware from userspace (not called for built-in firmware).
- * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- * the firmware to load. This argument will be NULL if the firmware
- * was loaded via the uevent-triggered blob-based interface exposed
- * by CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER.
- * @buf pointer to buffer containing firmware contents.
- * @size length of the firmware contents.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @kernel_module_request:
- * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for
- * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name.
- * @kmod_name name of the module requested by the kernel
- * Return 0 if successful.
- * @kernel_module_from_file:
- * Load a kernel module from userspace.
- * @file contains the file structure pointing to the file containing
- * the kernel module to load. If the module is being loaded from a blob,
- * this argument will be NULL.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_fix_setuid:
- * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user
- * identity attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter
- * indicates which of the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If
- * @new is the set of credentials that will be installed. Modifications
- * should be made to this rather than to @current->cred.
- * @old is the set of credentials that are being replaces
- * @flags contains one of the LSM_SETID_* values.
- * Return 0 on success.
- * @task_setpgid:
- * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the
- * process @p to @pgid.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process being modified.
- * @pgid contains the new pgid.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getpgid:
- * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the
- * process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getsid:
- * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process
- * @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getsecid:
- * Retrieve the security identifier of the process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the process and place is into @secid.
- * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * @task_setnice:
- * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice.
- * @p contains the task_struct of process.
- * @nice contains the new nice value.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setioprio
- * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio.
- * @p contains the task_struct of process.
- * @ioprio contains the new ioprio value
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getioprio
- * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct of process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setrlimit:
- * Check permission before setting the resource limits of the current
- * process for @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can
- * be examined by dereferencing (current->signal->rlim + resource).
- * @resource contains the resource whose limit is being set.
- * @new_rlim contains the new limits for @resource.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_setscheduler:
- * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of
- * process @p based on @policy and @lp.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * @policy contains the scheduling policy.
- * @lp contains the scheduling parameters.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_getscheduler:
- * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process
- * @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_movememory
- * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_kill:
- * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL,
- * the constant 1, or a pointer to a siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or
- * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming
- * from the kernel and should typically be permitted.
- * SIGIO signals are handled separately by the send_sigiotask hook in
- * file_security_ops.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * @info contains the signal information.
- * @sig contains the signal value.
- * @secid contains the sid of the process where the signal originated
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_wait:
- * Check permission before allowing a process to reap a child process @p
- * and collect its status information.
- * @p contains the task_struct for process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @task_prctl:
- * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the
- * current process.
- * @option contains the operation.
- * @arg2 contains a argument.
- * @arg3 contains a argument.
- * @arg4 contains a argument.
- * @arg5 contains a argument.
- * Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value to
- * cause prctl() to return immediately with that value.
- * @task_to_inode:
- * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's
- * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes.
- * @p contains the task_struct for the task.
- * @inode contains the inode structure for the inode.
- *
- * Security hooks for Netlink messaging.
- *
- * @netlink_send:
- * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission
- * checking can be performed when the message is processed. The security
- * information can be saved using the eff_cap field of the
- * netlink_skb_parms structure. Also may be used to provide fine
- * grained control over message transmission.
- * @sk associated sock of task sending the message.
- * @skb contains the sk_buff structure for the netlink message.
- * Return 0 if the information was successfully saved and message
- * is allowed to be transmitted.
- *
- * Security hooks for Unix domain networking.
- *
- * @unix_stream_connect:
- * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection
- * between @sock and @other.
- * @sock contains the sock structure.
- * @other contains the peer sock structure.
- * @newsk contains the new sock structure.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @unix_may_send:
- * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to
- * @other.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @other contains the peer socket structure.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because
- * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix
- * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name
- * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod
- * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to
- * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient
- * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible
- * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target
- * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code.
- *
- * Security hooks for socket operations.
- *
- * @socket_create:
- * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket.
- * @family contains the requested protocol family.
- * @type contains the requested communications type.
- * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
- * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_post_create:
- * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security
- * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the
- * socket structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored
- * in the associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will
- * allocate and and attach security information to
- * sock->inode->i_security. This hook may be used to update the
- * sock->inode->i_security field with additional information that wasn't
- * available when the inode was allocated.
- * @sock contains the newly created socket structure.
- * @family contains the requested protocol family.
- * @type contains the requested communications type.
- * @protocol contains the requested protocol.
- * @kern set to 1 if a kernel socket.
- * @socket_bind:
- * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is
- * performed and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the
- * @address parameter.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @address contains the address to bind to.
- * @addrlen contains the length of address.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_connect:
- * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation
- * attempts to connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @address contains the address of remote endpoint.
- * @addrlen contains the length of address.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_listen:
- * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @backlog contains the maximum length for the pending connection queue.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_accept:
- * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new
- * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it,
- * but the accept operation has not actually been performed.
- * @sock contains the listening socket structure.
- * @newsock contains the newly created server socket for connection.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_sendmsg:
- * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @msg contains the message to be transmitted.
- * @size contains the size of message.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_recvmsg:
- * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @msg contains the message structure.
- * @size contains the size of message structure.
- * @flags contains the operational flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getsockname:
- * Check permission before the local address (name) of the socket object
- * @sock is retrieved.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getpeername:
- * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object
- * @sock is retrieved.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_getsockopt:
- * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket
- * @sock.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @level contains the protocol level to retrieve option from.
- * @optname contains the name of option to retrieve.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_setsockopt:
- * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket
- * @sock.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @level contains the protocol level to set options for.
- * @optname contains the name of the option to set.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_shutdown:
- * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket
- * @sock is shut down.
- * @sock contains the socket structure.
- * @how contains the flag indicating how future sends and receives are handled.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @socket_sock_rcv_skb:
- * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct
- * from Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the
- * incoming sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk.
- * Must not sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks.
- * @sk contains the sock (not socket) associated with the incoming sk_buff.
- * @skb contains the incoming network data.
- * @socket_getpeersec_stream:
- * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
- * state for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt
- * SO_GETPEERSEC. For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the
- * socket is associated with an ipsec SA.
- * @sock is the local socket.
- * @optval userspace memory where the security state is to be copied.
- * @optlen userspace int where the module should copy the actual length
- * of the security state.
- * @len as input is the maximum length to copy to userspace provided
- * by the caller.
- * Return 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return
- * values.
- * @socket_getpeersec_dgram:
- * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security
- * state for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via
- * getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated
- * the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the
- * security state returned by this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY
- * ancillary message type.
- * @skb is the skbuff for the packet being queried
- * @secdata is a pointer to a buffer in which to copy the security data
- * @seclen is the maximum length for @secdata
- * Return 0 on success, error on failure.
- * @sk_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field,
- * which is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets.
- * @sk_free_security:
- * Deallocate security structure.
- * @sk_clone_security:
- * Clone/copy security structure.
- * @sk_getsecid:
- * Retrieve the LSM-specific secid for the sock to enable caching of network
- * authorizations.
- * @sock_graft:
- * Sets the socket's isec sid to the sock's sid.
- * @inet_conn_request:
- * Sets the openreq's sid to socket's sid with MLS portion taken from peer sid.
- * @inet_csk_clone:
- * Sets the new child socket's sid to the openreq sid.
- * @inet_conn_established:
- * Sets the connection's peersid to the secmark on skb.
- * @secmark_relabel_packet:
- * check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to the given secid
- * @security_secmark_refcount_inc
- * tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
- * @security_secmark_refcount_dec
- * tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded
- * @req_classify_flow:
- * Sets the flow's sid to the openreq sid.
- * @tun_dev_alloc_security:
- * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN
- * device.
- * @security pointer to a security structure pointer.
- * Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure.
- * @tun_dev_free_security:
- * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN
- * device.
- * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure
- * @tun_dev_create:
- * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device.
- * @tun_dev_attach_queue:
- * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue.
- * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
- * @tun_dev_attach:
- * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
- * associated with the TUN device's sock structure.
- * @sk contains the existing sock structure.
- * @security pointer to the TUN device's security structure.
- * @tun_dev_open:
- * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state
- * associated with the TUN device's security structure.
- * @security pointer to the TUN devices's security structure.
- * @skb_owned_by:
- * This hook sets the packet's owning sock.
- * @skb is the packet.
- * @sk the sock which owns the packet.
- *
- * Security hooks for XFRM operations.
- *
- * @xfrm_policy_alloc_security:
- * @ctxp is a pointer to the xfrm_sec_ctx being added to Security Policy
- * Database used by the XFRM system.
- * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
- * the user-level policy update program (e.g., setkey).
- * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security
- * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate, legal context)
- * @gfp is to specify the context for the allocation
- * @xfrm_policy_clone_security:
- * @old_ctx contains an existing xfrm_sec_ctx.
- * @new_ctxp contains a new xfrm_sec_ctx being cloned from old.
- * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the
- * information from the old_ctx structure.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful (memory to allocate).
- * @xfrm_policy_free_security:
- * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx
- * Deallocate xp->security.
- * @xfrm_policy_delete_security:
- * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx.
- * Authorize deletion of xp->security.
- * @xfrm_state_alloc:
- * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
- * Database by the XFRM system.
- * @sec_ctx contains the security context information being provided by
- * the user-level SA generation program (e.g., setkey or racoon).
- * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
- * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
- * context to correspond to sec_ctx. Return 0 if operation was successful
- * (memory to allocate, legal context).
- * @xfrm_state_alloc_acquire:
- * @x contains the xfrm_state being added to the Security Association
- * Database by the XFRM system.
- * @polsec contains the policy's security context.
- * @secid contains the secid from which to take the mls portion of the
- * context.
- * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security
- * field is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the
- * context to correspond to secid. Return 0 if operation was successful
- * (memory to allocate, legal context).
- * @xfrm_state_free_security:
- * @x contains the xfrm_state.
- * Deallocate x->security.
- * @xfrm_state_delete_security:
- * @x contains the xfrm_state.
- * Authorize deletion of x->security.
- * @xfrm_policy_lookup:
- * @ctx contains the xfrm_sec_ctx for which the access control is being
- * checked.
- * @fl_secid contains the flow security label that is used to authorize
- * access to the policy xp.
- * @dir contains the direction of the flow (input or output).
- * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing
- * XFRMs on a packet. The hook is called when selecting either a
- * per-socket policy or a generic xfrm policy.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno
- * on other errors.
- * @xfrm_state_pol_flow_match:
- * @x contains the state to match.
- * @xp contains the policy to check for a match.
- * @fl contains the flow to check for a match.
- * Return 1 if there is a match.
- * @xfrm_decode_session:
- * @skb points to skb to decode.
- * @secid points to the flow key secid to set.
- * @ckall says if all xfrms used should be checked for same secid.
- * Return 0 if ckall is zero or all xfrms used have the same secid.
- *
- * Security hooks affecting all Key Management operations
- *
- * @key_alloc:
- * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does
- * not have a serial number assigned at this point.
- * @key points to the key.
- * @flags is the allocation flags
- * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
- * @key_free:
- * Notification of destruction; free security data.
- * @key points to the key.
- * No return value.
- * @key_permission:
- * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a
- * key.
- * @key_ref refers to the key (key pointer + possession attribute bit).
- * @cred points to the credentials to provide the context against which to
- * evaluate the security data on the key.
- * @perm describes the combination of permissions required of this key.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise.
- * @key_getsecurity:
- * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key
- * for the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function
- * allocates the storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller
- * should free it.
- * @key points to the key to be queried.
- * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
- * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
- * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
- * an error.
- * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
- *
- * Security hooks affecting all System V IPC operations.
- *
- * @ipc_permission:
- * Check permissions for access to IPC
- * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
- * @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ipc_getsecid:
- * Get the secid associated with the ipc object.
- * @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure.
- * @secid contains a pointer to the location where result will be saved.
- * In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
- *
- * Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
- * @msg_msg_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field.
- * The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first
- * created.
- * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @msg_msg_free_security:
- * Deallocate the security structure for this message.
- * @msg contains the message structure to be modified.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V IPC Message Queues
- *
- * @msg_queue_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the
- * msq->q_perm.security field. The security field is initialized to
- * NULL when the structure is first created.
- * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_free_security:
- * Deallocate security structure for this message queue.
- * @msq contains the message queue structure to be modified.
- * @msg_queue_associate:
- * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the
- * msgget system call. This hook is only called when returning the
- * message queue identifier for an existing message queue, not when a
- * new message queue is created.
- * @msq contains the message queue to act upon.
- * @msqflg contains the operation control flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgctl:
- * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd
- * is to be performed on the message queue @msq.
- * The @msq may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or MSG_INFO.
- * @msq contains the message queue to act upon. May be NULL.
- * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgsnd:
- * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message
- * queue, @msq.
- * @msq contains the message queue to send message to.
- * @msg contains the message to be enqueued.
- * @msqflg contains operational flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @msg_queue_msgrcv:
- * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message
- * queue, @msq. The @target task structure contains a pointer to the
- * process that will be receiving the message (not equal to the current
- * process when inline receives are being performed).
- * @msq contains the message queue to retrieve message from.
- * @msg contains the message destination.
- * @target contains the task structure for recipient process.
- * @type contains the type of message requested.
- * @mode contains the operational flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V Shared Memory Segments
- *
- * @shm_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the shp->shm_perm.security
- * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- * first created.
- * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @shm_free_security:
- * Deallocate the security struct for this memory segment.
- * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- * @shm_associate:
- * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the
- * shmget system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared
- * memory region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared
- * memory region is created.
- * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- * @shmflg contains the operation control flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @shm_shmctl:
- * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by
- * @cmd is to be performed on the shared memory region @shp.
- * The @shp may be NULL, e.g. for IPC_INFO or SHM_INFO.
- * @shp contains shared memory structure to be modified.
- * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @shm_shmat:
- * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the
- * shared memory segment @shp to the data segment of the calling process.
- * The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr.
- * @shp contains the shared memory structure to be modified.
- * @shmaddr contains the address to attach memory region to.
- * @shmflg contains the operational flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * Security hooks for System V Semaphores
- *
- * @sem_alloc_security:
- * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sma->sem_perm.security
- * field. The security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is
- * first created.
- * @sma contains the semaphore structure
- * Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted.
- * @sem_free_security:
- * deallocate security struct for this semaphore
- * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
- * @sem_associate:
- * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget
- * system call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore
- * identifier for an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be
- * created.
- * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
- * @semflg contains the operation control flags.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sem_semctl:
- * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be
- * performed on the semaphore @sma. The @sma may be NULL, e.g. for
- * IPC_INFO or SEM_INFO.
- * @sma contains the semaphore structure. May be NULL.
- * @cmd contains the operation to be performed.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @sem_semop
- * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the
- * semaphore set @sma. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set
- * may be modified.
- * @sma contains the semaphore structure.
- * @sops contains the operations to perform.
- * @nsops contains the number of operations to perform.
- * @alter contains the flag indicating whether changes are to be made.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * @binder_set_context_mgr
- * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager.
- * @mgr contains the task_struct for the task being registered.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @binder_transaction
- * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call
- * to @to.
- * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- * @binder_transfer_binder
- * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to.
- * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- * @binder_transfer_file
- * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to.
- * @from contains the task_struct for the sending task.
- * @file contains the struct file being transferred.
- * @to contains the task_struct for the receiving task.
- *
- * @ptrace_access_check:
- * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the
- * @child process.
- * Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check
- * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of
- * tracing check during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of
- * binprm_security_ops if the process is being traced and its security
- * attributes would be changed by the execve.
- * @child contains the task_struct structure for the target process.
- * @mode contains the PTRACE_MODE flags indicating the form of access.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ptrace_traceme:
- * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the
- * current process before allowing the current process to present itself
- * to the @parent process for tracing.
- * @parent contains the task_struct structure for debugger process.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @capget:
- * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
- * the @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to
- * determine if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets
- * of the @target process.
- * @target contains the task_struct structure for target process.
- * @effective contains the effective capability set.
- * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
- * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
- * Return 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained.
- * @capset:
- * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for
- * the current process.
- * @new contains the new credentials structure for target process.
- * @old contains the current credentials structure for target process.
- * @effective contains the effective capability set.
- * @inheritable contains the inheritable capability set.
- * @permitted contains the permitted capability set.
- * Return 0 and update @new if permission is granted.
- * @capable:
- * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated
- * credentials.
- * @cred contains the credentials to use.
- * @ns contains the user namespace we want the capability in
- * @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>.
- * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
- * Return 0 if the capability is granted for @tsk.
- * @syslog:
- * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing
- * logging to the console.
- * See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of the @type values.
- * @type contains the type of action.
- * @from_file indicates the context of action (if it came from /proc).
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @settime:
- * Check permission to change the system time.
- * struct timespec and timezone are defined in include/linux/time.h
- * @ts contains new time
- * @tz contains new timezone
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @vm_enough_memory:
- * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping.
- * @mm contains the mm struct it is being added to.
- * @pages contains the number of pages.
- * Return 0 if permission is granted.
- *
- * @ismaclabel:
- * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name
- * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
- * attribute otherwise returns 0.
- * @name full extended attribute name to check against
- * LSM as a MAC label.
- *
- * @secid_to_secctx:
- * Convert secid to security context. If secdata is NULL the length of
- * the result will be returned in seclen, but no secdata will be returned.
- * This does mean that the length could change between calls to check the
- * length and the next call which actually allocates and returns the secdata.
- * @secid contains the security ID.
- * @secdata contains the pointer that stores the converted security context.
- * @seclen pointer which contains the length of the data
- * @secctx_to_secid:
- * Convert security context to secid.
- * @secid contains the pointer to the generated security ID.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
- *
- * @release_secctx:
- * Release the security context.
- * @secdata contains the security context.
- * @seclen contains the length of the security context.
- *
- * Security hooks for Audit
- *
- * @audit_rule_init:
- * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
- * @field contains the required Audit action. Fields flags are defined in include/linux/audit.h
- * @op contains the operator the rule uses.
- * @rulestr contains the context where the rule will be applied to.
- * @lsmrule contains a pointer to receive the result.
- * Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set,
- * -EINVAL in case of an invalid rule.
- *
- * @audit_rule_known:
- * Specifies whether given @rule contains any fields related to current LSM.
- * @rule contains the audit rule of interest.
- * Return 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise.
- *
- * @audit_rule_match:
- * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved
- * by @audit_rule_known.
- * @secid contains the security id in question.
- * @field contains the field which relates to current LSM.
- * @op contains the operator that will be used for matching.
- * @rule points to the audit rule that will be checked against.
- * @actx points to the audit context associated with the check.
- * Return 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on failure.
- *
- * @audit_rule_free:
- * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by
- * audit_rule_init.
- * @rule contains the allocated rule
- *
- * @inode_notifysecctx:
- * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode
- * should be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the
- * security module for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes
- * this hook to initialize the security context in its incore inode to the
- * value provided by the server for the file when the server returned the
- * file's attributes to the client.
- *
- * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
- *
- * @inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
- *
- * @inode_setsecctx:
- * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the
- * incore security context managed by the security module and invokes the
- * fs code as needed (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing
- * xattrs that represent the context. Example usage: NFS server invokes
- * this hook to change the security context in its incore inode and on the
- * backing filesystem to a value provided by the client on a SETATTR
- * operation.
- *
- * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked.
- *
- * @dentry contains the inode we wish to set the security context of.
- * @ctx contains the string which we wish to set in the inode.
- * @ctxlen contains the length of @ctx.
- *
- * @inode_getsecctx:
- * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security
- * context for the given @inode.
- *
- * @inode we wish to get the security context of.
- * @ctx is a pointer in which to place the allocated security context.
- * @ctxlen points to the place to put the length of @ctx.
- * This is the main security structure.
- */
-struct security_operations {
- char name[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1];
-
- int (*binder_set_context_mgr) (struct task_struct *mgr);
- int (*binder_transaction) (struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to);
- int (*binder_transfer_binder) (struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to);
- int (*binder_transfer_file) (struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to, struct file *file);
-
- int (*ptrace_access_check) (struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
- int (*ptrace_traceme) (struct task_struct *parent);
- int (*capget) (struct task_struct *target,
- kernel_cap_t *effective,
- kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capset) (struct cred *new,
- const struct cred *old,
- const kernel_cap_t *effective,
- const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
- const kernel_cap_t *permitted);
- int (*capable) (const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
- int cap, int audit);
- int (*quotactl) (int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb);
- int (*quota_on) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*syslog) (int type);
- int (*settime) (const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz);
- int (*vm_enough_memory) (struct mm_struct *mm, long pages);
-
- int (*bprm_set_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- int (*bprm_check_security) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- int (*bprm_secureexec) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- void (*bprm_committing_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
- void (*bprm_committed_creds) (struct linux_binprm *bprm);
-
- int (*sb_alloc_security) (struct super_block *sb);
- void (*sb_free_security) (struct super_block *sb);
- int (*sb_copy_data) (char *orig, char *copy);
- int (*sb_remount) (struct super_block *sb, void *data);
- int (*sb_kern_mount) (struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data);
- int (*sb_show_options) (struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb);
- int (*sb_statfs) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*sb_mount) (const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
- const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data);
- int (*sb_umount) (struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
- int (*sb_pivotroot) (struct path *old_path,
- struct path *new_path);
- int (*sb_set_mnt_opts) (struct super_block *sb,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
- unsigned long kern_flags,
- unsigned long *set_kern_flags);
- int (*sb_clone_mnt_opts) (const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb);
- int (*sb_parse_opts_str) (char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts);
- int (*dentry_init_security) (struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen);
-
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
- int (*path_unlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*path_mkdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
- int (*path_rmdir) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*path_mknod) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
- unsigned int dev);
- int (*path_truncate) (struct path *path);
- int (*path_symlink) (struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *old_name);
- int (*path_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
- struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int (*path_rename) (struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int (*path_chmod) (struct path *path, umode_t mode);
- int (*path_chown) (struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid);
- int (*path_chroot) (struct path *path);
-#endif
-
- int (*inode_alloc_security) (struct inode *inode);
- void (*inode_free_security) (struct inode *inode);
- int (*inode_init_security) (struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
- void **value, size_t *len);
- int (*inode_create) (struct inode *dir,
- struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
- int (*inode_link) (struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int (*inode_unlink) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_symlink) (struct inode *dir,
- struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name);
- int (*inode_mkdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode);
- int (*inode_rmdir) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_mknod) (struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- umode_t mode, dev_t dev);
- int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
- int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
- bool rcu);
- int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
- int (*inode_setattr) (struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
- int (*inode_getattr) (const struct path *path);
- int (*inode_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- void (*inode_post_setxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- int (*inode_getxattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
- int (*inode_listxattr) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_removexattr) (struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
- int (*inode_need_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_killpriv) (struct dentry *dentry);
- int (*inode_getsecurity) (const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc);
- int (*inode_setsecurity) (struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags);
- int (*inode_listsecurity) (struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size);
- void (*inode_getsecid) (const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
-
- int (*file_permission) (struct file *file, int mask);
- int (*file_alloc_security) (struct file *file);
- void (*file_free_security) (struct file *file);
- int (*file_ioctl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg);
- int (*mmap_addr) (unsigned long addr);
- int (*mmap_file) (struct file *file,
- unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags);
- int (*file_mprotect) (struct vm_area_struct *vma,
- unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot);
- int (*file_lock) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd);
- int (*file_fcntl) (struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg);
- void (*file_set_fowner) (struct file *file);
- int (*file_send_sigiotask) (struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
- int (*file_receive) (struct file *file);
- int (*file_open) (struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
-
- int (*task_create) (unsigned long clone_flags);
- void (*task_free) (struct task_struct *task);
- int (*cred_alloc_blank) (struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
- void (*cred_free) (struct cred *cred);
- int (*cred_prepare)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
- gfp_t gfp);
- void (*cred_transfer)(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
- int (*kernel_act_as)(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
- int (*kernel_create_files_as)(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
- int (*kernel_fw_from_file)(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size);
- int (*kernel_module_request)(char *kmod_name);
- int (*kernel_module_from_file)(struct file *file);
- int (*task_fix_setuid) (struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
- int flags);
- int (*task_setpgid) (struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
- int (*task_getpgid) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_getsid) (struct task_struct *p);
- void (*task_getsecid) (struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
- int (*task_setnice) (struct task_struct *p, int nice);
- int (*task_setioprio) (struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
- int (*task_getioprio) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_setrlimit) (struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
- struct rlimit *new_rlim);
- int (*task_setscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_getscheduler) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_movememory) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_kill) (struct task_struct *p,
- struct siginfo *info, int sig, u32 secid);
- int (*task_wait) (struct task_struct *p);
- int (*task_prctl) (int option, unsigned long arg2,
- unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5);
- void (*task_to_inode) (struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
-
- int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag);
- void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid);
-
- int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
- void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg *msg);
-
- int (*msg_queue_alloc_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
- void (*msg_queue_free_security) (struct msg_queue *msq);
- int (*msg_queue_associate) (struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg);
- int (*msg_queue_msgctl) (struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd);
- int (*msg_queue_msgsnd) (struct msg_queue *msq,
- struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg);
- int (*msg_queue_msgrcv) (struct msg_queue *msq,
- struct msg_msg *msg,
- struct task_struct *target,
- long type, int mode);
-
- int (*shm_alloc_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp);
- void (*shm_free_security) (struct shmid_kernel *shp);
- int (*shm_associate) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg);
- int (*shm_shmctl) (struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd);
- int (*shm_shmat) (struct shmid_kernel *shp,
- char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg);
-
- int (*sem_alloc_security) (struct sem_array *sma);
- void (*sem_free_security) (struct sem_array *sma);
- int (*sem_associate) (struct sem_array *sma, int semflg);
- int (*sem_semctl) (struct sem_array *sma, int cmd);
- int (*sem_semop) (struct sem_array *sma,
- struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter);
-
- int (*netlink_send) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
-
- void (*d_instantiate) (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode);
-
- int (*getprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value);
- int (*setprocattr) (struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size);
- int (*ismaclabel) (const char *name);
- int (*secid_to_secctx) (u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
- int (*secctx_to_secid) (const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid);
- void (*release_secctx) (char *secdata, u32 seclen);
-
- int (*inode_notifysecctx)(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
- int (*inode_setsecctx)(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen);
- int (*inode_getsecctx)(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk);
- int (*unix_may_send) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *other);
-
- int (*socket_create) (int family, int type, int protocol, int kern);
- int (*socket_post_create) (struct socket *sock, int family,
- int type, int protocol, int kern);
- int (*socket_bind) (struct socket *sock,
- struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
- int (*socket_connect) (struct socket *sock,
- struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen);
- int (*socket_listen) (struct socket *sock, int backlog);
- int (*socket_accept) (struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock);
- int (*socket_sendmsg) (struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, int size);
- int (*socket_recvmsg) (struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags);
- int (*socket_getsockname) (struct socket *sock);
- int (*socket_getpeername) (struct socket *sock);
- int (*socket_getsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
- int (*socket_setsockopt) (struct socket *sock, int level, int optname);
- int (*socket_shutdown) (struct socket *sock, int how);
- int (*socket_sock_rcv_skb) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*socket_getpeersec_stream) (struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, int __user *optlen, unsigned len);
- int (*socket_getpeersec_dgram) (struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid);
- int (*sk_alloc_security) (struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority);
- void (*sk_free_security) (struct sock *sk);
- void (*sk_clone_security) (const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
- void (*sk_getsecid) (struct sock *sk, u32 *secid);
- void (*sock_graft) (struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent);
- int (*inet_conn_request) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct request_sock *req);
- void (*inet_csk_clone) (struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);
- void (*inet_conn_established) (struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
- int (*secmark_relabel_packet) (u32 secid);
- void (*secmark_refcount_inc) (void);
- void (*secmark_refcount_dec) (void);
- void (*req_classify_flow) (const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl);
- int (*tun_dev_alloc_security) (void **security);
- void (*tun_dev_free_security) (void *security);
- int (*tun_dev_create) (void);
- int (*tun_dev_attach_queue) (void *security);
- int (*tun_dev_attach) (struct sock *sk, void *security);
- int (*tun_dev_open) (void *security);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
- int (*xfrm_policy_alloc_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp);
- int (*xfrm_policy_clone_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctx);
- void (*xfrm_policy_free_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
- int (*xfrm_policy_delete_security) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
- int (*xfrm_state_alloc) (struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
- int (*xfrm_state_alloc_acquire) (struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
- u32 secid);
- void (*xfrm_state_free_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
- int (*xfrm_state_delete_security) (struct xfrm_state *x);
- int (*xfrm_policy_lookup) (struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
- int (*xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) (struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- const struct flowi *fl);
- int (*xfrm_decode_session) (struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid, int ckall);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-
- /* key management security hooks */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- int (*key_alloc) (struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags);
- void (*key_free) (struct key *key);
- int (*key_permission) (key_ref_t key_ref,
- const struct cred *cred,
- unsigned perm);
- int (*key_getsecurity)(struct key *key, char **_buffer);
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- int (*audit_rule_init) (u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
- int (*audit_rule_known) (struct audit_krule *krule);
- int (*audit_rule_match) (u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
- void (*audit_rule_free) (void *lsmrule);
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-};
-
/* prototypes */
extern int security_init(void);
-extern int security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops);
-extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops);
-extern void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops);
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr);
static inline int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
- return cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+ return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_vm_enough_memory(mm, pages));
}
static inline int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
static inline int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ return 0;
}
static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA
-extern int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
- unsigned int mode);
-extern int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
-extern void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
-extern int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);
-#else
-static inline int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
- unsigned int mode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void yama_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-}
-
-static inline int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2,
- unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5)
-{
- return -ENOSYS;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA */
-
#endif /* ! __LINUX_SECURITY_H */
}
/*
- * Flush all pending signals for a task.
+ * Flush all pending signals for this kthread.
*/
-void __flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
-{
- clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
- flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
- flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
-}
-
void flush_signals(struct task_struct *t)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
- __flush_signals(t);
+ clear_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SIGPENDING);
+ flush_sigqueue(&t->pending);
+ flush_sigqueue(&t->signal->shared_pending);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&t->sighand->siglock, flags);
}
obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) += min_addr.o
# Object file lists
-obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o capability.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY) += security.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITYFS) += inode.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/
file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
};
const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
- int error = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (error)
- return error;
+ int error = 0;
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
*/
int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
-
/* the decision to use secure exec is computed in set_creds
* and stored in bprm->unsafe.
*/
- if (!ret && (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED))
- ret = 1;
+ if (bprm->unsafe & AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED)
+ return 1;
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
/**
* License.
*/
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
static int apparmor_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- int error = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
return aa_ptrace(current, child, mode);
}
static int apparmor_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- int error = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
return aa_ptrace(parent, current, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
}
cred = __task_cred(target);
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- *effective = cred->cap_effective;
- *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
- *permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
-
+ /*
+ * cap_capget is stacked ahead of this and will
+ * initialize effective and permitted.
+ */
if (!unconfined(profile) && !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) {
*effective = cap_intersect(*effective, profile->caps.allow);
*permitted = cap_intersect(*permitted, profile->caps.allow);
int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
- /* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
- if (!error) {
- profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
- if (!unconfined(profile))
- error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
- }
+ int error = 0;
+
+ profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_capable(profile, cap, audit);
return error;
}
return error;
}
-static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
- .name = "apparmor",
-
- .ptrace_access_check = apparmor_ptrace_access_check,
- .ptrace_traceme = apparmor_ptrace_traceme,
- .capget = apparmor_capget,
- .capable = apparmor_capable,
-
- .path_link = apparmor_path_link,
- .path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
- .path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
- .path_mkdir = apparmor_path_mkdir,
- .path_rmdir = apparmor_path_rmdir,
- .path_mknod = apparmor_path_mknod,
- .path_rename = apparmor_path_rename,
- .path_chmod = apparmor_path_chmod,
- .path_chown = apparmor_path_chown,
- .path_truncate = apparmor_path_truncate,
- .inode_getattr = apparmor_inode_getattr,
-
- .file_open = apparmor_file_open,
- .file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
- .file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
- .file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
- .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
- .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
- .file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
- .file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
-
- .getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
- .setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
-
- .cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
- .cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
- .cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
- .cred_transfer = apparmor_cred_transfer,
-
- .bprm_set_creds = apparmor_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_committing_creds = apparmor_bprm_committing_creds,
- .bprm_committed_creds = apparmor_bprm_committed_creds,
- .bprm_secureexec = apparmor_bprm_secureexec,
-
- .task_setrlimit = apparmor_task_setrlimit,
+static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, apparmor_path_mkdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, apparmor_path_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, apparmor_path_mknod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, apparmor_path_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, apparmor_path_chmod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, apparmor_path_chown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, apparmor_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, apparmor_inode_getattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, apparmor_file_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, apparmor_file_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, apparmor_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, apparmor_file_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, apparmor_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, apparmor_file_mprotect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, apparmor_file_lock),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, apparmor_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, apparmor_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, apparmor_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, apparmor_cred_transfer),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, apparmor_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, apparmor_bprm_committing_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, apparmor_bprm_secureexec),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
};
/*
{
int error;
- if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable(&apparmor_ops)) {
+ if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) {
aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter");
apparmor_enabled = 0;
return 0;
error = set_init_cxt();
if (error) {
AA_ERROR("Failed to set context on init task\n");
- goto register_security_out;
- }
-
- error = register_security(&apparmor_ops);
- if (error) {
- struct cred *cred = (struct cred *)current->real_cred;
- aa_free_task_context(cred_cxt(cred));
- cred_cxt(cred) = NULL;
- AA_ERROR("Unable to register AppArmor\n");
- goto register_security_out;
+ aa_free_root_ns();
+ goto alloc_out;
}
+ security_add_hooks(apparmor_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(apparmor_hooks));
/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */
apparmor_initialized = 1;
return error;
-register_security_out:
- aa_free_root_ns();
-
alloc_out:
aa_destroy_aafs();
+++ /dev/null
-/*
- * Capabilities Linux Security Module
- *
- * This is the default security module in case no other module is loaded.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- */
-
-#include <linux/security.h>
-
-static int cap_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_syslog(int type)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
- const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
- struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
- unsigned long kern_flags,
- unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
-
-{
- if (unlikely(opts->num_mnt_opts))
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
- void **value, size_t *len)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_create(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
- umode_t mask)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode,
- struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_unlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_symlink(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_mkdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
- umode_t mask)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_rmdir(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_mknod(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
- umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
- bool rcu)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name,
- void **buffer, bool alloc)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
- const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
- size_t buffer_size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
-{
- *secid = 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
-static int cap_path_mknod(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
- unsigned int dev)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_mkdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_rmdir(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_symlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
- const char *old_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
- struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_rename(struct path *old_path, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct path *new_path, struct dentry *new_dentry)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_truncate(struct path *path)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_path_chroot(struct path *root)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif
-
-static int cap_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_file_free_security(struct file *file)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int command,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
- unsigned long arg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
- struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_receive(struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
-{
- *secid = 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
- struct rlimit *new_rlim)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
- int sig, u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
-{
- *secid = 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
- int msgflg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
- struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
- int shmflg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
- unsigned nsops, int alter)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
-static int cap_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
- struct sock *newsk)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type,
- int protocol, int kern)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
- int addrlen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
- int addrlen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
- int size, int flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
- char __user *optval,
- int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
-{
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
-static int cap_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
- struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
-{
- return -ENOPROTOOPT;
-}
-
-static int cap_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- struct request_sock *req)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
- const struct request_sock *req)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
-{
-}
-
-static void cap_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
- struct flowi *fl)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_create(void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
- gfp_t gfp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec,
- u32 secid)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_xfrm_state_free_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- const struct flowi *fl)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int cap_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *fl, int ckall)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-static void cap_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int cap_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value,
- size_t size)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int cap_ismaclabel(const char *name)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static int cap_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
-{
- *secid = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-static int cap_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
- unsigned long flags)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_key_free(struct key *key)
-{
-}
-
-static int cap_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
- unsigned perm)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
-{
- *_buffer = NULL;
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
-static int cap_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int cap_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void cap_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
-{
-}
-#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-
-#define set_to_cap_if_null(ops, function) \
- do { \
- if (!ops->function) { \
- ops->function = cap_##function; \
- pr_debug("Had to override the " #function \
- " security operation with the default.\n");\
- } \
- } while (0)
-
-void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_set_context_mgr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transaction);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_binder);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, binder_transfer_file);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_access_check);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ptrace_traceme);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capget);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capset);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, capable);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quotactl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, quota_on);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, syslog);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, settime);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, vm_enough_memory);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_set_creds);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committing_creds);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_committed_creds);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_check_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, bprm_secureexec);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_copy_data);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_remount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_kern_mount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_show_options);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_statfs);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_mount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_umount);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_pivotroot);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_set_mnt_opts);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_clone_mnt_opts);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sb_parse_opts_str);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, dentry_init_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_init_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_link);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_unlink);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_symlink);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mkdir);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rmdir);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_mknod);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_rename);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_readlink);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_follow_link);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_permission);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setxattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_post_setxattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getxattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listxattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_removexattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_need_killpriv);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_killpriv);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecurity);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecurity);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_listsecurity);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mknod);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_mkdir);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rmdir);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_unlink);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_symlink);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_link);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_rename);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_truncate);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chmod);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chown);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, path_chroot);
-#endif
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_permission);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_set_fowner);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_send_sigiotask);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_receive);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_open);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_free);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_alloc_blank);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_free);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_prepare);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setpgid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getpgid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getsecid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setnice);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setioprio);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getioprio);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setrlimit);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_setscheduler);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_getscheduler);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_movememory);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_wait);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_kill);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_prctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_associate);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgsnd);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, msg_queue_msgrcv);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_associate);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, shm_shmat);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_associate);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sem_semop);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, netlink_send);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, d_instantiate);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, getprocattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, setprocattr);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, ismaclabel);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secid_to_secctx);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secctx_to_secid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, release_secctx);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_notifysecctx);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_setsecctx);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inode_getsecctx);
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_stream_connect);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, unix_may_send);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_post_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_bind);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_connect);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_listen);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_accept);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sendmsg);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_recvmsg);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockname);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeername);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_setsockopt);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getsockopt);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_shutdown);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_sock_rcv_skb);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_stream);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, socket_getpeersec_dgram);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_clone_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sk_getsecid);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, sock_graft);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_request);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_csk_clone);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, inet_conn_established);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_relabel_packet);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_inc);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, secmark_refcount_dec);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, req_classify_flow);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_create);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_clone_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_delete_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_alloc_acquire);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_free_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_delete_security);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_lookup);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_state_pol_flow_match);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_decode_session);
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_alloc);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_free);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_permission);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, key_getsecurity);
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
-#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_init);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_known);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_match);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, audit_rule_free);
-#endif
-}
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
}
}
-int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @pages: The size of the mapping
*
* Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
- * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not.
+ * task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
*/
int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
- return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+ return cap_sys_admin;
}
/*
{
return 0;
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+
+struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
+};
+
+void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks));
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
return err;
}
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path)
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path)
{
key_ref_t key;
char *data;
iint = integrity_iint_find(d_backing_inode(dentry));
if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
return 0;
+
+ /* exception for pseudo filesystems */
+ if (dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == TMPFS_MAGIC
+ || dentry->d_inode->i_sb->s_magic == SYSFS_MAGIC)
+ return 0;
+
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA,
+ dentry->d_inode, dentry->d_name.name,
+ "update_metadata",
+ integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+ -EPERM, 0);
}
out:
if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
* @xattr_name: pointer to the affected extended attribute name
*
* Update the HMAC stored in 'security.evm' to reflect removal of the xattr.
+ *
+ * No need to take the i_mutex lock here, as this function is called from
+ * vfs_removexattr() which takes the i_mutex.
*/
void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name)
{
- struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
-
if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name))
return;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0);
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
}
/**
char *buf;
int rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (!path || !*path)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(file);
extern int ima_hash_algo;
extern int ima_appraise;
+/* IMA event related data */
+struct ima_event_data {
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct file *file;
+ const unsigned char *filename;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value;
+ int xattr_len;
+ const char *violation;
+};
+
/* IMA template field data definition */
struct ima_field_data {
u8 *data;
/* IMA template field definition */
struct ima_template_field {
const char field_id[IMA_TEMPLATE_FIELD_ID_MAX_LEN];
- int (*field_init) (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
- void (*field_show) (struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
- struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+ int (*field_init)(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+ void (*field_show)(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
};
/* IMA template descriptor definition */
struct ima_digest_data *hash);
int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate(struct ima_digest_data *hash);
void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const char *op, const char *cause);
int ima_init_crypto(void);
void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen);
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size);
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size);
struct ima_template_desc *ima_template_desc_current(void);
int ima_init_template(void);
int xattr_len);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry);
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_template_entry **entry);
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
/*
* ima_alloc_init_template - create and initialize a new template entry
*/
-int ima_alloc_init_template(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, struct ima_template_entry **entry)
+int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_template_entry **entry)
{
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
int i, result = 0;
struct ima_template_field *field = template_desc->fields[i];
u32 len;
- result = field->field_init(iint, file, filename,
- xattr_value, xattr_len,
+ result = field->field_init(event_data,
&((*entry)->template_data[i]));
if (result != 0)
goto out;
* value is invalidated.
*/
void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+ struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const char *op, const char *cause)
{
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, NULL, 0,
+ cause};
int violation = 1;
int result;
/* can overflow, only indicator */
atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
- result = ima_alloc_init_template(NULL, file, filename,
- NULL, 0, &entry);
+ result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
if (result < 0) {
result = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
int result = -ENOMEM;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, file, filename, xattr_value,
+ xattr_len, NULL};
int violation = 0;
if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
return;
- result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, file, filename,
- xattr_value, xattr_len, &entry);
+ result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
if (result < 0) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
op, audit_cause, result, 0);
result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
xattr_value_len);
if (result == 1) {
+ bool digsig;
+
if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
return -EINVAL;
- ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
- (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
+ digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
+ if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+ return -EPERM;
+ ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
result = 0;
}
return result;
.release = seq_release,
};
-void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, int size)
+void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest, u32 size)
{
- int i;
+ u32 i;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#define IMA_X509_PATH CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH
-#else
-#define IMA_X509_PATH "/etc/keys/x509_ima.der"
-#endif
-
/* name for boot aggregate entry */
static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
int ima_used_chip;
const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
struct ima_template_entry *entry;
struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint;
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
+ NULL, 0, NULL};
int result = -ENOMEM;
int violation = 0;
struct {
}
}
- result = ima_alloc_init_template(iint, NULL, boot_aggregate_name,
- NULL, 0, &entry);
+ result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
if (result < 0) {
audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
goto err_out;
int unset_flags = ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE;
ima_policy_flag &= ~unset_flags;
- integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, IMA_X509_PATH);
+ integrity_load_x509(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, CONFIG_IMA_X509_PATH);
ima_policy_flag |= unset_flags;
}
#endif
*pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf);
if (send_tomtou)
- ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
+ ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
+ "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
if (send_writers)
- ima_add_violation(file, *pathname,
+ ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
"invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
}
#define IMA_UID 0x0008
#define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
+#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
+#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
};
+enum policy_types { ORIGINAL_TCB = 1, DEFAULT_TCB };
+
struct ima_rule_entry {
struct list_head list;
int action;
* normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
* and running executables.
*/
-static struct ima_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules[] = {
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC,
+ .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC}
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules[] = {
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
.flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
- {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ, .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID,
- .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
+};
+
+static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules[] = {
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = MMAP_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = BPRM_CHECK, .mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_EUID},
+ {.action = MEASURE, .func = FILE_CHECK, .mask = MAY_READ,
+ .uid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_INMASK | IMA_UID},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = MODULE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
{.action = MEASURE, .func = FIRMWARE_CHECK, .flags = IMA_FUNC},
};
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = BINFMTFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = SELINUX_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = NSFS_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
{.action = DONT_APPRAISE, .fsmagic = CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
{.action = APPRAISE, .fowner = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, .flags = IMA_FOWNER},
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_rules_mutex);
-static bool ima_use_tcb __initdata;
+static int ima_policy __initdata;
static int __init default_measure_policy_setup(char *str)
{
- ima_use_tcb = 1;
+ if (ima_policy)
+ return 1;
+
+ ima_policy = ORIGINAL_TCB;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);
+static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
+{
+ if (ima_policy)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (strcmp(str, "tcb") == 0)
+ ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup);
+
static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata;
static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str)
{
if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) &&
(rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR))
return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) &&
+ (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR))
+ return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
&& rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
return false;
return false;
if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
return false;
+ if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) {
+ if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) {
+ if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid)
+ && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid))
+ return false;
+ } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid))
+ return false;
+ }
+
if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid))
return false;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
{
int i, measure_entries, appraise_entries;
- /* if !ima_use_tcb set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
- measure_entries = ima_use_tcb ? ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules) : 0;
+ /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
+ measure_entries = ima_policy ? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules) : 0;
appraise_entries = ima_use_appraise_tcb ?
ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules) : 0;
- for (i = 0; i < measure_entries + appraise_entries; i++) {
- if (i < measure_entries)
- list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list,
- &ima_default_rules);
- else {
- int j = i - measure_entries;
+ for (i = 0; i < measure_entries; i++)
+ list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules[i].list, &ima_default_rules);
- list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[j].list,
+ switch (ima_policy) {
+ case ORIGINAL_TCB:
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules); i++)
+ list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules[i].list,
&ima_default_rules);
- }
+ break;
+ case DEFAULT_TCB:
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules); i++)
+ list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < appraise_entries; i++) {
+ list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules[i].list,
+ &ima_default_rules);
}
ima_rules = &ima_default_rules;
Opt_audit,
Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
- Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner,
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
+ Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio
};
{Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
{Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"},
{Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+ {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"},
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *from;
char *p;
int result = 0;
if (entry->mask)
result = -EINVAL;
- if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+ from = args[0].from;
+ if (*from == '^')
+ from++;
+
+ if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_READ;
- else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
else
result = -EINVAL;
if (!result)
- entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+ entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^')
+ ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK;
break;
case Opt_fsmagic:
ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from);
break;
case Opt_uid:
ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from);
+ case Opt_euid:
+ if (token == Opt_euid)
+ ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from);
if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) {
result = -EINVAL;
result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
if (!result) {
- entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum);
- if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum))
+ entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
+ (uid_t) lnum);
+ if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) ||
+ (uid_t)lnum != lnum)
result = -EINVAL;
else
- entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+ entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid)
+ ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID;
}
break;
case Opt_fowner:
enum data_formats datafmt,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
- u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data, buflen = field_data->len;
+ u8 *buf_ptr = field_data->data;
+ u32 buflen = field_data->len;
switch (datafmt) {
case DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO:
/*
* This function writes the digest of an event (with size limit).
*/
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
struct {
memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
- if (!iint) /* recording a violation. */
+ if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
goto out;
- if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
- cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
- cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+ if (ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo)) {
+ cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+ cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
goto out;
}
- if (!file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
+ if (!event_data->file) /* missing info to re-calculate the digest */
return -EINVAL;
- inode = file_inode(file);
+ inode = file_inode(event_data->file);
hash.hdr.algo = ima_template_hash_algo_allowed(ima_hash_algo) ?
ima_hash_algo : HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
- result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr);
+ result = ima_calc_file_hash(event_data->file, &hash.hdr);
if (result) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode,
- filename, "collect_data",
+ event_data->filename, "collect_data",
"failed", result, 0);
return result;
}
/*
* This function writes the digest of an event (without size limit).
*/
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data)
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
u8 *cur_digest = NULL, hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
u32 cur_digestsize = 0;
- /* If iint is NULL, we are recording a violation. */
- if (!iint)
+ if (event_data->violation) /* recording a violation. */
goto out;
- cur_digest = iint->ima_hash->digest;
- cur_digestsize = iint->ima_hash->length;
+ cur_digest = event_data->iint->ima_hash->digest;
+ cur_digestsize = event_data->iint->ima_hash->length;
- hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
+ hash_algo = event_data->iint->ima_hash->algo;
out:
return ima_eventdigest_init_common(cur_digest, cur_digestsize,
hash_algo, field_data);
}
-static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
+static int ima_eventname_init_common(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data,
bool size_limit)
{
const char *cur_filename = NULL;
u32 cur_filename_len = 0;
- BUG_ON(filename == NULL && file == NULL);
+ BUG_ON(event_data->filename == NULL && event_data->file == NULL);
- if (filename) {
- cur_filename = filename;
- cur_filename_len = strlen(filename);
+ if (event_data->filename) {
+ cur_filename = event_data->filename;
+ cur_filename_len = strlen(event_data->filename);
if (!size_limit || cur_filename_len <= IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX)
goto out;
}
- if (file) {
- cur_filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
+ if (event_data->file) {
+ cur_filename = event_data->file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
cur_filename_len = strlen(cur_filename);
} else
/*
/*
* This function writes the name of an event (with size limit).
*/
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
- return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
- field_data, true);
+ return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, true);
}
/*
* This function writes the name of an event (without size limit).
*/
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
- return ima_eventname_init_common(iint, file, filename,
- field_data, false);
+ return ima_eventname_init_common(event_data, field_data, false);
}
/*
* ima_eventsig_init - include the file signature as part of the template data
*/
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data)
{
enum data_formats fmt = DATA_FMT_HEX;
+ struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = event_data->xattr_value;
+ int xattr_len = event_data->xattr_len;
int rc = 0;
if ((!xattr_value) || (xattr_value->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
void ima_show_template_sig(struct seq_file *m, enum ima_show_type show,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventname_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
- struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len, struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventdigest_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
+ struct ima_field_data *field_data);
+int ima_eventname_ng_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
-int ima_eventsig_init(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
- const unsigned char *filename,
- struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len,
+int ima_eventsig_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_field_data *field_data);
#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_TEMPLATE_LIB_H */
const char *digest, int digestlen);
int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id);
-int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, char *path);
+int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path);
#else
static inline int integrity_digsig_verify(const unsigned int id,
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
+/* Maximum number of letters for an LSM name string */
+#define SECURITY_NAME_MAX 10
+
/* Boot-time LSM user choice */
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
-static struct security_operations *security_ops;
-static struct security_operations default_security_ops = {
- .name = "default",
-};
-
-static inline int __init verify(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
- /* verify the security_operations structure exists */
- if (!ops)
- return -EINVAL;
- security_fixup_ops(ops);
- return 0;
-}
-
static void __init do_security_initcalls(void)
{
initcall_t *call;
*/
int __init security_init(void)
{
- printk(KERN_INFO "Security Framework initialized\n");
+ pr_info("Security Framework initialized\n");
- security_fixup_ops(&default_security_ops);
- security_ops = &default_security_ops;
+ /*
+ * Always load the capability module.
+ */
+ capability_add_hooks();
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+ /*
+ * If Yama is configured for stacking load it next.
+ */
+ yama_add_hooks();
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Load the chosen module if there is one.
+ * This will also find yama if it is stacking
+ */
do_security_initcalls();
return 0;
}
-void reset_security_ops(void)
-{
- security_ops = &default_security_ops;
-}
-
/* Save user chosen LSM */
static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
{
/**
* security_module_enable - Load given security module on boot ?
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_operations that is to be checked.
+ * @module: the name of the module
*
* Each LSM must pass this method before registering its own operations
* to avoid security registration races. This method may also be used
* choose an alternate LSM at boot time.
* Otherwise, return false.
*/
-int __init security_module_enable(struct security_operations *ops)
+int __init security_module_enable(const char *module)
{
- return !strcmp(ops->name, chosen_lsm);
+ return !strcmp(module, chosen_lsm);
}
-/**
- * register_security - registers a security framework with the kernel
- * @ops: a pointer to the struct security_options that is to be registered
+/*
+ * Hook list operation macros.
*
- * This function allows a security module to register itself with the
- * kernel security subsystem. Some rudimentary checking is done on the @ops
- * value passed to this function. You'll need to check first if your LSM
- * is allowed to register its @ops by calling security_module_enable(@ops).
+ * call_void_hook:
+ * This is a hook that does not return a value.
*
- * If there is already a security module registered with the kernel,
- * an error will be returned. Otherwise %0 is returned on success.
+ * call_int_hook:
+ * This is a hook that returns a value.
*/
-int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
-{
- if (verify(ops)) {
- printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s could not verify "
- "security_operations structure.\n", __func__);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (security_ops != &default_security_ops)
- return -EAGAIN;
- security_ops = ops;
-
- return 0;
-}
+#define call_void_hook(FUNC, ...) \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) \
+ P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
+#define call_int_hook(FUNC, IRC, ...) ({ \
+ int RC = IRC; \
+ do { \
+ struct security_hook_list *P; \
+ \
+ list_for_each_entry(P, &security_hook_heads.FUNC, list) { \
+ RC = P->hook.FUNC(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if (RC != 0) \
+ break; \
+ } \
+ } while (0); \
+ RC; \
+})
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
{
- return security_ops->binder_set_context_mgr(mgr);
+ return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to)
{
- return security_ops->binder_transaction(from, to);
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to)
{
- return security_ops->binder_transfer_binder(from, to);
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
}
int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->binder_transfer_file(from, to, file);
+ return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
}
int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- int rc;
- rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode);
}
int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- int rc;
- rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent);
}
int security_capget(struct task_struct *target,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- return security_ops->capset(new, old,
- effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old,
+ effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
}
int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->quotactl(cmds, type, id, sb);
+ return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb);
}
int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->quota_on(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry);
}
int security_syslog(int type)
{
- return security_ops->syslog(type);
+ return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type);
}
int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
- return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
+ return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz);
}
int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
- return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int cap_sys_admin = 1;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * The module will respond with a positive value if
+ * it thinks the __vm_enough_memory() call should be
+ * made with the cap_sys_admin set. If all of the modules
+ * agree that it should be set it will. If any module
+ * thinks it should not be set it won't.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ cap_sys_admin = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
}
int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_set_creds, 0, bprm);
}
int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
+ ret = call_int_hook(bprm_check_security, 0, bprm);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_bprm_check(bprm);
void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm);
}
void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- security_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
+ call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm);
}
int security_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- return security_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm);
+ return call_int_hook(bprm_secureexec, 0, bprm);
}
int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->sb_alloc_security(sb);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_alloc_security, 0, sb);
}
void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb)
{
- security_ops->sb_free_security(sb);
+ call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb);
}
int security_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
{
- return security_ops->sb_copy_data(orig, copy);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_copy_data, 0, orig, copy);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_copy_data);
int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_remount(sb, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_remount, 0, sb, data);
}
int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_kern_mount(sb, flags, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb, flags, data);
}
int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
{
- return security_ops->sb_show_options(m, sb);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb);
}
int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry);
}
int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
{
- return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
}
int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
- return security_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags);
}
int security_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
{
- return security_ops->sb_pivotroot(old_path, new_path);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path);
}
int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
unsigned long kern_flags,
unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
- return security_ops->sb_set_mnt_opts(sb, opts, kern_flags,
- set_kern_flags);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts,
+ opts->num_mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb,
+ opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts);
int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
struct super_block *newsb)
{
- return security_ops->sb_clone_mnt_opts(oldsb, newsb);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts);
int security_sb_parse_opts_str(char *options, struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
{
- return security_ops->sb_parse_opts_str(options, opts);
+ return call_int_hook(sb_parse_opts_str, 0, options, opts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_parse_opts_str);
int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
{
inode->i_security = NULL;
- return security_ops->inode_alloc_security(inode);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_alloc_security, 0, inode);
}
void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
{
integrity_inode_free(inode);
- security_ops->inode_free_security(inode);
+ call_void_hook(inode_free_security, inode);
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name,
- ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
+ name, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
return 0;
if (!initxattrs)
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
- ret = security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
&lsm_xattr->name,
&lsm_xattr->value,
&lsm_xattr->value_len);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, name, value,
- len);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, 0, inode, dir, qstr,
+ name, value, len);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ return call_int_hook(path_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(path_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
}
int security_path_unlink(struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(path_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+ return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_link(old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry);
}
int security_path_rename(struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
return 0;
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
- int err = security_ops->path_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
- old_dir, old_dentry);
+ int err = call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
+ old_dir, old_dentry);
if (err)
return err;
}
- return security_ops->path_rename(old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
- new_dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir,
+ new_dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_truncate(path);
+ return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path);
}
int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode);
}
int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->path_chown(path, uid, gid);
+ return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid);
}
int security_path_chroot(struct path *path)
{
- return security_ops->path_chroot(path);
+ return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path);
}
#endif
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_create, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
}
int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry);
}
int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_symlink(dir, dentry, old_name);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name);
}
int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mkdir, 0, dir, dentry, mode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_rmdir(dir, dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry);
}
int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
}
int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
return 0;
if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) {
- int err = security_ops->inode_rename(new_dir, new_dentry,
+ int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry,
old_dir, old_dentry);
if (err)
return err;
}
- return security_ops->inode_rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
+ return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry,
new_dir, new_dentry);
}
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry);
}
int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, inode, rcu);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu);
}
int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask);
}
int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_setattr, 0, dentry, attr);
if (ret)
return ret;
return evm_inode_setattr(dentry, attr);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_getattr(path);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path);
}
int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ /*
+ * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+ * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+ */
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, 1, dentry, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+
+ if (ret == 1)
+ ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return;
- security_ops->inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+ call_void_hook(inode_post_setxattr, dentry, name, value, size, flags);
evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
}
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_getxattr(dentry, name);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name);
}
int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_listxattr(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry);
}
int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
return 0;
- ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+ /*
+ * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call,
+ * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so.
+ */
+ ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, 1, dentry, name);
+ if (ret == 1)
+ ret = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry);
}
int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
{
- return security_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, dentry);
}
int security_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
+ buffer, alloc);
}
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return security_ops->inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
+ value, size, flags);
}
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
{
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
- return security_ops->inode_listsecurity(inode, buffer, buffer_size);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_listsecurity, 0, inode, buffer, buffer_size);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity);
void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+ call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid);
}
int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->file_permission(file, mask);
+ ret = call_int_hook(file_permission, 0, file, mask);
if (ret)
return ret;
int security_file_alloc(struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->file_alloc_security(file);
+ return call_int_hook(file_alloc_security, 0, file);
}
void security_file_free(struct file *file)
{
- security_ops->file_free_security(file);
+ call_void_hook(file_free_security, file);
}
int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+ return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
}
static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
unsigned long flags)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+ ret = call_int_hook(mmap_file, 0, file, prot,
mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+ return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr);
}
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
- return security_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
+ return call_int_hook(file_mprotect, 0, vma, reqprot, prot);
}
int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->file_lock(file, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd);
}
int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- return security_ops->file_fcntl(file, cmd, arg);
+ return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg);
}
void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
{
- security_ops->file_set_fowner(file);
+ call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file);
}
int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig)
{
- return security_ops->file_send_sigiotask(tsk, fown, sig);
+ return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig);
}
int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
{
- return security_ops->file_receive(file);
+ return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file);
}
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred);
+ ret = call_int_hook(file_open, 0, file, cred);
if (ret)
return ret;
int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
+ return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
}
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- yama_task_free(task);
-#endif
- security_ops->task_free(task);
+ call_void_hook(task_free, task);
}
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return security_ops->cred_alloc_blank(cred, gfp);
+ return call_int_hook(cred_alloc_blank, 0, cred, gfp);
}
void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
{
- security_ops->cred_free(cred);
+ call_void_hook(cred_free, cred);
}
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp)
{
- return security_ops->cred_prepare(new, old, gfp);
+ return call_int_hook(cred_prepare, 0, new, old, gfp);
}
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- security_ops->cred_transfer(new, old);
+ call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old);
}
int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_create_files_as(new, inode);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode);
}
int security_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->kernel_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_fw_from_file, 0, file, buf, size);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_fw_from_file(file, buf, size);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
{
- return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
+ return call_int_hook(kernel_module_request, 0, kmod_name);
}
int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
{
int ret;
- ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file);
+ ret = call_int_hook(kernel_module_from_file, 0, file);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_module_check(file);
int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
int flags)
{
- return security_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags);
}
int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
- return security_ops->task_setpgid(p, pgid);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid);
}
int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getpgid(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p);
}
int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getsid(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p);
}
void security_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->task_getsecid(p, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(task_getsecid, p, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid);
int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- return security_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice);
}
int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- return security_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio);
}
int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getioprio(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p);
}
int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
- return security_ops->task_setrlimit(p, resource, new_rlim);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim);
}
int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_setscheduler(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p);
}
int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_getscheduler(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p);
}
int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_movememory(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p);
}
int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
int sig, u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, secid);
}
int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
- return security_ops->task_wait(p);
+ return call_int_hook(task_wait, 0, p);
}
int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- int rc;
- rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
- if (rc != -ENOSYS)
- return rc;
-#endif
- return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ int thisrc;
+ int rc = -ENOSYS;
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.task_prctl, list) {
+ thisrc = hp->hook.task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+ if (thisrc != -ENOSYS) {
+ rc = thisrc;
+ if (thisrc != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rc;
}
void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
{
- security_ops->task_to_inode(p, inode);
+ call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode);
}
int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
{
- return security_ops->ipc_permission(ipcp, flag);
+ return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag);
}
void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
{
- security_ops->ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid);
}
int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_msg_alloc_security, 0, msg);
}
void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg)
{
- security_ops->msg_msg_free_security(msg);
+ call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg);
}
int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_alloc_security(msq);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_alloc_security, 0, msq);
}
void security_msg_queue_free(struct msg_queue *msq)
{
- security_ops->msg_queue_free_security(msq);
+ call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq);
}
int security_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_associate(msq, msqflg);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgctl(msq, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq,
struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgsnd(msq, msg, msqflg);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg);
}
int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
{
- return security_ops->msg_queue_msgrcv(msq, msg, target, type, mode);
+ return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode);
}
int security_shm_alloc(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
- return security_ops->shm_alloc_security(shp);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_alloc_security, 0, shp);
}
void security_shm_free(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
{
- security_ops->shm_free_security(shp);
+ call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp);
}
int security_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
{
- return security_ops->shm_associate(shp, shmflg);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg);
}
int security_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->shm_shmctl(shp, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd);
}
int security_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
- return security_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
+ return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
}
int security_sem_alloc(struct sem_array *sma)
{
- return security_ops->sem_alloc_security(sma);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_alloc_security, 0, sma);
}
void security_sem_free(struct sem_array *sma)
{
- security_ops->sem_free_security(sma);
+ call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma);
}
int security_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
{
- return security_ops->sem_associate(sma, semflg);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg);
}
int security_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
{
- return security_ops->sem_semctl(sma, cmd);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd);
}
int security_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
unsigned nsops, int alter)
{
- return security_ops->sem_semop(sma, sops, nsops, alter);
+ return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter);
}
void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
{
if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return;
- security_ops->d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
+ call_void_hook(d_instantiate, dentry, inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate);
int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
{
- return security_ops->getprocattr(p, name, value);
+ return call_int_hook(getprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value);
}
int security_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t size)
{
- return security_ops->setprocattr(p, name, value, size);
+ return call_int_hook(setprocattr, -EINVAL, p, name, value, size);
}
int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return security_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb);
}
int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)
{
- return security_ops->ismaclabel(name);
+ return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel);
int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
{
- return security_ops->secid_to_secctx(secid, secdata, seclen);
+ return call_int_hook(secid_to_secctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, secid, secdata,
+ seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx);
int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->secctx_to_secid(secdata, seclen, secid);
+ *secid = 0;
+ return call_int_hook(secctx_to_secid, 0, secdata, seclen, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid);
void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
- security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
+ call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx);
int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_notifysecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx);
int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_setsecctx(dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx);
int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
- return security_ops->inode_getsecctx(inode, ctx, ctxlen);
+ return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx);
int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
{
- return security_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
+ return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect);
int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
{
- return security_ops->unix_may_send(sock, other);
+ return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send);
int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- return security_ops->socket_create(family, type, protocol, kern);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern);
}
int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
int type, int protocol, int kern)
{
- return security_ops->socket_post_create(sock, family, type,
+ return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type,
protocol, kern);
}
int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- return security_ops->socket_bind(sock, address, addrlen);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
}
int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
- return security_ops->socket_connect(sock, address, addrlen);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen);
}
int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
{
- return security_ops->socket_listen(sock, backlog);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog);
}
int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_accept(sock, newsock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock);
}
int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size)
{
- return security_ops->socket_sendmsg(sock, msg, size);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size);
}
int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
int size, int flags)
{
- return security_ops->socket_recvmsg(sock, msg, size, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags);
}
int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getsockname(sock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock);
}
int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeername(sock);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock);
}
int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
}
int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
{
- return security_ops->socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname);
}
int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
{
- return security_ops->socket_shutdown(sock, how);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how);
}
int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- return security_ops->socket_sock_rcv_skb(sk, skb);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb);
int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_stream(sock, optval, optlen, len);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_stream, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock,
+ optval, optlen, len);
}
int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, skb, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, 0, sock, skb, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
{
- return security_ops->sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
+ return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority);
}
void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk)
{
- security_ops->sk_free_security(sk);
+ call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk);
}
void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
{
- security_ops->sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+ call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_clone);
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
{
- security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
+ call_void_hook(sk_getsecid, sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi *fl)
{
- security_ops->req_classify_flow(req, fl);
+ call_void_hook(req_classify_flow, req, fl);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow);
void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
{
- security_ops->sock_graft(sk, parent);
+ call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft);
int security_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req)
{
- return security_ops->inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
+ return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request);
void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
const struct request_sock *req)
{
- security_ops->inet_csk_clone(newsk, req);
+ call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req);
}
void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- security_ops->inet_conn_established(sk, skb);
+ call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
}
int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->secmark_relabel_packet(secid);
+ return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet);
void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
{
- security_ops->secmark_refcount_inc();
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc);
void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
{
- security_ops->secmark_refcount_dec();
+ call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_alloc_security(security);
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
{
- security_ops->tun_dev_free_security(security);
+ call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
int security_tun_dev_create(void)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_attach_queue(security);
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk, security);
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
{
- return security_ops->tun_dev_open(security);
+ return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx,
gfp_t gfp)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, 0, ctxp, sec_ctx, gfp);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old_ctx, new_ctxp);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp);
}
void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(ctx);
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx);
}
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc(x, sec_ctx);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc, 0, x, sec_ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc);
int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(x, polsec, secid);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid);
}
int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_delete_security(x);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete);
void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
- security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
+ call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x);
}
int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(ctx, fl_secid, dir);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid, dir);
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
const struct flowi *fl)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Since this function is expected to return 0 or 1, the judgment
+ * becomes difficult if multiple LSMs supply this call. Fortunately,
+ * we can use the first LSM's judgment because currently only SELinux
+ * supplies this call.
+ *
+ * For speed optimization, we explicitly break the loop rather than
+ * using the macro
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
}
int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, secid, 1);
+ return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1);
}
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
- int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
+ int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &fl->flowi_secid,
+ 0);
BUG_ON(rc);
}
int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned long flags)
{
- return security_ops->key_alloc(key, cred, flags);
+ return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags);
}
void security_key_free(struct key *key)
{
- security_ops->key_free(key);
+ call_void_hook(key_free, key);
}
int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
{
- return security_ops->key_permission(key_ref, cred, perm);
+ return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, perm);
}
int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
{
- return security_ops->key_getsecurity(key, _buffer);
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_known(krule);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
{
- security_ops->audit_rule_free(lsmrule);
+ call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
- return security_ops->audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, lsmrule, actx);
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule,
+ actx);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads = {
+ .binder_set_context_mgr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_set_context_mgr),
+ .binder_transaction =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transaction),
+ .binder_transfer_binder =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_binder),
+ .binder_transfer_file =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.binder_transfer_file),
+
+ .ptrace_access_check =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_access_check),
+ .ptrace_traceme =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ptrace_traceme),
+ .capget = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capget),
+ .capset = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capset),
+ .capable = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.capable),
+ .quotactl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quotactl),
+ .quota_on = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.quota_on),
+ .syslog = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.syslog),
+ .settime = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.settime),
+ .vm_enough_memory =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.vm_enough_memory),
+ .bprm_set_creds =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_set_creds),
+ .bprm_check_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_check_security),
+ .bprm_secureexec =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_secureexec),
+ .bprm_committing_creds =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committing_creds),
+ .bprm_committed_creds =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.bprm_committed_creds),
+ .sb_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_alloc_security),
+ .sb_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_free_security),
+ .sb_copy_data = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_copy_data),
+ .sb_remount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_remount),
+ .sb_kern_mount =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_kern_mount),
+ .sb_show_options =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_show_options),
+ .sb_statfs = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_statfs),
+ .sb_mount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_mount),
+ .sb_umount = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_umount),
+ .sb_pivotroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_pivotroot),
+ .sb_set_mnt_opts =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_set_mnt_opts),
+ .sb_clone_mnt_opts =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+ .sb_parse_opts_str =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sb_parse_opts_str),
+ .dentry_init_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
+ .path_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_unlink),
+ .path_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mkdir),
+ .path_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rmdir),
+ .path_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_mknod),
+ .path_truncate =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_truncate),
+ .path_symlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_symlink),
+ .path_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_link),
+ .path_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_rename),
+ .path_chmod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chmod),
+ .path_chown = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chown),
+ .path_chroot = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.path_chroot),
+#endif
+ .inode_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_alloc_security),
+ .inode_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_free_security),
+ .inode_init_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_init_security),
+ .inode_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_create),
+ .inode_link = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_link),
+ .inode_unlink = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_unlink),
+ .inode_symlink =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_symlink),
+ .inode_mkdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mkdir),
+ .inode_rmdir = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rmdir),
+ .inode_mknod = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_mknod),
+ .inode_rename = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_rename),
+ .inode_readlink =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_readlink),
+ .inode_follow_link =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_follow_link),
+ .inode_permission =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_permission),
+ .inode_setattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setattr),
+ .inode_getattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getattr),
+ .inode_setxattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setxattr),
+ .inode_post_setxattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_post_setxattr),
+ .inode_getxattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getxattr),
+ .inode_listxattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listxattr),
+ .inode_removexattr =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_removexattr),
+ .inode_need_killpriv =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_need_killpriv),
+ .inode_killpriv =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_killpriv),
+ .inode_getsecurity =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity),
+ .inode_setsecurity =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity),
+ .inode_listsecurity =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_listsecurity),
+ .inode_getsecid =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid),
+ .file_permission =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_permission),
+ .file_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_alloc_security),
+ .file_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_free_security),
+ .file_ioctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_ioctl),
+ .mmap_addr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_addr),
+ .mmap_file = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.mmap_file),
+ .file_mprotect =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_mprotect),
+ .file_lock = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_lock),
+ .file_fcntl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_fcntl),
+ .file_set_fowner =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_set_fowner),
+ .file_send_sigiotask =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_send_sigiotask),
+ .file_receive = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_receive),
+ .file_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.file_open),
+ .task_create = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_create),
+ .task_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_free),
+ .cred_alloc_blank =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_alloc_blank),
+ .cred_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_free),
+ .cred_prepare = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_prepare),
+ .cred_transfer =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.cred_transfer),
+ .kernel_act_as =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as),
+ .kernel_create_files_as =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_create_files_as),
+ .kernel_fw_from_file =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_fw_from_file),
+ .kernel_module_request =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_request),
+ .kernel_module_from_file =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.kernel_module_from_file),
+ .task_fix_setuid =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_fix_setuid),
+ .task_setpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setpgid),
+ .task_getpgid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getpgid),
+ .task_getsid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsid),
+ .task_getsecid =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getsecid),
+ .task_setnice = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setnice),
+ .task_setioprio =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setioprio),
+ .task_getioprio =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getioprio),
+ .task_setrlimit =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setrlimit),
+ .task_setscheduler =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_setscheduler),
+ .task_getscheduler =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_getscheduler),
+ .task_movememory =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_movememory),
+ .task_kill = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_kill),
+ .task_wait = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_wait),
+ .task_prctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_prctl),
+ .task_to_inode =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.task_to_inode),
+ .ipc_permission =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_permission),
+ .ipc_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid),
+ .msg_msg_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_alloc_security),
+ .msg_msg_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_msg_free_security),
+ .msg_queue_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_alloc_security),
+ .msg_queue_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_free_security),
+ .msg_queue_associate =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_associate),
+ .msg_queue_msgctl =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgctl),
+ .msg_queue_msgsnd =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgsnd),
+ .msg_queue_msgrcv =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.msg_queue_msgrcv),
+ .shm_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_alloc_security),
+ .shm_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_free_security),
+ .shm_associate =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_associate),
+ .shm_shmctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmctl),
+ .shm_shmat = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.shm_shmat),
+ .sem_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_alloc_security),
+ .sem_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_free_security),
+ .sem_associate =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_associate),
+ .sem_semctl = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semctl),
+ .sem_semop = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sem_semop),
+ .netlink_send = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.netlink_send),
+ .d_instantiate =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.d_instantiate),
+ .getprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.getprocattr),
+ .setprocattr = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.setprocattr),
+ .ismaclabel = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.ismaclabel),
+ .secid_to_secctx =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx),
+ .secctx_to_secid =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid),
+ .release_secctx =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.release_secctx),
+ .inode_notifysecctx =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_notifysecctx),
+ .inode_setsecctx =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_setsecctx),
+ .inode_getsecctx =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx),
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
+ .unix_stream_connect =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_stream_connect),
+ .unix_may_send =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.unix_may_send),
+ .socket_create =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_create),
+ .socket_post_create =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_post_create),
+ .socket_bind = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_bind),
+ .socket_connect =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_connect),
+ .socket_listen =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_listen),
+ .socket_accept =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_accept),
+ .socket_sendmsg =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sendmsg),
+ .socket_recvmsg =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_recvmsg),
+ .socket_getsockname =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockname),
+ .socket_getpeername =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeername),
+ .socket_getsockopt =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getsockopt),
+ .socket_setsockopt =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_setsockopt),
+ .socket_shutdown =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_shutdown),
+ .socket_sock_rcv_skb =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ .socket_getpeersec_stream =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ .socket_getpeersec_dgram =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ .sk_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_alloc_security),
+ .sk_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_free_security),
+ .sk_clone_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_clone_security),
+ .sk_getsecid = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sk_getsecid),
+ .sock_graft = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.sock_graft),
+ .inet_conn_request =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_request),
+ .inet_csk_clone =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_csk_clone),
+ .inet_conn_established =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.inet_conn_established),
+ .secmark_relabel_packet =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet),
+ .secmark_refcount_inc =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_inc),
+ .secmark_refcount_dec =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.secmark_refcount_dec),
+ .req_classify_flow =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.req_classify_flow),
+ .tun_dev_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_alloc_security),
+ .tun_dev_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_free_security),
+ .tun_dev_create =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_create),
+ .tun_dev_attach_queue =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach_queue),
+ .tun_dev_attach =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_attach),
+ .tun_dev_open = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.tun_dev_open),
+ .skb_owned_by = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.skb_owned_by),
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+ .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_alloc_security),
+ .xfrm_policy_clone_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_clone_security),
+ .xfrm_policy_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_free_security),
+ .xfrm_policy_delete_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_delete_security),
+ .xfrm_state_alloc =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc),
+ .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+ .xfrm_state_free_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_free_security),
+ .xfrm_state_delete_security =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_delete_security),
+ .xfrm_policy_lookup =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_policy_lookup),
+ .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+ .xfrm_decode_session =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.xfrm_decode_session),
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ .key_alloc = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_alloc),
+ .key_free = LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_free),
+ .key_permission =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_permission),
+ .key_getsecurity =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.key_getsecurity),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ .audit_rule_init =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init),
+ .audit_rule_known =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_known),
+ .audit_rule_match =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match),
+ .audit_rule_free =
+ LIST_HEAD_INIT(security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free),
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+};
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
/* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
}
if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
- sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
+
+ if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
if (!sbsec->behavior) {
/*
switch (protocol) {
case NETLINK_ROUTE:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
- case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
- return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_NFLOG:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_SELINUX:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_ISCSI:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_AUDIT:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
- case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
- return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_GENERIC:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_RDMA:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
+ case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
+ return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
default:
return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
}
return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *sid)
+static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
+ u16 tclass,
+ u16 flags,
+ u32 *sid)
{
int rc;
+ struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
char *buffer, *path;
buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (IS_ERR(path))
rc = PTR_ERR(path);
else {
- /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
- * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
- * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
- while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
- path[1] = '/';
- path++;
+ if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
+ /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
+ * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
+ * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
+ while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
+ path[1] = '/';
+ path++;
+ }
}
- rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
+ rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
}
free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
return rc;
}
-#else
-static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
- u16 tclass,
- u32 *sid)
-{
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-#endif
/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
- if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
* procfs inodes */
if (opt_dentry)
if (!dentry)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
- rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
+ rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
+ sbsec->flags, &sid);
dput(dentry);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
u32 sid = current_sid();
u32 csid = task_sid(child);
static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
}
static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- int error;
-
- error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
- return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
}
static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
{
- int error;
-
- error = cap_capset(new, old,
- effective, inheritable, permitted);
- if (error)
- return error;
-
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
}
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
- return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
+ return cap_sys_admin;
}
/* binprm security operations */
struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
int rc;
- rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
/* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
* the script interpreter */
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}
- return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+ return !!atsecure;
}
static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
- if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
- __flush_signals(current);
+ if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
+ flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
+ flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
+ recalc_sigpending();
}
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
}
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ if (!error)
+ error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
- int rc;
-
- /* do DAC check on address space usage */
- rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ int rc = 0;
if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
u32 sid = current_sid();
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
}
if (err == -EINVAL) {
printk(KERN_WARNING
"SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
- " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
- sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
+ " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
+ sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
+ secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
err = 0;
}
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- int err;
-
- err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
}
#endif
-static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
- .name = "selinux",
-
- .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
- .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
- .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
- .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
-
- .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
- .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
- .capget = selinux_capget,
- .capset = selinux_capset,
- .capable = selinux_capable,
- .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
- .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
- .syslog = selinux_syslog,
- .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
-
- .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
-
- .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
- .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
- .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
-
- .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
- .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
- .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
- .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
- .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
- .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
- .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
- .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
- .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
- .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
- .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
- .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
-
- .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
-
- .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
- .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
- .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
- .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
- .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
- .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
- .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
- .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
- .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
- .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
- .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
- .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
- .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
- .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
- .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
- .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
- .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
- .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
- .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
- .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
- .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
- .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
- .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
- .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
- .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
-
- .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
- .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
- .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
- .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
- .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
- .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
- .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
- .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
- .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
- .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
- .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
- .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
-
- .file_open = selinux_file_open,
-
- .task_create = selinux_task_create,
- .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
- .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
- .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
- .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
- .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
- .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
- .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
- .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
- .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
- .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
- .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
- .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
- .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
- .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
- .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
- .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
- .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
- .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
- .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
- .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
- .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
-
- .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
- .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
-
- .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
- .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
-
- .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
- .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
- .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
- .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
- .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
- .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
-
- .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
- .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
- .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
- .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
- .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
-
- .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
- .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
- .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
- .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
- .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
-
- .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
-
- .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
- .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
-
- .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
- .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
- .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
- .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
- .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
- .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
- .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
-
- .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
- .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
-
- .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
- .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
- .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
- .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
- .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
- .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
- .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
- .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
- .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
- .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
- .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
- .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
- .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
- .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
- .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
- .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
- .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
- .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
- .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
- .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
- .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
- .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
- .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
- .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
- .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
- .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
- .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
- .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
- .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
- .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
- .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
- .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
- .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
+static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
+ selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
+ selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
- .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
- .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
- .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
- .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
- .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
- .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
- .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
- .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
- .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
- .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
- .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
+ selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
+ selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
- .key_free = selinux_key_free,
- .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
- .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
- .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
- .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
- .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
#endif
};
static __init int selinux_init(void)
{
- if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
+ if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
selinux_enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
avc_init();
- if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
- panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
selinux_disabled = 1;
selinux_enabled = 0;
- reset_security_ops();
+ security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
/* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
avc_disable();
"getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
- "rename", "execute", "swapon", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
+ "rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
"open", "execmod"
#define COMMON_SOCK_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "bind", "connect", \
"listen", "accept", "getopt", "setopt", "shutdown", "recvfrom", \
- "sendto", "recv_msg", "send_msg", "name_bind"
+ "sendto", "name_bind"
#define COMMON_IPC_PERMS "create", "destroy", "getattr", "setattr", "read", \
"write", "associate", "unix_read", "unix_write"
"audit_control", "setfcap", NULL } },
{ "filesystem",
{ "mount", "remount", "unmount", "getattr",
- "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "transition", "associate", "quotamod",
+ "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "associate", "quotamod",
"quotaget", NULL } },
{ "file",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS,
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "tcp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
- "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", "node_bind", "name_connect",
+ "node_bind", "name_connect",
NULL } },
{ "udp_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"node_bind", NULL } },
{ "node",
- { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
- "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "enforce_dest",
- "dccp_recv", "dccp_send", "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
+ { "recvfrom", "sendto", NULL } },
{ "netif",
- { "tcp_recv", "tcp_send", "udp_recv", "udp_send",
- "rawip_recv", "rawip_send", "dccp_recv", "dccp_send",
- "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
+ { "ingress", "egress", NULL } },
{ "netlink_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "packet_socket",
{ "key_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "unix_stream_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", "newconn", "acceptfrom", NULL
- } },
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, "connectto", NULL } },
{ "unix_dgram_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL
- } },
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "sem",
{ COMMON_IPC_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "msg", { "send", "receive", NULL } },
{ "netlink_route_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
- { "netlink_firewall_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
- "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
{ "netlink_tcpdiag_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
"nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
{ "netlink_selinux_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_iscsi_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "netlink_audit_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
"nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", "nlmsg_relay", "nlmsg_readpriv",
"nlmsg_tty_audit", NULL } },
- { "netlink_ip6fw_socket",
- { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
- "nlmsg_read", "nlmsg_write", NULL } },
+ { "netlink_fib_lookup_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_connector_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_netfilter_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "netlink_dnrt_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "association",
{ "sendto", "recvfrom", "setcontext", "polmatch", NULL } },
{ "netlink_kobject_uevent_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_generic_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_scsitransport_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_rdma_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "netlink_crypto_socket",
+ { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "appletalk_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "packet",
/* Non-mount related flags */
#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x0100
#define SE_SBPROC 0x0200
+#define SE_SBGENFS 0x0400
#define CONTEXT_STR "context="
#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
};
+struct smack_onlycap {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct smack_known *smk_label;
+};
+
/*
* Mount options
*/
struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_privileged(int cap);
/*
* Shared data.
extern int smack_cipso_direct;
extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
-extern struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
extern struct list_head smk_netlbladdr_list;
-extern struct security_operations smack_ops;
+extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
}
/*
- * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
- * by the onlycap rule.
- */
-static inline int smack_privileged(int cap)
-{
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
-
- if (!capable(cap))
- return 0;
- if (smack_onlycap == NULL || smack_onlycap == skp)
- return 1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
* logging functions
*/
#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
* @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
*
* Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
- * matches the passed string.
+ * matches the passed string or NULL if not found.
*/
struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
{
* @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label
* @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
*
- * Returns a pointer to the clean label, or NULL
+ * Returns a pointer to the clean label or an error code.
*/
char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
{
* including /smack/cipso and /smack/cipso2
*/
if (string[0] == '-')
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
if (string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || string[i] == '/' ||
break;
if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (smack != NULL)
- strncpy(smack, string, i);
+ if (smack == NULL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ strncpy(smack, string, i);
return smack;
}
* @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
*
* Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
- * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary.
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary,
+ * or an error code.
*/
struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
{
int rc;
smack = smk_parse_smack(string, len);
- if (smack == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ if (IS_ERR(smack))
+ return ERR_CAST(smack);
mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
goto freeout;
skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (skp == NULL)
+ if (skp == NULL) {
+ skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
goto freeout;
+ }
skp->smk_known = smack;
skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
* smk_netlbl_mls failed.
*/
kfree(skp);
- skp = NULL;
+ skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
freeout:
kfree(smack);
unlockout:
rcu_read_unlock();
return &smack_known_invalid;
}
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
+ * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
+ * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone.
+ */
+LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
+ */
+int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+
+ if (!capable(cap))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sop, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
+ if (sop->smk_label == skp) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return 0;
+}
* @ip: a pointer to the inode
* @dp: a pointer to the dentry
*
- * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
- * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
+ * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
*/
static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
struct dentry *dp)
struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
if (buffer == NULL)
- return NULL;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
- if (rc > 0)
+ if (rc < 0)
+ skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+ else if (rc == 0)
+ skp = NULL;
+ else
skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
kfree(buffer);
*/
static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
{
- int rc;
struct smack_known *skp;
- rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
- rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
- return rc;
+ return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
}
/**
int rc;
struct smack_known *skp;
- rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
- if (skp != NULL) {
- sp->smk_hat = skp;
- specified = 1;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_hat = skp;
+ specified = 1;
+
} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
- if (skp != NULL) {
- sp->smk_floor = skp;
- specified = 1;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_floor = skp;
+ specified = 1;
+
} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
- if (skp != NULL) {
- sp->smk_default = skp;
- specified = 1;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_default = skp;
+ specified = 1;
+
} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
- if (skp != NULL) {
- sp->smk_root = skp;
- specified = 1;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ specified = 1;
+
} else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSTRANS, strlen(SMK_FSTRANS)) == 0) {
op += strlen(SMK_FSTRANS);
skp = smk_import_entry(op, 0);
- if (skp != NULL) {
- sp->smk_root = skp;
- transmute = 1;
- specified = 1;
- }
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ transmute = 1;
+ specified = 1;
}
}
struct inode_smack *isp;
int rc;
- rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (rc != 0)
- return rc;
-
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
return 0;
static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
- int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
- if (!ret && (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked))
- ret = 1;
+ if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
+ return 1;
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
/*
if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
- if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
(skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
rc = -EINVAL;
}
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
- if (skp != NULL)
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_inode = skp;
else
isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
- if (skp != NULL)
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_task = skp;
else
isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
} else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
- if (skp != NULL)
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
isp->smk_mmap = skp;
else
isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
struct smk_audit_info ad;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
/*
*/
static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
- return rc;
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
}
/**
*/
static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
- return rc;
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
}
/**
*/
static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
- if (rc == 0)
- rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
- return rc;
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
}
/**
return -EINVAL;
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
- if (skp == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
nsp->smk_inode = skp;
*/
dp = dget(opt_dentry);
skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
- if (skp != NULL)
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
final = skp;
/*
* Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
*/
skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
- if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+ if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+ skp == &smack_known_web)
skp = NULL;
isp->smk_task = skp;
+
skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
- if (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)
+ if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+ skp == &smack_known_web)
skp = NULL;
isp->smk_mmap = skp;
return -EINVAL;
skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
- if (skp == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
/*
* No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
return -EINVAL;
skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
- if (skp)
- *rule = skp->smk_known;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+ *rule = skp->smk_known;
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
-struct security_operations smack_ops = {
- .name = "smack",
-
- .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
- .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
- .syslog = smack_syslog,
-
- .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
- .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
- .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data,
- .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount,
- .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs,
-
- .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_committing_creds = smack_bprm_committing_creds,
- .bprm_secureexec = smack_bprm_secureexec,
-
- .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
- .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
- .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
- .inode_link = smack_inode_link,
- .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink,
- .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir,
- .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename,
- .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission,
- .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr,
- .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr,
- .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr,
- .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
- .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
- .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
- .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
- .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
- .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
- .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid,
-
- .file_permission = smack_file_permission,
- .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security,
- .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security,
- .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
- .file_lock = smack_file_lock,
- .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
- .mmap_file = smack_mmap_file,
- .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
- .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
- .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
- .file_receive = smack_file_receive,
-
- .file_open = smack_file_open,
-
- .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
- .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
- .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
- .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
- .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
- .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
- .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
- .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
- .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
- .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid,
- .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice,
- .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio,
- .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio,
- .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler,
- .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler,
- .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
- .task_kill = smack_task_kill,
- .task_wait = smack_task_wait,
- .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
-
- .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
- .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
-
- .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
- .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security,
-
- .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
- .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security,
- .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate,
- .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
- .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
- .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
-
- .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security,
- .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security,
- .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate,
- .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl,
- .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat,
-
- .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security,
- .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security,
- .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate,
- .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
- .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
-
- .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
-
- .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
- .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr,
-
- .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect,
- .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
-
- .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
+struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
- .socket_bind = smack_socket_bind,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
- .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
- .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
- .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
- .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
- .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
- .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security,
- .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security,
- .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft,
- .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request,
- .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
/* key management security hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
- .key_free = smack_key_free,
- .key_permission = smack_key_permission,
- .key_getsecurity = smack_key_getsecurity,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
/* Audit hooks */
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
- .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init,
- .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known,
- .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match,
- .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
- .ismaclabel = smack_ismaclabel,
- .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx,
- .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid,
- .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx,
- .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx,
- .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx,
- .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx,
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
};
struct cred *cred;
struct task_smack *tsp;
- if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
return 0;
smack_enabled = 1;
/*
* Register with LSM
*/
- if (register_security(&smack_ops))
- panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
return 0;
}
*/
int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
-/*
- * Unless a process is running with this label even
- * having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
- * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no label is
- * designated (the NULL case) capabilities apply to
- * everyone. It is expected that the hat (^) label
- * will be used if any label is used.
- */
-struct smack_known *smack_onlycap;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
/*
* Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
* @import: if non-zero, import labels
* @len: label length limit
*
- * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL on failure and -ENOENT when either subject
- * or object is missing.
+ * Returns 0 on success, appropriate error code on failure.
*/
static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
const char *access1, const char *access2,
if (import) {
rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
- if (rule->smk_subject == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_subject))
+ return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_subject);
rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len);
- if (rule->smk_object == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_object))
+ return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_object);
} else {
cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
- if (cp == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(cp))
+ return PTR_ERR(cp);
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
kfree(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
rule->smk_subject = skp;
cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
- if (cp == NULL)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(cp))
+ return PTR_ERR(cp);
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
kfree(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
* @import: if non-zero, import labels
* @tokens: numer of substrings expected in data
*
- * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -ERRNO on failure.
*/
static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
int import, int tokens)
if (data[cnt] == '\0')
/* Unexpected end of data */
- return -1;
+ return -EINVAL;
tok[i] = data + cnt;
while (cnt < count) {
if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
rc = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 1);
- if (rc != 0) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (rc < 0)
goto out;
- }
cnt = count;
} else {
rc = smk_parse_long_rule(data + cnt, &rule, 1, tokens);
- if (rc <= 0) {
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (rc == 0) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
struct list_head *head)
{
struct list_head *list;
+ int i = *pos;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for (list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(head));
+ list != head;
+ list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list))) {
+ if (i-- == 0)
+ return list;
+ }
- /*
- * This is 0 the first time through.
- */
- if (s->index == 0)
- s->private = head;
-
- if (s->private == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- list = s->private;
- if (list_empty(list))
- return NULL;
-
- if (s->index == 0)
- return list->next;
- return list;
+ return NULL;
}
static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
{
struct list_head *list = v;
- if (list_is_last(list, head)) {
- s->private = NULL;
- return NULL;
- }
- s->private = list->next;
- return list->next;
+ ++*pos;
+ list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list));
+
+ return (list == head) ? NULL : list;
}
static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
{
- /* No-op */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_master_list *smlp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LABELLEN);
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_known *skp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
char sep = '/';
int i;
mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock);
skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0);
- if (skp == NULL)
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
goto out;
+ }
if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_known *skp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_known, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
char sep = '/';
int i;
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smk_netlbladdr *skp =
- list_entry(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_netlbladdr, list);
unsigned char *hp = (char *) &skp->smk_host.sin_addr.s_addr;
int maskn;
u32 temp_mask = be32_to_cpu(skp->smk_mask.s_addr);
*/
if (smack[0] != '-') {
skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
- if (skp == NULL) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
goto free_out;
}
} else {
}
skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
- if (skp == NULL) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
goto out;
}
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
-/**
- * smk_read_onlycap - read() for smackfs/onlycap
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
- * @buf: where to put the result
- * @cn: maximum to send along
- * @ppos: where to start
- *
- * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+/*
+ * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
*/
-static ssize_t smk_read_onlycap(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
- size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
{
- char *smack = "";
- ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
- int asize;
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
- if (*ppos != 0)
- return 0;
+static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL)
- smack = smack_onlycap->smk_known;
+static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_onlycap *sop =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_onlycap, list);
- asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+ seq_puts(s, sop->smk_label->smk_known);
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
- if (cn >= asize)
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+ return 0;
+}
- return rc;
+static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
+ .start = onlycap_seq_start,
+ .next = onlycap_seq_next,
+ .show = onlycap_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
+ * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
+ * to the public list.
+ * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
+ *
+ * @public: public list
+ * @private: private list
+ */
+static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
+ struct list_head *private)
+{
+ struct list_head *first, *last;
+
+ if (list_empty(public)) {
+ list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
+ } else {
+ /* Remember public list before replacing it */
+ first = public->next;
+ last = public->prev;
+
+ /* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
+ private->prev->next = public;
+ private->next->prev = public;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
+ public->prev = private->prev;
+
+ synchronize_rcu();
+
+ /* When all readers are done with the old public list,
+ * attach it in place of private */
+ private->next = first;
+ private->prev = last;
+ first->prev = private;
+ last->next = private;
+ }
}
/**
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *data;
- struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(current->cred->security);
+ char *data_parse;
+ char *tok;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_onlycap *sop;
+ struct smack_onlycap *sop2;
+ LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
int rc = count;
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- /*
- * This can be done using smk_access() but is done
- * explicitly for clarity. The smk_access() implementation
- * would use smk_access(smack_onlycap, MAY_WRITE)
- */
- if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
- return -EPERM;
-
data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ kfree(data);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ data_parse = data;
+ while ((tok = strsep(&data_parse, " ")) != NULL) {
+ if (!*tok)
+ continue;
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sop = kzalloc(sizeof(*sop), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sop == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sop->smk_label = skp;
+ list_add_rcu(&sop->list, &list_tmp);
+ }
+ kfree(data);
+
/*
- * Should the null string be passed in unset the onlycap value.
- * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
- * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
- * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
- * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+ * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
+ * that we can pass a null string to unset the onlycap value.
*
- * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+ * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
* so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
+ *
+ * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+ * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
*/
- if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
- rc = -EFAULT;
- else
- smack_onlycap = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))
+ rc = count;
+
+ if (rc >= 0) {
+ mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+ smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(sop, sop2, &list_tmp, list)
+ kfree(sop);
- kfree(data);
return rc;
}
static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
- .read = smk_read_onlycap,
+ .open = smk_open_onlycap,
+ .read = seq_read,
.write = smk_write_onlycap,
- .llseek = default_llseek,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
};
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
char *data;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
int rc = count;
if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
if (data == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto freeout;
+ }
+
/*
- * Should the null string be passed in unset the unconfined value.
- * This seems like something to be careful with as usually
- * smk_import only expects to return NULL for errors. It
- * is usually the case that a nullstring or "\n" would be
- * bad to pass to smk_import but in fact this is useful here.
+ * Clear the smack_unconfined on invalid label errors. This means
+ * that we can pass a null string to unset the unconfined value.
*
- * smk_import will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+ * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
* so "-confine" will also work.
+ *
+ * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
*/
- if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
- rc = -EFAULT;
- else
- smack_unconfined = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
+ skp = NULL;
+ else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto freeout;
+ }
+ smack_unconfined = skp;
+
+freeout:
kfree(data);
return rc;
}
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_rule *srp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN);
res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
rule.smk_access1, NULL);
else if (res != -ENOENT)
- return -EINVAL;
+ return res;
/*
* smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case.
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_master_list *smlp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LONGLABEL);
{
struct list_head *list = v;
struct smack_rule *srp =
- list_entry(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL);
static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- char *data = NULL;
- const char *cp = NULL;
+ char *data;
+ const char *cp;
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_rule *sp;
struct list_head *rule_list;
if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
rc = -EFAULT;
- goto free_out;
+ goto out_data;
}
cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
- if (cp == NULL) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto free_out;
+ if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(cp);
+ goto out_data;
}
skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
if (skp == NULL)
- goto free_out;
+ goto out_cp;
rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
-free_out:
- kfree(data);
+out_cp:
kfree(cp);
+out_data:
+ kfree(data);
+
return rc;
}
rc = -EFAULT;
else {
skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
- if (skp == NULL)
- rc = -EINVAL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
else
- smack_syslog_label = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ smack_syslog_label = skp;
}
kfree(data);
int err;
int rc;
- if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
+ if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
return 0;
err = smk_init_sysfs();
* Copyright (C) 2005-2011 NTT DATA CORPORATION
*/
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include "common.h"
/**
*/
static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
/*
* Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
* operation.
* tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for
* registering TOMOYO.
*/
-static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
- .name = "tomoyo",
- .cred_alloc_blank = tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank,
- .cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
- .cred_transfer = tomoyo_cred_transfer,
- .cred_free = tomoyo_cred_free,
- .bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
- .file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
- .file_open = tomoyo_file_open,
- .path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate,
- .path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink,
- .path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir,
- .path_rmdir = tomoyo_path_rmdir,
- .path_symlink = tomoyo_path_symlink,
- .path_mknod = tomoyo_path_mknod,
- .path_link = tomoyo_path_link,
- .path_rename = tomoyo_path_rename,
- .inode_getattr = tomoyo_inode_getattr,
- .file_ioctl = tomoyo_file_ioctl,
- .path_chmod = tomoyo_path_chmod,
- .path_chown = tomoyo_path_chown,
- .path_chroot = tomoyo_path_chroot,
- .sb_mount = tomoyo_sb_mount,
- .sb_umount = tomoyo_sb_umount,
- .sb_pivotroot = tomoyo_sb_pivotroot,
- .socket_bind = tomoyo_socket_bind,
- .socket_connect = tomoyo_socket_connect,
- .socket_listen = tomoyo_socket_listen,
- .socket_sendmsg = tomoyo_socket_sendmsg,
+static struct security_hook_list tomoyo_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, tomoyo_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, tomoyo_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, tomoyo_cred_transfer),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, tomoyo_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, tomoyo_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, tomoyo_bprm_check_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, tomoyo_file_fcntl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, tomoyo_file_open),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, tomoyo_path_truncate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, tomoyo_path_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, tomoyo_path_mkdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, tomoyo_path_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, tomoyo_path_symlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, tomoyo_path_mknod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, tomoyo_path_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, tomoyo_path_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, tomoyo_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, tomoyo_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chmod, tomoyo_path_chmod),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chown, tomoyo_path_chown),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_chroot, tomoyo_path_chroot),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, tomoyo_sb_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, tomoyo_sb_umount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, tomoyo_sb_pivotroot),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, tomoyo_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, tomoyo_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, tomoyo_socket_listen),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, tomoyo_socket_sendmsg),
};
/* Lock for GC. */
{
struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
- if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+ if (!security_module_enable("tomoyo"))
return 0;
/* register ourselves with the security framework */
- if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
- panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+ security_add_hooks(tomoyo_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(tomoyo_hooks));
printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
tomoyo_mm_init();
*
*/
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
int yama_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
{
- int rc;
+ int rc = -ENOSYS;
struct task_struct *myself = current;
- rc = cap_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
- if (rc != -ENOSYS)
- return rc;
-
switch (option) {
case PR_SET_PTRACER:
/* Since a thread can call prctl(), find the group leader
*
* Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
*/
-int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
+static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
unsigned int mode)
{
- int rc;
-
- /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should
- * only tighten restrictions further.
- */
- rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ int rc = 0;
/* require ptrace target be a child of ptracer on attach */
if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) {
*/
int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
- int rc;
-
- /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should
- * only tighten restrictions further.
- */
- rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ int rc = 0;
/* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
switch (ptrace_scope) {
return rc;
}
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
-static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
- .name = "yama",
-
- .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check,
- .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme,
- .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
- .task_free = yama_task_free,
+static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, yama_task_prctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, yama_task_free),
};
-#endif
+
+void __init yama_add_hooks(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(yama_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(yama_hooks));
+}
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
static int yama_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
static __init int yama_init(void)
{
#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- if (!security_module_enable(&yama_ops))
+ /*
+ * If yama is being stacked this is already taken care of.
+ */
+ if (!security_module_enable("yama"))
return 0;
#endif
-
- printk(KERN_INFO "Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
-
-#ifndef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
- if (register_security(&yama_ops))
- panic("Yama: kernel registration failed.\n");
-#endif
+ pr_info("Yama: becoming mindful.\n");
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
if (!register_sysctl_paths(yama_sysctl_path, yama_sysctl_table))
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